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ABSTRACT
Political theorists have recently become interested in the role of nonhumans in politics, as
evinced in the recent literature on “new materialism”. This literature raises questions such as:
how do nonhumans participate in politics  as more than mere objects,  and what implications
might this suggest for normative concepts like justice? I explore this question by theorizing and
analyzing  the  concept  of  spatial  justice.  The  central  claim  of  spatial  justice  is  that  the
organization of space – a set of material and ideological relations that act on, yet are formed by,
social  relations  –  influences  the  fair  ordering  of  human  relations.  As  such,  it  provides  one
window onto the question of nonhumans and politics. 
I argue that spatial justice is best understood as an analytic lens that illuminates the ways
in which “space” - a term denoting the location of things relative to each other – participates in
the formation of justice claims. Spatial justice is a concept already deployed in geography and
urban  planning,  yet  it  is  most  frequently  understood  as  a  normative  evaluation:  that  any
particular space is just or unjust. I argue that such an understanding of spatial justice simply adds
a not-particularly helpful adjective to some well-worn justice claims – in other words, calling an
injustice spatial merely states that it happens “in space.” I argue that when spatial justice is better
instead understood as an analytic framework, it illuminates the representative effects of the urban
planning process: spatial representations frame justice debates by making certain constituencies
– both human and nonhuman – present in the political process. To make this argument, I engage
authors in critical geography, political theory, and science and technology studies.
vi
I argue that critical environmental scholars and political theorists have much to gain by
incorporating spatial  justice into their  analyses.  I  examine the controversy around the policy
document Detroit Future City (DFC), which literally maps a future for Detroit in which the city’s
widespread vacancy is transformed into sustainable uses. Against both critics and boosters of the
plan, I argue that DFC’s most important effect is to represent the city in its numerous maps,
surveys, and data tables, all of which have already become the subject of debate in the city. DFC
visualizes a Detroit  where low density neighborhoods are part  of a more just city, a marked
departure from dominant  approaches  to  urban planning that  posit  population  increase  as  the
solution to Detroit’s planning problems. I argue that although DFC is unlikely to directly guide
Detroit’s master plan, development, and investment strategy, it has already influenced policy and
activist debates with data and maps that inscribe vacancy into the city. I analyze DFC and its
surrounding controversy to argue that only by understanding spatial justice as an analytic lens
can DFC be appreciated in this productive light. 
My theory of spatial justice informs new materialism by emphasizing the capacity for
nonhumans to participate in politics. I differentiate this participatory approach from a tendency
among new materialists to emphasize the innate capacities of nonhumans to transform human
behavior. Against this latter analysis, in which nonhumans are said to disrupt humans’ ethical and
political  commitments,  I  argue  that  nonhumans  like  spatial  relations  transform the  political
alliances that represent them. Thus spatial justice provides a language for analyzing nonhumans'
emergent political power.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In a 2017 Opinion piece for the New York Times, law professor Bernadette Atuahene
observed a new form of what is by now a tragically familiar pattern for housing in Detroit:
“African-Americans still face housing discrimination in the city and beyond. Another 50 years is
too long to wait for justice.” Atuahene argued that the city has for years levied unconstitutionally
high property tax rates, which, in a city with a staggering proportion of residents living below the
poverty line, led to widespread tax foreclosures in the city. In this context, rosy claims about
Detroit’s economic comeback, as made by Detroit’s Mayor Mike Duggan and others, gloss over
the geographically uneven character of redevelopment:
“What this comeback story omits is that although Detroit is 143 square miles,
only 7.2 square miles are part of the revival. The real story is a tale of two cities.
In downtown and surrounding areas, developers receive tax breaks, incentives and
subsidies to renovate the portion of the city inhabited by newcomers. Meanwhile,
the  neighborhoods  peopled  by  the  residents  who  have  been  holding  the  city
together through its economic turmoil are subject to monumental tax injustice.”
(Atuahene 2017)
While downtown and midtown see massive investment in sports arenas and transit infrastructure,
“the neighborhoods” suffer an ongoing foreclosure crisis that forces many longtime Detroiters
out of their homes. 
Similar critiques of concentrated development and its beneficiaries have occurred before
in Detroit, and could easily be made about most other major urban centers in the country – the
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fiery  critique  of  gentrification  in  the  San  Francisco  Bay  Area,  for  example,  elicits  similar
sentiments about geographically uneven development and its subsequent effects on residential
patterns in that area. Beyond intra-city development, one might also encounter these sorts of
claims along a rural-urban divide, as Kathy Cramer demonstrates in her study of rural Wisconsin
politics  (Cramer Walsh 2012). For the small-town residents of Cramer’s study, “Madison” and
“Milwaukee” are understood as the undeserving others who monopolized the state’s resources
because  of  elite  political  manipulation.  Cramer’s  rural  subjects,  in  turn,  developed  a  “rural
consciousness” that was in part founded on their social and physical distance from Wisconsin’s
metropolitan centers. 
In the case of both Detroit and rural Wisconsin, location is made central to claims about
distributive justice. But what is the role of location in these accounts? What political work is
accomplished by locating actors in justice claims? On the one hand, we can interpret the role of
geographic location as shorthand for well-worn problems of injustice. That is, there is a claim
about  the  unequal  distribution  of  resources  that  benefits  one  particular  geographic  group
(downtown Detroit and metropolitan Wisconsin). In this sense, we can understand geography as
a background concern for politics: the right policies might deliver the right goods to the right
people  and thus  resolve  the  injustices  critiqued above.  Sufficiently  fine-grained maps  might
reveal whether just arrangements have been achieved and when they have been violated. 
On the other hand, we can interpret the role of geography above as doing something more
than simply revealing distributive injustices: the location of actors relative to each other signifies
differences that can bear justice claims in the first place.  For example,  in Cramer’s account,
distance from Wisconsin’s metropolitan centers animates the rural consciousness that eventually
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was mobilized into a resentment capable of electing Governor Scott Walker (Cramer 2016). Less
explicitly  in  Atuahene,  a  difference  between  Detroit’s  newcomers  and  longtime  residents  is
implicitly established geographically: those who suffered under the recession of 2008 and those
who are there to take advantage of Detroit’s supposed renaissance. To make a justice claim on
behalf of the neighborhoods is to tacitly reinforce geographic differences as meaningful ones.
And likewise, stating a geographic position in Detroit is to implicitly make a set of arguments
about interests, history, and social position more generally: when one is from downtown, there is
an implication that one is also new Detroit and relatively well off. Both Cramer and Atuahene
recognize – sometimes explicitly and at other times only implicitly – that group differences and
the justice problems they entail are generated spatially. 
This  dissertation  asks:  to  what  extent  do  spatial  relationships  act  in  politics,  and  in
particular the politics of justice? To answer that question, I theorize the concept spatial justice,
the guiding principle  of  which  is  “the  idea that  justice,  however  it  might  be  defined,  has  a
consequential geography, a spatial expression that is more than just a background reflection or
set  of  physical  attributes  to  be  descriptively  mapped”  (Soja  2010,  1).  In  other  words,  the
organization of space– a set of material and ideological relations that act on, yet are formed by,
social relations – influences the fair ordering of political relations. My answer is that spatial
relations very well can act on the politics of justice, but they do so in the way suggested by the
two examples above: they structure what is knowable as issues of justice and injustice and render
differences visible.
Spatial  justice  is  likely  an  unfamiliar  term  to  political  theorists.   Even  in  its  natal
discipline,  geography,  the  term  is  something  of  a  fringe  concept.  And  yet,  the  individual
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components – space and justice – are terms with rich histories in their respective disciplines.
Space has long been a defining concern of geography; likewise, justice is a well-developed (if
deeply contested) concept in political theory.  Although rarely explicitly theorized together, the
relationship  between  space  and  justice  are  frequently  of  great  importance  to  both  critical
geographers and political theorists. Geographers and spatial theorists have taken an interest in
justice since at least 1968, when Henri Lefebvre argued for a “right to the city” that empowered
city inhabitants to control urban futures  (Purcell 2002). Lefebvre extended this analysis in his
landmark Production of Space (1992), in which he further argued that spatial transformation was
a fundamental component of any social transformation (which implicitly includes those that aim
toward social justice). David Harvey likewise made justice an explicit concern of his 1979 Social
Justice and the City, in which he argued that urban problems – which, Harvey argued, urban
planners  overwhelmingly  conceived  as  natural  problems  of  the  urban  cycle  –  were  in  fact
injustices produced through capitalist accumulation. In the late 1990s, Susan Fainstein invoked
the concept of “just cities” to call attention to the need for planners to attend to the planning
process itself as a site of justice problems (Fainstein 2000, 2011). Fainstein argues that planners
are preoccupied with designing environments rather than on creating meaningful opportunities
for political participation. Fainstein turned “just cities” toward an argument for more democratic
planning. As the above examples show, spatial justice, is the latest incarnation of a longstanding
concern in critical geography to address both the inherently political character of urban planning
(as, for instance, in the just cities account of Susan Fainstein) and to argue for the inherently
spatial character of politics (as it functions in, for instance, Lefebvre’s Production of Space). 
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Despite the insistence of spatial theorists like Lefebvre and Soja that spatial  relations
have profound consequences for politics, political theorists have largely rendered space a silent
partner in their accounts; nevertheless, I will argue in this dissertation that political theorists have
an abiding, if usually only implicit, interest in space. John Rawls’ original position is perhaps the
best example: “Is that position a general assembly which includes at one moment everyone who
lives at the same time? No. Is it a gathering of all actual or possible persons? Plainly not” (Rawls
2001, 81). As this quote exemplifies, Rawls purposefully de-spatializes justice. Yet, as I will
argue  more  fully  in  Chapter  3,  even  while  Rawls  relegates  spatial  considerations  to  the
background, space remains always a silent but critical partner in his account. The irony of the
original position is that it requires us to believe in an everywhere and nowhere from which we
could  agree  on  fair  principles  of  justice.  This  universal  standpoint  is  a  proposition  that
communitarians  would  subsequently  critique,  again  without  explicit  attention  to  the  spatial
metaphors  they  would then take  up.  Although justice has  long been an explicit  concern  for
geographers, space has never occupied political theorists’ attention in quite the same manner.
Spatial justice offers an opportunity to study these two complementary disciplines together. 
Why, though, bother to study spatial justice? What can it illuminate that existing theories 
of justice do not? The most prominent answer to this question is that it can offer a new 
vocabulary for thinking about injustice. Thus, much like “environmental justice” became a 
banner uniting diverse social movements fighting for clean air, water, food supplies, and park 
access in urban centers (to name just a few of its political uses), spatial justice might provide a 
vocabulary and consciousness for social movements committed to transportation access, housing 
equity, and democratic participation in planning. Spatial justice might therefore become a type of
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justice claim used by different political actors. One of the most visible examples of spatial justice
being used this way appears in the Spatial and Land Use Management Act, a unified land use 
policy for South Africa, in which spatial justice figures as a central principle for making land use 
decisions. Spatial justice, urges the document, should direct planning toward just land use 
decisions and inclusive procedures (Republic of South Africa 2013). To the extent spatial justice 
continues to be incorporated into social movements and policy, it may provide a vocabulary for 
critiquing unjust planning practices.
Although spatial justice may in time prove to be an important tool for advocating and
analyzing  injustice,  another  way  of  thinking  about  spatial  justice  receives  relatively  little
attention: spatial justice can be a theoretical and analytic orientation that investigates how spatial
relations participate in justice claims. In other words, spatial justice is a concept that treats the
material apparatus of space as an active participant in politics. This is the interpretive lens I bring
to  bear  on  the  examples  of  Atuahene  and  Cramer,  analyzing  how  justice  claims  there  are
contingent on spatial claims that mark out meaningful differences. In this dissertation, I theorize
this insight and argue that, if treated as an animating principle, it can shed light on complex
political events and the politics of justice.  
In brief, thinking spatially about justice can call attention to how claims about justice
become politically meaningful and legible: how justice claims are contingent on the arrangement
of actors spatially. This concept of spatial justice as productive runs parallel to a recent strain in
democratic theory that argues for the productive power of politics. As one example, consider
Clarissa Hayward’s work on the productive relationship between states and citizens.  Hayward
critiques political scientists who view the state as an entity that merely responds to race, class,
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and other social differences.  She argues that, instead, “states play a critical role in constructing
social identities and differences.  They help define, institutionalize, and order the categories and
the relations that produce and maintain identity/difference” (2003, 501). Recognizing that states
play an active role in making differences, Hayward also argues that those differences are more
and less democratic: 
“They function more democratically when they sort in ways that are relatively
nonhierarchical;  when they  are  amenable  to  change by those  they  affect;  and
when they are permeable, so that the identities and differences they produce are
made present to one another.  Boundaries function less democratically when they
sort  in  ways  that  define  relations  of  privilege  and  deprivation,  power  and
powerlessness, dominance and marginality; when they are relatively resistant to
democratic contestation and change; and when they render difference invisible to
identity, creating seemingly unbridgeable distances among interdependent persons
and groups” (2003, 509).
States create communities that are more or less democratic based on the relations they create
among  citizens.  Similarly,  in  my account  of  spatial  justice,  I  argue  that  difference  is  made
spatially by locating people and things in particular relationships to each other. Such a spatial
proximity, I will argue, helps to arrange what is conceivable as a matter of justice. Spatial justice
can  thus  provide  another  dimension  for  thinking  about  how  political  constituencies  and
subjectivities are made. 
Thinking about spatial justice as productive also sheds light on one particular problem in
contemporary political theory: what has become known as “the actancy of things” as expressed
in the literature on “new materialism.” New materialism takes as its starting point the claim that
agency,  a concept historically  thought  to be specific to  human political action,  is  distributed
across both human and nonhuman entities. Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter, an influential touch-
point in the literature, makes the case that nonhuman entities like microbes, fatty acids, garbage,
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and power lines have a capacity for political action known as “actancy” (Bennett 2010). That is,
such nonhuman entities are not just objects on which human policies act, but also themselves
engage in politics. Bennett’s book is primarily an ontological exploration of that claim, yet it is 
an ontological account with potentially vast political implications:
“What would happen to our thinking about nature if we experienced materialities
as actants, and how would the direction of public policy shift if it attended more
carefully to their trajectories and powers?”  (Bennett 2010, 62)
How would politics and policy change if we recognized that nonhumans have actancy, a capacity
for shaping politics hitherto thought reserved for humans? What normative force, if any, do (or
should) nonhumans exert on politics? Spatial justice is an apt site to address these questions
because it calls attention to the interaction between the material and conceptual category “space”
and the normative category “justice.” Spatial justice directs new materialists to consider not how
humans can be inspired to  adopt  more ethical policies by a greater attunement to the material
world, but instead to how political problems are made present through the making of the material
world.  In  other  words,  redrawing maps can  rearrange both the issues  of  justice  that  can be
articulated and the constituencies who can bear them.
Environmental Justice
In order to show both what spatial justice is and how it can enrich political theory and
political analysis,  in this  section I contrast  spatial  justice with a close cousin: environmental
justice.  Two questions  seem especially  relevant:  Is  there a meaningful  conceptual distinction
between  environmental  justice  and  spatial  justice?  If  so,  how  might  spatial  justice  inform
environmental justice? 
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First, the question of their conceptual distinctness. Given that environmental justice is
applied more and more expansively to encompass issues of transportation access, food security,
democratic  participation,  wildlife,  and  nearly  all  other  aspects  of  the  built  and  unbuilt
environments,  one  might  reasonably  think  that  the  difference  between  EJ  and  SJ  is  merely
semantic. What, if anything, makes them distinct? Although it might be tempting to imagine that
they  are  distinct  content  areas  -  one  concerns  “the  environment”  while  the  other  concerns
“space” -  they are better  conceived as distinct theoretical  orientations with different  analytic
emphases. There are two reasons for thinking of them analytically rather than as content areas.
First EJ has shattered most boundaries around the notion of “environment,” with its historical
connotations of nature  (Schlosberg 2013). Consequently, “environment” is a sufficiently broad
category to include nearly any aspect of the built or unbuilt environment, including whatever
flies under the banner of “space.” Second, as I will argue further in Chapter 2, “space” is best
conceived of as a set of relations among things, where and how things are placed relative to each
other,  not  as  a  “realm” to which or  through which  justice and injustice  can be  done.  Thus,
thinking of “environment” and “space” as distinct content  areas does some violence to  both
concepts.
There is, however, good reason to think of EJ and SJ as separate analytic traditions. Its
academic theorists frame EJ as oriented around two poles: 1) distribution of environmental goods
and bads,  and;  2)  participation  in  decision  making  about  the  environment.  In  an  influential
review article, Sze and London define the basic orientation of EJ as “a critical analysis of power
as it plays out in the (mal)distribution of harms and opportunities related to the environment with
special attention to race and class” (2008, 1348).  Likewise, David Schlosberg argues that recent
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developments in EJ have pushed this analysis to an expanding set of concerns: the goods and
bads in question are more global in scale, more varied in their scope. Although Schlosberg argues
that EJ incorporates an ever-expanding set of goods and bads, Schlosberg has also consistently
argued that EJ has always been about more than simply distribution: EJ analysis has always
crucially included a claim about recognition and participation, about how voices are made to
matter in the political process (2004, 2012). If, then, there is an analytic core to EJ, it concerns
how  environmental  goods  and  bads  are  distributed  and  the  means  by  which  citizens  and
communities are enabled to participate in their distribution. 
Those are valuable questions to ask, but my theory of spatial justice will ultimately not
answer them. Instead, my account of spatial  justice will call  into question how claims about
justice  rely  on  particular  spatial  configurations  like  communities,  neighborhoods,  and
environments, and furthermore how such spatial configurations become politically present. In
Chapter 4, I do so by analyzing the way in which “vacancy” is transformed into “density” in a
planning document in Detroit and specifying the particular justice arrangements supported by
such a transformation. Environmental justice analyses have tended to focus on how particular
goods and bads will be distributed as a consequence of that plan.  
Spatial  justice  can  inform  environmental  justice  theory  and  practice  by  providing  a
vocabulary  for  analyzing  the  site  and  composition  of  justice.  EJ  movements,  argues  David
Schlosberg,  frequently  challenge  notions  of  justice  that  focus  on  individuals  rather  than
communities: “these needs are not simply about individuals, but neighbourhoods, communities,
and the city itself” (2013, 43). And it is here that spatial justice has further questions: how are
those locations made relevant and politically meaningful? How are people and things arranged
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relative to each other, and when are those arrangements made politically relevant? In the case of
DFC, I will argue, spatial justice revealed how “vacancy” is made a salient political issue, and
subsequently how “low density” was proposed as a solution to its problems. In this sense, spatial
justice can enrich the claims of environmental justice advocates by providing a particular set of
questions about how environmental goods and bads are made politically relevant, and how the
communities in question are composed. 
Spatial justice can make explicit what is already implicit in work in EJ: the importance of
space in composing claims about justice.  Gordon Walker  (2009), for instance, argues that the
“first wave” of environmental justice scholarship focused on proximity – how poor and minority
residents were located close to toxic dumps – and the uneven distribution of pollutants.  Walker
argues that environmental justice activists have since broadened their  conception of space to
include considerations of responsibility (where pollutants come from, just as much as where they
are sited), the production of toxic places (how certain locations become marked with “trash”),
and  mapping  participation  (how  to  draw  boundaries  around  affected  communities)  (Walker
2009).  Walker investigates how spatial analytic issues of territory, place, scale, and network
inform, frustrate, and produce a politics of environmental justice.  Scale, in particular, has been a
fruitful  conceptual  tool  for  thinking  spatially  about  environmental  justice  (Heynen  2003;
Bickerstaff and Agyeman 2009; Sze et al. 2009).  A spatial justice approach to the question of
environmental justice provides a distinct set of analytic tools for problematizing environmental
degradation.
Consider the question of climate change, which at its core requires a discussion of the
multiple scales at which climate change is likely to be experienced. In the first place, climate
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change is obviously a global phenomenon: it describes an aggregate rise in global temperatures.
Yet the effects of climate change will be experienced differently across continents, ecosystems,
watersheds, cities, and regions.  Further, any mitigation of or adaptation to climate change will
involve political action at different scales: international regulations on carbon emissions may or
may not ever come to pass, but in the meantime, national, state, and municipal governments are
all offering regulations of their own.  Adaptation to climate change will certainly require policy
action at all of those scales (Adger, Arnell, and Tompkins 2005). The relevant question for spatial
justice  is  how those scales  are made,  deployed,  circulated,  and ground certain  claims about
inequality and not others. Climate change is one especially powerful example of how careful
attention to scale – an analytic for which spatial thinkers have developed thoughtful conceptual
vocabularies – will become increasingly important in assessing environmental politics.  
Chapter Outline
Chapters 2 and 3 theorize spatial justice in some detail. In chapter 2, by interpreting the
existing work on spatial justice, I specify what it means for space to act on social relations. I
argue that there are basically two possible conceptions of spatial justice, only one of which do I
find compelling: spatial justice can be a normative evaluation (this space is just or unjust) or it
can be an analytic framework examining how spatial relations organize justice claims. I argue
that the former simply adds a not-particularly helpful adjective to some well-worn justice claims
– in other words, calling an injustice spatial merely states the that it happens “in space,” a truism
without  much  normative  or  analytic  force.  On  the  other  hand,  as  an  interpretive  lens  to
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investigate  how the  location  of  things  relative  to  each other  modifies  justice  claims,  spatial
justice can offer a new angle on the politics of justice. 
Such a position, however, requires theorizing what it would mean for spatial relations – a
relationship of proximity composed of both humans and nonhumans - to modify anything at all.
In the remainder of that chapter, following the cues of Actor-Network Theorists, I develop what I
call a “geography of associations” to theorize that possibility. I argue that the “space” of spatial
justice is best understood as an assemblage referring to particular locations and relationships of
proximity.  And,  as  with  any other  assemblage,  these  spaces  can  be  understood  to  “act”  on
anything  insofar  as  they  undergo  “translation,”  a  process  whereby  they  are  problematized,
represented, and either consent or refuse to become enlisted in their representation.
In the third chapter, I turn specifically to the question of how space so understood can
intervene in justice. I argue that there are two ways in which that occurs. First, I argue that spatial
representations are at the core of justice claims, both those of philosophers and those made by
political  actors.  As  I  suggested  earlier,  even  John  Rawls'  original  position  is  a  spatial
representation that grounds his basic principles of justice: it would not be possible to imagine a
universal theory of justice in the absence of his everywhere/nowhere spatial imaginary. Likewise,
Michael Walzer's emplaced theory of justice as relies on discrete boundaries. In the absence of
such teritorrially bound political communities, Walzer's pluralist justice would be empty. Thus,
although a certain spatial imaginary is hardly sufficient for or directive of a particular theory of
justice,  all  claims about  justice  will  implicitly  be grounded in spatial  claims.  I  argue in  the
second place that spatial relations are the basis of justice claims in a stronger sense: spaces,
understood as particular locations with the power to act in the way I theorize in Chapter 2, make
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possible certain kinds of justice claims while foreclosing others. That is, “justice” is a claim that
evaluates  how  different  actors  –  hospitals,  educational  opportunity,  race,  toxins,  household
income - are placed relative to each other. Yet, as I argued in chapter 2, space is itself contingent,
not merely a given of some abstract facts, but itself produced. Thus, changing the location of
human and nonhuman actors  relative to  each other  enables  and constrains  different  sorts  of
justice claims. 
In Chapter 4, I  show how that unfolds via one case study: a policy document called
Detroit Future City. I  show how justice claims in it are organized around the specific set of
spatial allies it enrolls, even while those spatial allies are themselves contested. That is, in DFC,
part of the political contest over how to move toward a more just city concerns how to position
people  and things  relative  to  each  other.  For  DFC,  the  relevant  actors  are  vacancy,  service
delivery, transportation networks, grocery stores, and employment opportunities, all of which
placed in particular locations.  For critics, on the other hand, it is instead vacancy translated into
viability,  services  withdrawn  from  neighborhoods,  the  arrival  of  capital.  One  of  the  most
trenchant controversies sparked by DFC concerns how, and whether, to represent vacancy and its
transformation. Through what actors, materials, and distributions is vacancy made an issue of
injustice? And does such an association of vacancy with these different actors change not only
the principle of justice involved, but also Detroit, the location in question? The specific location
of all these different materials makes a tremendous difference to the justice claims possible in
DFC. I show in that chapter how spatial justice is imperative for understanding the controversy
around DFC. In particular, the interpretive account I develop by engaging ANT in Chapter 2
allows  me  to  argue  for  the  representative role  of  DFC,  a  role  that  boosters  and  academic
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observers are unlikely to see when they approach DFC as simply another document that resolves
or reinforces injustices.
I chose to situate my analysis  in Detroit  because it  is a city where themes of spatial
relationships,  justice,  planning,  and  representation  are  deeply  contested  and  highly  visible.
Detroit’s  history  and  present  are  replete  with  the  worst  sorts  of  planning  and  housing
development disasters, including violent discrimination against African Americans, mass white
flight, and ill-fated urban renewal projects. Moreover, Detroit is a city that is often made to mean
something, to represent our American selves back to us. As I will show in Chapter 4, Detroit’s
residents  are  acutely  aware  of  both  the  injustices  heaped  upon  them  and  the  role  that
representation plays in reproducing those injustices. Thus Detroit provides a setting where the
themes of spatial justice are especially visible. 
I chose to analyze DFC in particular because it makes those themes even more visible. 
DFC was released in January 2013, at the moment when a years-long debate about Detroit’s 
insolvency was coming to a head. In March 2013, Governor Rick Snyder appointed an 
emergency manager to Detroit, an appointment that would eventually lead to the largest 
municipal bankruptcy in American history (The Detroit News 2014). Additionally, the 2009 
foreclosure crisis led to mass evictions in the city, such that the 2000s saw some of the highest 
population loss rates in the city’s history (Seelye 2011). Thus questions of democracy, justice, 
service provision, and vacancy were already actively debated in Detroit, and DFC tasked itself 
with discerning “how to move forward” in this context. DFC provided one of the most 
ambitious, yet deeply contested, answers to this question, which required associating spatial 
relationships like vacancy with claims about justice and injustice. Given the regular invocation of
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“space” and “justice” in DFC and its surrounding controversy, DFC is a clear test case for spatial
justice: if spatial justice is going to have anything to add to urban analysis, it ought to illuminate 
a document like DFC, where these themes are explicitly invoked. As I will argue in chapter 4, 
spatial justice helps to see the productive, representative role for DFC.
The body of this  dissertation is  concerned with the “what” of spatial  justice: what is
spatial justice, and what would it look like to use it? In Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, I will
return to more explicitly to the “why” of spatial  justice,  offering some thoughts on political
theory. That chapter will be primarily concerned with new materialism. I make more explicit a
thread that runs through the dissertation: that redrawing maps can rearrange both the issues of
justice that can be articulated and the constituencies who can bear them. Attending to spatial
intervention is thus imperative for anyone interested in the politics of justice.
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CHAPTER II
Spatial Production
Introduction
Detroit's recent bankruptcy proceedings call attention to the city's long slide into financial
and  infrastructural  disrepair.  As  historians,  urban  planners,  and  city  officials  point  out,
bankruptcy is part of a much longer story about race, housing, capital flight, and the development
of automobile  infrastructure.  For those paying attention to  Detroit  before the bankruptcy,  an
important  question  has  long  been  how  to  deal  with  the  city's  bloated  and  deteriorating
infrastructure, mass unemployment and poverty, and yearly losses of population. What can, and
should, be done about Detroit?
One response  to  Detroit's  financial  woes is  to  accept,  and perhaps  lament,  the  city's
shrinking. For example, significant media coverage of Detroit before the bankruptcy was careless
“ruin pornography,” so called for its sensational, glossy aesthetisization of Detroit's abandoned
buildings. These glossy photo spreads often accompany stories about Detroit as symbol of the
American  Dream  gone  awry,  about  how  the  cost  of  consumerism,  suburban  sprawl,  and  a
transformed economy are  catching up with  Americans.  Although ruin porn has  rightly  been
criticized for its various representational failures, this type of photojournalism is perhaps best
understood as  an expression of  a  perfectly  reasonable  tendency to worry about  the material
conditions  of  Detroit,  and  what  those  mean  for  Detroit's  residents.  In  defense  of  ruin
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photography, blogger Richy Piiparinen argues that the genre “outs the conditions of poverty,
showing...not so much how the other half lives, but what the other half lives with” (Piiparinen
2012). Ruin pornography, at its best, expresses a concern about how the material conditions in
which one lives – Detroit's sprawling streets, abandoned buildings, and razed lots – reflect and
reproduce  intense  inequities  between  residents  of  the  City  of  Detroit  and  the  surrounding
suburbs. 
The  deterioration  of  Detroit's  physical  infrastructure  is  a  concern  not  only  for
photojournalists, but also the City government. Early in his term, Mayor Dave Bing pledged to
demolish 10,000 vacant houses, claiming: “Abandoned and dilapidated buildings are hotspots for
crime and a living reminder of a time when the City of Detroit turned a blind eye to owners who
neglected  their  properties"  (Associated  Press  2010).  Vacant  houses  are  understood  here  as
important components of Detroit's continued struggle: both an invitation to crime and reminder
of  disrepair.  This  concern  for  Detroit's  physicality  runs  through Bing's  further  aspirations  to
consolidate  city  services  and  “rightsize”  the  city.  Rightsizing  is  a  planning  ideal  with
transformation in mind, less interested in bringing Detroit and other postindurstrial cities back to
their former glory than accepting depopulation as a permanent feature of cities. By razing houses
and consolidating city services into the densest neighborhoods, a transformed Detroit might offer
a new model of the American city, a city with large green belts and swaths of agricultural land
peppered by pockets  of  dense residential  and commercial  activity.  Through such rightsizing,
Detroit might reinvent itself, grasping its unusual future and becoming a different kind of city.
The  proposal,  in  other  words,  concerns  how  a  transformation  in  the  built  environment  is
necessary given Detroit's current reality.
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As land vacancy increases and buildings are razed, some residents are turning the soil and
planting crops. Organizations like the Greening of Detroit  and the Detroit  Black Community
Food Security Network provide training, resources, land, and social networks to support these
urban  farmers.  Although  urban  farming  is,  in  part,  understood  to  foster  local  economic
opportunities,  the  practice  also  enables  residents  and organizations  to  develop networks  and
promote the goal of food security (Lawson and Miller 2013, 28).  These urban farmers treat the
transformation of Detroit's material landscape as a central part of remaking a more just Detroit
with food security, revitalized communities, and a thriving local food economy. Urban farming is
one of the most exciting, and vulnerable, set of practices in Detroit: real estate speculation might
threaten the informal land use practices that many farmers rely on. Farming the land, producing a
new set of relationships among food, work, and neighborhood control, will help to forge a more
just, vibrant Detroit.
These related representations of Detroit – ruins, rightsize, farmland – are hardly the only
ways of imagining the city. Yet they demonstrate a central point for me: claims about justice are
tightly bound up with claims about space in Detroit. That is, they all take the reconfiguration of
Detroit's  geography to  be  a  central  component  in  either  critiquing injustices  or  forging new
justice  relations.  In  this  sense,  they  demonstrate  the  unavoidability  of  thinking about  spatial
justice in Detroit.
In this chapter, I elaborate on what it means to think spatially, and what is to be gained in
doing so. In particular, I argue that if thinking spatially is to be useful for thinking about justice,
it must be sufficiently materialist. Part of the trouble with existing literature on spatial justice is
that it leaves space a perplexingly undefined category, which makes it difficult to know why
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anyone should bother thinking about an explicitly spatial justice. So I argue, first of all,  that
existing  literature on spatial  justice has  a  poorly defined notion  of  space.  Worse:  too often,
theorists of spatial justice implicitly deploy a concept of space that they would explicitly reject:
space as a passive receptacle for social action. My first task below is to develop this critique of
spatial justice theorists.
My critique of spatial justice theorists is ultimately sympathetic: I, like Soja and others,
argue that thinking spatially is important for thinking about justice. My second task below is to
lay the groundwork for an account of space that can make goods on the central insight of spatial
justice: that spatial relations produce justice relations. Extending on the work of Bruno Latour,
John Law,  and Michel  Callon,  I  argue for  what  I  will  call  a geography of  assemblages.  A
geography of assemblages focuses on how geographic entities are configured politically, and
what specific  materials  – spatial  allies,  I'll  call  them – are enrolled in  that  configuration.  In
Detroit, this process of geographic production is especially visible because of the fiscal crisis it
now  faces.  Bankruptcy  attorneys,  union  pensioners,  school  teachers,  a  State-appointed
emergency manager, urban farmers, tech entrepreneurs, activists, and residents are all struggling
to figure out Detroit's spatial past, present, and future. That is, Detroit's identity is unstable at the
moment, and different actors are vying to recompose it. Almost everyone seems to agree that
Detroit is no longer what it once was: the epicenter of 20th century industrial manufacturing, with
the comfortably middle-class workforce and vibrant infrastructure to prove it. But what Detroit is
now – frontier for entrepreneurs and artists? Ready for an economic comeback? Lost to nature?
Victim of an emergency manager? - is up for debate. That is, a materialist geography is a method
for analyzing how Detroit, as a site of controversy, is held together by spokespeople who enlist
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specific spatial allies: vacancy, ruins, fields, roads, suburbs, capital flows, public transportation,
and a global economy, to name a few.
In Chapter 4, I will take up in depth how Detroit and justice are reconfigured together. In
this chapter, I want to lay the groundwork for what it means to think spatially. My goal is to
show why I prefer a sufficiently materialist conception of space; this materialist conception of
space will, in turn, guide the rest of my thinking on spatial justice. As I demonstrate below, if
spatial justice is to have any explanatory or normative power apart from any other notion of
social justice, it is precisely in its ability to suggest that the the enrolment of the material world is
an important component of justice claims.
The Geography of Spatial Justice
In this section, I argue that existing accounts of spatial justice are inadequate in two ways.
First, accounts of spatial justice generally suffer from an inability to show why thinking through
space matters in the context of social justice, despite their assertions of the concept's radical
potential. Second and more importantly, I argue that this analytical poverty emerges, in no small
measure, from the conception of geography that many spatial justice theorists implicitly deploy.
In brief, these thinkers tacitly (and paradoxically) accept that “space” is a background condition
to be filled  with social  justice (or,  more frequently,  social  injustice).  The upshot  is  strange:
theorists of spatial justice misapprehend space as much as they do justice.
Spatial Justice is Afraid of Space
“This is a classic case of spatial injustice.” (Agyeman 2013, 146)
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Agyeman makes this claim as he observes patterns of racially uneven access to parklands and
greenspaces. The above quotation is noteworthy for two reasons. On the one hand, it associates
spatial injustice with a history; he refers to an event as indicative of a long history of spatially
unjust practices, much as one might refer to a number of other sorts of well-defined injustices: a
“classic case of sexual harassment” or a “classic case of redlining.” On the other hand, Agyeman
indicates that this is a  spatial injustice: there is something spatial about this particular kind of
injustice.  The claim about  history  seems to  be  derived  from the  claim about  this  subset  of
injustices: spatial injustice is a normative evaluation that can be grafted onto particular events.
One might immediately wonder: what is particularly spatial about this injustice? There is quite
obviously a spatial, geographic component embedded in struggles over access to parklands, but
what is to be gained in calling explicit attention to that spatial component? 
Unfortunately,  the  existing  literature  on  spatial  justice  offers  little  in  the  way  of  an
answer. Despite offering an explicit invocation of space in the context of theories of justice, and
despite arguing for the radical and transformative potential of justice so rethought, scholars who
invoke spatial justice tend to offer little in the way of new analysis when it comes to spatial
justice. Spatial justice most often becomes simply another version of social justice, where justice
is to be achieved in the realm of practices which are labelled “geographic.” Put simply: it's not
clear why anybody – activist, academic, urban planner – would require the adjective “spatial” to
make  justice  claims  on  behalf  of  racially  unequal  access  to  park  lands.  Although  such  an
approach to spatial justice is valuable to the extent it unites diverse movements and catalyzes
those  seeking  justice,  it  hardly  offers  the  transformative  and  radical  conceptual  potential  to
political theorists, geographers, urban planners, and policy makers that its advocates suggest.
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Legal scholar Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has described this tendency among spatial
justice thinkers as “social justice from a spatial  perspective”  (2010, 203). Or, to put it more
bluntly, much of the existing literature on spatial justice is paradoxically “afraid of space”  (A.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010).  
The work of Edward Soja exemplifies this approach, and is useful to interpret both as a
long-standing theorist of space and advocate for a spatial justice perspective. Soja has been a
consistent and forceful voice in asserting the importance of thinking spatially about social theory
(Soja 1999, 1989).  Against so much critical theory, in which time and history are the relevant
analytic categories and space is merely the context in which they play out, Soja insists that space
is  a  fundamental  aspect  of  social  existence.  Drawing  on  influential  spatial  theorist  Henri
Lefebvre  (whom  I  briefly  mention  below),  Soja  argues  that  geographies  –  built  form,  the
distribution of capital, the provision of services, the availability of public meeting grounds – are
consequential  for  social  relationships.  For  instance,  it  is  a  by-now well-worn  postulate  that
industrial  capitalism  could  not  succeed  without  the  intense  geographic  centralization  of  a
workforce in large cities. Thus urban geographies are produced by, and also enable, certain kinds
of economic relations. Soja has referred to this exchange between society and space – thought of
as two different realms of human experience - as “the socio-spatial dialectic.” When Soja turns to
spatial  justice,  he likewise  maintains  two principles,  consistent  with his  earlier  work on the
socio-spatial dialectic. First, space is a socially full dimension: “space is not an empty void. It is
always filled with politics, ideology, and other forces shaping our lives”  (2010, 19). Second,
space is more than simply a background for social practice; space also intervenes in society: “the
geographies in which we live can have both positive and negative effects on our lives”  (2010,
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19). These two principles are the most important components of Soja's socio-spatial dialectic:
society and space constantly co-produce each other. Soja's space is elusive: he describes what
space is  not  -  “it  is  more than just  a  physical  quality  of  the material  world or  an  essential
philosophical attribute...” (2010, 17) - and paints in broad (and circular) strokes when describing
it  -  “a  complex  social  product,  a  collectively  created  and  purposeful  configuration  and
socialization of space that defines our contextual habitat, the human and humanized geography in
which we all live out our lives” (2010, 17–18). I take up the meaning of space in a later section
of this chapter, trying to add specificity. For now, I want to point out that, if we are to take  Soja
seriously on the matter of space producing society, then we would also need to take seriously that
justice has a spatial component: “everything on earth is spatial whether recognized or not” (2010,
53), justice included (2010, 5). 
Given his longstanding commitment to  the constitutive power of  geography,  the first
thing  to  note  about  Soja's  theorization  of  spatial  justice  is  the  difficulty  of  seeing  what's
particularly  spatial about  it.  When  Soja  turns  to  the  task  of  interpreting  existing  social
movements  in  Los  Angeles  that  implicitly  make  use  of  a  spatial  justice  claim,  that  spatial
component  is  observable,  if  not  especially  profound:  the  Bus  Rider's  Union  engagement  in
struggles over provision of metropolitan bus routes, Justice for Janitors' recognition of the need
to organize workers across a vast Los Angeles metropolitan area. That geography plays a role in
these  movements  is  clear  (after  all,  everything  on  earth  has  a  spatial  component),  yet  the
importance of taking that geography seriously is less apparent. Anguelovski and Roberts (2011)
similarly invoke spatial justice to critique the unjust geography of climate change, in which the
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Global  South  will  suffer  the  disproportionate  effects  of  rising  sea  levels  and  disrupted
agricultures. In both cases, geography is evaluated as the expression of unjust social processes.
The trouble  with  this  approach  to  spatial  justice  is  that  it  simply  adds  the  adjective
“spatial”  to  existing  claims  about  just  transportation  (Bullard  and Johnson 1997) or  climate
justice  (Schlosberg 2012). In this way, space is simply the dimension in which these sorts of
injustices occur: climate justice “has” a spatial dimension; transportation justice, too. Theories of
spatial justice are afraid of space in that there is nothing particularly spatial about justice so
imagined: “the spatial remains an adjectival context, a background against which considerations
of the surrounding space are thrown into relief” (A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010, 204). 
But if this spatial justice has failed to assert what was profound about spatial justice, its
theorists have also implicitly deployed an understanding of space that Soja would reject. What is
especially surprising about Soja's understanding of spatial justice is the theory of space that it
implicitly deploys, a space that is at odds both with Soja's assertion of the socio-spatial dialectic
and much contemporary work in geographic theory, a point that I now explore in more detail.
The Implicit Geography of Spatial Justice, or; the Geography of the Social
In the above accounts, spatial justice is treated as a normatively bad outcome, a state of
affairs in the world. But this is just one of several ways that one might conceive of spatial justice:
“spatial justice is a theoretical concept, a focal point for empirical analysis, and a target for social
and political action”  (2010, 1). To restate, spatial justice is a  normative evaluation,  analytical
framework, and  political claim.  I will have relatively little to say about spatial justice as an
explicit  political  claim,  because  political  claims  for  spatial  justice  emerge  mostly  from
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academics1. As my discussion above suggests, spatial justice as a normative evaluation seems to
be the most persistent meaning of the concept, and one that forces its theorists to misapprehend
geography.
What would it mean to call a geography unjust, to evaluate space itself as unjust? There
are basically three ways to answer this question: geographies  indicate,  exacerbate, or  produce
injustices.  Soja follows each strand of unjust geographies at different moments, and I interpret
him here as exemplary of approaches to theorizing unjust geographies. As I now argue, the first
approach clearly fails to live up to Soja's socio-spatial dialectic. The second approach, although
reaching toward the constitutive power of geography that Soja demands, still treats spatial justice
as a social phenomenon. The final possibility is the most promising, but already gestures toward
treating spatial justice as an analytical framework. To the extent spatial justice is thought of as a
normative outcome, it will fail to take seriously the productive power of geographies2. 
To begin, geography might be thought to indicate injustice. Unjust geographies might
signal unjust distribution of goods and services in space. One might think of the siting of grocery
stores,  bus  routes,  hospitals,  and  other  goods  deemed  necessary  for  living  a  full  life,  or
alternatively  of  the  siting  of  incinerators  and  pollution  sources  that  impede  justice.  Unjust
geographies are those in which some principle of distribution has been violated3. The question
1 There are few existing calls for spatial justice outside the academy. Unlike theorizing environmental justice, 
which occurred as a response to a burgeoning unification of traditional environmental NGOs and grassroots 
social justice movements, spatial justice is a movement that is largely being argued for by legal scholars, 
geographers, and a limited number of activists. Theorizing an explicitly spatial justice politics will largely have 
to wait. To the extent those movements make demands for spatial justice, they will, I think, be making 
normative claims that are similar to those made by Soja and other academics (see Republic of South Africa 2013
on this count). 
2 One important note: my argument concerns how geography is conceived in the examples below. I take no issue 
with the justice claims expressed. Racial residential segregation, access to transit, and military occupation are all
instances where justice claims are rightly made. My critique is of those scholars wishing to paste the label 
“spatial” onto those justice claims.
3 The exact principle is often left unclear, but one can imagine any number of possible variations: Rawls' 
difference principle, utilitarians' greatest good for the greatest number, Marx's to each according to their needs.
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here  is  how the  important  things  are  distributed  on  a  map,  and  whether  that  siting  is  just
according to  a  principle of equity.  Space is  understood as  an indicator  of  some prior  social
injustice: “distributional inequalities are the more visible outcome of deeper processes of spatial
discrimination set in place by a multitude of individual decisions made by many different, often
competing actors” (Soja 2010, 47).  
Soja speaks of unjust geographies as indicators of social injustice when he references Los
Angeles' unjust transit geography that favors some transit users (notably, automobile drivers) and
disadvantages others (bus riders): 
“I  refer  here  to  the  pronounced  investment  gap  between  the  building  and
maintenance of roads and freeways on the one hand, and the construction of all
other  means  of  mass  transit  on  the  other.  The  outcome  of  this  socially  and
spatially  discriminatory  process  was  an  unjust  metropolitan  transit  geography,
favoring the wealthier, multicar-owning population in the suburban rings over the
massive  agglomeration  of  the  immigrant  and  more  urgently  transit-dependent
working poor in the inner core of the urban region” (2010, x). 
An unjust transit geography is the outcome of discriminatory practices, where highways are built
and maintained in a way that disadvantages the working poor. To put this another way, access to
transit is distributed unjustly; the built form indicates an unjust distribution of transit services. 
When spatial justice is this kind of normative evaluation, the radical potential of Soja's
socio-spatial dialectic is pretty clearly removed: sufficiently fine-grained mapping exercises can
tell us whether or not the metropolis is just, but the landscape itself simply reflects that injustice.
The injustice originates in planning decisions, transit  geography reflects those injustices, and
spatial justice assigns moral evaluation to that geography. Space doesn't act back on society in
this  respect,  it  is  the  passive  receptacle  of  social  intervention  (including  the  scholar's
evaluations).  Space  is  understood  precisely  as  that  kind  of  background  that  Soja  sought  to
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distance himself from: geography is a container in which unjust social relations occur, the mirror
of  unjust  transit  decisions.  Soja's  socio-spatial  dialectic  is  meant  to  critique  just  this  sort  of
“spatial expression of social forces” kind of claim, as if society could unproblematically fill the
container of space with its injustices. 
Second,  unjust  geographies  might  be  those  geographies  that  exacerbate injustices:
“ingrained in the industrial capitalist city and, one might add, in many socialist cities as well, are
deep and unquestioned structures of privilege and spatial advantage based on differential wealth
and power” (2010, 48, emphasis original). If it is true that injustices are ingrained in the city and
structure  how  city  residents  move  and  relate  to  each  other,  then  racial  inequalities  will  be
especially  hard  to  remove,  because  they  are  durably  built  into  the  residential  patterns  of
American cities. One might say that the built form exacerbates injustices like racial and class
segregation by making them durable over time, a plausible condition in postindustrial cities like
Detroit. This seems to imply the radical capacity that Soja asserts in his socio-spatial dialectic:
the  built  form  acts  back  on  society  by  structuring  and  extending  social  relations.  Such  an
extension occurs, for example, in Soja's discussion of Palestine: 
“the occupied territories would essentially remain under the control of the Israeli
military  even  with  the  creation  of  an  independent  Palestinian  state.  Almost
invisible  microgeographies  of  power,  surveillance,  and control,  as  well  as  the
intentionally overt construction of barrier walls and guarded settlements, infuse
the  spaces  in  and  around  the  state  of  Israel  with  an  array  of  multilayered
injustices...One lesson is clear: once spatial  injustice is inscribed into the built
environment, it is difficult to erase” (p41). 
Soja points out that a geography of surveillance will persist even if the Israeli military
were to remove itself entirely from Palestine. Geography reproduces injustice by durably
extending it.
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Focusing  on  how  geography  exacerbates  injustices  appears,  on  first  glance,  to  take
seriously the radical geography that Soja argues for: Palestine's built form acts back on society
by materializing injustices, thereby extending them well beyond the Israeli military's withdrawal.
Yet  this  initially  radical-seeming  spatiality  treats  space  as  what  Bruno  Latour  calls  an
intermediary, an object that “transports meaning or force without transformation: defining its
inputs is enough to define its outputs” (Latour 2007, 39). To return to the example of segregation,
inequality is  ingrained in the built  form, which then structures social interaction.  The actual
emplacement of racial inequality into metropolitan geography is relevant only insofar as it is a
stopping off point for injustices that emerge in the social realm:
“Not all examples of residential segregation are entirely unjust. To some degree,
residential  segregation can be voluntary and beneficial,  with people of similar
background choosing to live together for many different purposes...Segregation
becomes a problem, however, when it is rigidly imposed from above as a form of
subjugation and control, as with apartheid and racial ghetto formation; or when it
emerges less intentionally from below as an oppressive by-product of unregulated
'freedoms' of choice operating within persistent spatial structures of advantage”
(2010, 55).
Soja argues that justice and injustice emerge from access to meaningful choices about where one
lives. Space adds a brief extension, but the injustice itself occurs before it is ever emplaced,
when it is “rigidly imposed from above.” In Latour's language, the  input  to the built form is
justice or injustice determined as a matter of meaningful choice; the output in this case is simply
an  unjust  geography.  To the  extent  that  racial  segregation  adds  anything  to  the  injustice,  it
extends it more durably. Yet the injustice itself seems little changed by its emplacement: the
metropolitan form is the stopping-off point for those socially produced injustices. When the built
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form is unjust because it  exacerbates or extends social injustices, spatial  justice fails to take
seriously the radical socio-spatial dialectic, that geographies produce injustice.
There  is,  however,  a  final  possibility:  geographies  are  unjust  when  they  produce
injustices. A claim about the production of injustices appears most visibly when Soja evaluates
access to public space, a claim inspired by the “right to the city” literature4. For those making
this claim, “the essential starting point in the search for spatial justice is the vigilant defense of
public space against the forces of commodification, privatization, and state interference”  (Soja
2010, 45). Spatial injustice emerges as cities are more and more cut up into privately owned
parcels  that  replace  publicly  owned land,  and as  public  spaces  are increasingly made up of
automotive  thoroughfares.   Claims  about  unjust  access  can  take  two  different  forms:  either
vanishing public space is a distributive claim, in which case it indicates an injustice as I argue
above; or vanishing public space produces something new. I will focus here on the latter claim. 
The  critique  of  access  to  certain  kinds  of  space  might  signal  that  certain  kinds  of
geographic spaces – plazas, walkable streets, meeting places – enable us to live fully human
lives.  Such a claim is  evident not only in the right to the city literature,  but also in Martha
Nussbaum's capabilities approach to justice, which counts, in a parallel fashion, access to the
“world of nature” as an important component of being human (1992, 219). In both the right to
the city and Nussbaum's capabilities approach, access to certain kinds of spaces constitute just
relations among citizens. This is more than simply  indicating  or  exacerbating  an unjust set of
4 Soja also treats residential segregation as having productive power that exceeds its social inputs, albeit only 
glancingly: “there are some positive advantages to ghetto formation, such as serving to create a shared 
consciousness of oppression that can generate concerted resistance; and there are negative effects that can occur 
in the most culturally adaptive enclave” (2010, 58). Even when segregation emerges from social injustice, 
certain “positives” and “negatives” can emerge, the unintended consequence of concentrating groups of people. 
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arrangements: the material absence of those goods will actually make lives less just. It seems as
if we have arrived at the productive power of geography that Soja has asserted.
 What is noteworthy about this way of conceptualizing spatial justice is that it has moved
away from a normative evaluation of geography and toward an analysis of the effect of spatial
relations on justice relations. In the first two meanings of unjust geographies – as indication or
exacerbation – geographies took on social injustices; society was the source of injustices that
were grafted onto,  for instance,  transit  geographies.  In the capabilities account,  on the other
hand,  geography  is  the  source  of  that  injustice,  an  active  component  in  the  production  of
injustice: public space is a necessary component of just social relations. But to make this claim is
to make a primarily analytical claim about geography: the question is now how does geography
produce  just  and  unjust  relations?  Importantly,  geography  adds  to  the  justice  or  injustice;
changing geography changes the injustice.
To sum up the argument so far, conceptualizing spatial justice as a normative outcome –
as a state of affairs in the world that we can achieve (or not) – will necessarily lead to thinking of
geography as a receptacle for social relations, exactly the condition that spatial justice promises
to transcend. To meet its radical promise, spatial justice must instead be an analytic framework
that takes seriously the productive power of geography on justice relations. An important set of
questions immediately follow: how and when do geographies influence justice relations? By
what mechanisms? To answer these questions, I now develop what I will call a geography of
associations. 
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Materialist Space, or a Geography of Associations
“Though  a  product to  be  used,  to  be  consumed,  [space]  is  also  a  means  of
production; networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion
space and are determined by it” (Lefebvre 1992, 85).
The question of how space influences  social  relations  has been an important  one for
geographers at least since Henri Lefebvre. For Lefebvre, space was a commodity in the Marxist
sense,  an  artifact  that  was  socially  produced.  We may  be  tempted  to  view commodities  as
products  isolated  from  the  processes  that  gave  them  form,  but  Marx  urges  us  to  think  of
commodities  instead  as  both  having  social  histories  (the  labor,  materials,  and  coordination
involved in producing a commodity) and as serving also as inputs to other productive processes
(yarn – an output from the wool mill – is an input into production for the weaver). Much like any
other commodity, space exhibits this twofold character of being both output of social processes
and input into future production. This means, in effect, that just as the price of yarn influences
the weaver's products, so, too, space structures what sorts of social relations are possible: “the
spatiality  of  whatever  subject  you  are  looking  at  is  viewed  as  shaping  social  relations  and
societal development just as much as social processes configure and give meaning to the human
geographies or spatialities in which we live” (E. W. Soja 2010, 4). Spatial relations and social
relations co-produce each other.
 But how might space – understood as a product of social relations – influence society?
How could “space” fashion anything, including justice relations? As we saw above, existing
accounts of spatial justice are ill-equipped to answer these questions because “space” is most
often a stand-in for “society.” In this section, extending on John Law, Michel Callon, Bruno
Latour, and a prominent strain of contemporary geographic theory, I contend: 1) space is best
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understood as the set of locational relations made among entities. As a shorthand, we can say that
space is “where things are in relation to each other”; 2) space can produce justice or injustice to
the  extent  it  is  enrolled  into  political  controversies.   Understanding  spatial  justice  this  way
requires  shifting  away  from  thinking  of  “space”  as  a  realm  that  does  or  doesn't  influence
“society,” another realm that's already assembled. Instead, spatial justice can most helpfully be
conceived as analytical framework that investigates how particular relations that often go under
the title “geographic” or “spatial” influence justice relations.
I turn to scholars in Actor-Network Theory – who variously go under the title of science
and technology students or sociologists of associations – because of their explicit preoccupation
with the role of nonhumans in fashioning political life. Spatial justice is most insightful when its
practitioners focus on how nonhumans emerge in political life. Such a concern leads Soja, for
instance, to focus on the manner in which the formation of US ghettos – a pattern of housing
location,  neighborhood disinvestment,  and unequal  policing – does  more than simply reflect
existing inequities. How things are arranged in the American metropolis  – where they are –
actively contributed to relations of injustice among citizens. My goal in this section is to offer
some analytic precision to this intuition. 
In brief,  my account here asks how geographic entities emerge as actors:  “Instead of
starting with entities that are already components of the world,  [a sociology of associations]
focuses on the complex and controversial nature of what it is for an actor to come into existence”
(Latour 1999, 303). How does Detroit emerge as a political actor that variously goes back to
nature, or warns against a bleak capitalist future, or inspires entrepreneurs in the tech economy?
Even more explicitly: “How are localisations produced? How are scale effects created? How are
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things made absent or present?” (Callon and Law 2004, 3). That is, how are spatial relationships
– where this is in relation to that - made? The starting point for answering these questions treats
locations, much like any other entity in the world, as unstable. Yet crucially, it also treats society
as  unstable,  a  step that  spatial  justice theorists  rarely  take.  In  leaving both geographies  and
societies as undetermined, I open the possibility that geographies reconfigure justice relations.
The Instability of Geography
Like “society,” space can be understood in at least two different ways. On the one hand, it
can refer to a specific domain of human experience, action, and causality: “A given trait was said
to be 'social' or to 'pertain to society' when it could be defined as possessing specific properties”
(Latour 2007, 3). Bruno Latour calls this first way of understanding society “the sociology of the
social,” in which society is already formed and can be used to explain outcomes in the world.
Similarly, I want to call the kind of geography that takes “space” to be already composed and
capable of explaining events in the world “a geography of the social.” On the other hand, both
space and society can be understood as collectives whose holding together requires explanation.
Latour  calls  this  second  mode  of  sociology  “the  sociology  of  associations,”  which  I  here
transform into “the geography of associations.”
 The sociology of the social begins from a familiar premise: the social realm is distinct
from other human domains like law, economics,  politics,  and the like.  This unique realm of
human activity then becomes a means of explaining these other realms of human action: “For
instance, although it is recognized that law has its own strength, some aspects of it would be
better  understood if  a  'social  dimension'  were added to  it”  (2007,  3).  This  understanding of
society as a context in which other activities occur is, Latour claims, the misguided hallmark of
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most contemporary sociology. The basic claim of a sociology of the social is that some factor is
socially constructed or produced: a stable social substrate – often capitalism – produces law, or
religion, or scientific knowledge. 
Latour analyzes this tendency in the sociology of science, where, for instance, he laments
the unfortunate tendency to explain Einstein's revolutionary physics by appealing to his turbulent
youth, or else Pasteur's microbes by his adoration of the crown:
“Yes,  Einstein  had a  turbulent  youth and called  his  theory  'revolutionary'  and
'relativist', but that does not lead you all the way  through his use of Maxwell's
equations,  only  in  their  vicinity;  yes,  Pasteur  was  somewhat  reactionary  and
adored the Empress Eugenie but  that does not carry you very far through his
bacteriology, even though 'it might not be unrelated' to his rejection, for instance,
of spontaneous generation” (2007, 105).
In other words, Pasteur's microbes cannot be explained by his psychological attachments to the
Second Empire in France. Yet Pasteur's microbes can themselves explain a good deal about what
it meant to be socially connected in that very Empire: “contagious and uncontaminated people
didn't  establish the same solidarity  as,  say,  the rich and the poor.  The direction of  causality
between what is to be explained and what provides the explanation is not simply reversed, but
thoroughly subverted: the contagion redraws the social maps” (2007, 107–8). Thus “the social” -
in this case, what it means to be part of an economic class – is re-forged through the entourage of
bacteria, Pasteur and his laboratory. Governance institutions emerge, medical practices change,
sanitation starts  to  become a part  of  everyday life.  What  is  important  here is  that  scientific
practice helps to remake social practice and connectedness: bacteria in Pasteur's lab are at the
center of a network that ties together all these different practices, institutions, and actors. 
This insight – that society, which has been understood as itself adding some explanatory
power, is instead re-composed through the emergence in the laboratory of other material actors –
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is  the  hallmark  of  a  sociology  of  associations.  For  the  sociology  of  associations,  “society”
concerns not some context or force that can explain other domains of human experience; society
is instead produced through legal, economic, political,  scientific, and religious (among other)
associations: 
“law,  for  instance,  should not be seen as  what  should be explained by 'social
structure' in addition to its inner logic; on the contrary, its inner logic may explain
some  features  of  what  makes  an  association  last  longer  and  extend
wider...Whereas, in the first approach, every activity – law, science, technology,
religion,  organization,  politics,  management,  etc.  -  could  be  related  to  and
explained by the same social aggregates behind all of them, in the second version
of sociology there exists  nothing behind those activities even though they might
be linked in a way that does produce a society – or doesn't produce one” (2007,
7–8). 
Society is not a realm “behind” all the other types of human associations and institutions, a realm
that subsequently explains their workings; society is composed through these very associations.
In this version of society – what Latour refers to as the collective - one must not take for granted
that some stable, social substrate unites all other realms of human activity. Instead, the stability
of associations – how it is that relatively durable social patterns emerge and are maintained – is
precisely what needs explaining.
So  what  renders  certain  social  patterns  durable?  That  is,  because  society  is  not  a
permanent substrate but instead an association among actors, the collective will not persist in the
absence of its performance; it takes work to hold it together. The question then becomes “what is
doing  that  work?”  The  answer  to  this  question  involves  tracing  all  the  connections  among
bacteria, medical institutions, the nobility, the production of lab glassware, and, to some small
extent, Pasteur's adoration of the Empress. 
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Yet examining any one of these elements – bacteria, for instance – will likewise lead to a
further question: how are “bacteria,” as actors in our society, held together? Their appearance
requires,  notably,  Louis  Pasteur,  and  also  glassware,  writing  instruments,  cultures,  and  an
Academy to spread the good word5. If one doesn't like “bacteria” as an example of a thing to be
held together, we could just as readily ask this question of, for instance, guns: a whole host of
things, from gun factories to tiny screwdrivers to a well-funded gun lobby and a few words in the
US Constitution make possible the “gun” tucked responsibly in a gun safe. The point is that any
given  thing  can  itself  be  analyzed  as  being  held  together,  in  what  John  Law  has  called  a
“baroque” approach to complexity, “an imagination that looks down [to specificity] rather than
up  [to  unifying  order]”  (2004,  19).  A sociology  of  assocations  traces  these  connections  by
looking at the particular connections among elements of society.
This, then, is the first conceptual point about a geography of associations: space, much
like society, must be made and held together. Such a recognition is embedded in a an important
strain of critical geography that investigates “the production of space” (Lefebvre 1992; Harvey
1973; Castells  1979),  which has been influential  for thinkers in spatial  justice.  Yet if  spatial
justice theorists  and ANT scholars have tended to agree on the matter  of geographies  being
produced, they have tended to diverge on the question of what is accomplishing that production
and what, ultimately, is produced. Spatial justice theorists have tended to focus on the productive
power of  a relatively stable set of human relations – capitalism, globalization, the state – in
producing society. An already configured social realm – made of “large scale” forces like class
relations and the fluctuations of global capitalism – transforms the urban landscape, which we
5 The question of whether “bacteria” actually exist, and whether anything at all is required to hold them together, 
receives a good deal of Latour's attention (see for instance Latour 1999, 145–73).
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can observe as being just or unjust. In Soja's telling, Los Angeles is a stopping off point for social
forces, and that geography then “structures” or “frames” further social action. 
This focus on the  social  production of space rendered Soja incapable of asserting the
radical potential of spatial justice, that geographies reconstitute justice relations. In other words,
if  Los  Angeles'  transit  geography  is  the  outcome  of  large-scale  social  forces  like  the
transformation of the global economy,  if  residential  segregation is  the consequence of racial
inequities,  then  space  at  most  extends social  injustice.  If  geographies  are  to  produce justice
relations,  then  social  relations  cannot  be  understood  to  be  durable  by  themselves:  the
recomposition of geography implies the recomposition of those relations. The power of Latour's
critique of the sociology of the social is to make possible and inevitable the reconfiguration of
social  relations,  an  insight  shared  but  ultimately  left  unfinished  by  spatial  justice  theorists.
Spatial justice is most meaningful when it explicitly acknowledges that social relations can be
reconfigured as geographies that are reassembled in new ways, as the right to the city approach
suggests.  If  there  is  to  be room for  space  to  influence  social  relations,  society,  as  much as
geography, will have to be left unconstituted. 
If we ought not to take for granted the productive power of large scale social forces, we
similarly ought to be cautious about how we conceive of the productive power of space, which
brings me to the second point about a geography of associations: space acts on justice relations
insofar as it is a field of inquiry, the object of geographic knowledge, and not a dimension or
realm of human existence.  Much as “social” is  a “convenient shorthand to designate all  the
ingredients already accepted in the collective realm” (Latour 2007, 11), “spatial” is a convenient
shorthand for all the elements already accepted into localities. So, for example, “public space”
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can be taken to describe particular entities and acts – plazas, walkable streets, densely packed
housing stock, encounters among different people, furtive and revolutionary conversations. 
What, then, of spatial justice? What elements are already accepted into localities, and
how do they influence justice relations? Here, we would do well to follow geographers, whose
primary occupation has been answering just this question about what holds particular locations
together. A good starting point is a framework advanced by Jessop et al (2008), which argues that
geographers  have  tended  to  focus  on  four  components  in  how  geographies  are  produced:
territory, place, scale, and network. If one wanted to know about the geography of Detroit, for
example, one could think about how Detroit's territorial boundaries are made, which at the very
least  requires  maps  that  trace  the  City's  boundaries  filed  with  the  State.  Detroit  is  also  an
inhabited location, a place to which some residents feel especially strongly attached. How are
those attachments made, and what sustains or transforms them? Detroit also operates within a
nested hierarchy of power, or regional scale: as the State-appointed Emergency Manager makes
painfully  clear,  the  City  is  under  considerable  control  of  the  State  of  Michigan,  which  also
reports to the national government.  At the very least,  two Constitutions and Supreme Courts
backed up by the National Guard make such arrangements possible. Detroit's geography is also
an effect of its network connections: how money moves into and out of the City's boundaries, the
movement of people across the border into Canada or into the City's sprawling suburbs. In the
context of spatial justice, what I want to stress is that geographers tend to draw attention to some
particular features of what it means to be an actor in the world, which we can call “spatial.” The
analytical power of spatial justice lies in taking seriously that the way in which geographies –
understood as particular territories, places, scales, and networks held together by a multitude of
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actors -  influence justice relations.  There are particular geographies,  and sometimes,  but not
always, they produce relations of justice.
Spaces, like any actor, must be composed and held together. What's left to be shown is
how elements of the world are assembled into these particular locations. That is, work is required
to make “Detroit” a stable location in the world. But who and what is accomplishing that work?
How is such a feat accomplished? If Detroit's bankruptcy is an inflection point where different
Detroits are possible, then how will Detroit be recomposed? Without being able to lean on a
stable social realm that produces Detroit, the answers will involve nonhumans, a topic that I now
explore in more detail. A geography of associations can thus leave room for geographies to be
produced without being exclusively socially produced.
The Actancy of Nonhumans
Because  a  sociology of  associations  begins  by  rejecting  the  claim that  society  holds
political actors together (through, for instance, a process of “social construction” or else the laws
of  capital)  and  embracing  the  uncertain  emergence  of  political  actors,  nonhumans  come  to
occupy a central role. The reasons for this concern the relative durability of nonhumans: “It's the
power exerted through entities that don't sleep and associations that don't break down that allow
power to last longer and expand further...” (Latour 2007, 70). Nonhumans grant some durability
to otherwise fleeting and impermanent entities. For the sake of a geography of associations, I am
interested in how nonhumans help to hold together localities like Detroit.
As  a  banal  but  useful  example  of  how  nonhumans  can  hold  associations  together,
consider the speed bump. In important ways, this concrete hump has been given the task of a
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police officer: both are tasked with slowing down drivers. Although the speed bump and the
police officer do similar things (tell a driver to slow down), they do so through entirely different
means. Instead of a patrol car, a threat of fines and inflated insurance rates, a gun, a badge, a sour
and sinking stomach as the blue and white lights flash in a rearview mirror, there is a hump of
concrete, a broken suspension, the unpleasant sensation of bouncing out of the driver's seat and
jamming a collarbone into the seatbelt, until it locks with a definite “clack.” 
The important point to keep in mind is that these different ways of slowing people down
make a tremendous difference to what actors, both human and nonhuman, our driver encounters
and is associated with. The speed bump brings the driver into contact with different kinds of far
flung actors than does the police officer, so a traffic engineer instead of a police chief is the
brains behind the operation; a gravel pit instead of a gun factory produces the credible threat. The
network assembled by the speed bump is distinct from the one assembled by the police officer;
these  two  collectives  require  different  experts,  different  kinds  of  knowledge,  different
manufacturers,  among  other  notable  differences.  What's  relevant  here  is  that  the  cast  of
characters changes according to the material used to influence the driver. State power does not
simply “flow through” the police officer nor the speed bump; both measures enlist the driver in
different kinds of motivations (fear of a speeding ticket vs. a trip to the auto mechanic), bring
into  play  different  employees'  unions  (police  officers'  vs.  traffic  engineers'),  invite  different
strategies for evasion (radar scanners and a keen eye for patrol cars vs. a robust suspension), and
credibly threaten our driver over different time periods (only so long as the patrol car is there vs.
as long as it simply sits there). In effect, the police officer and the speed bump have the potential
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to produce a different kind of driver with different intentions, connected to different actants in
different times and places.
If geographies are but one form of political actor, then the speed bump can constitute not
only a new driver, but new geographies. Such a production occurs, first of all, at the site of the
speed bump: a heavily speed-bumped street might influence drivers to seek travel on arterial
routes, where they are less likely to ruin their suspension. A busy neighborhood thoroughfare
may become a sleepy residential street, which itself invites new uses for neighborhood children.
And this  transformation will  be different than the kind wrought  by the presence of a police
officer,  whose presence may imply observation,  or human contact,  or safety.  Second, such a
transformation  implies  a  different  network  geography  in  the  sense  that  distant  locations  are
connected to the bump: the geography of asphalt production – gravel mines and oil fields; the
geography of our officer – precinct house, training academy, a long commute to the city from her
home in the suburbs. Locations are connected differently depending on the actants involved.
But not only do these two different actants enroll the driver in different geographies, they
do so over different time periods. The speed bump makes the instructions “slow down” more
durable. When the police officer goes home at the end of her shift, our speed demon no longer
has a reason to slow down. It is certainly the case that our driver might fear a speeding ticket,
and so slow down even in the absence of a patrol car. But it might also be true that our speed
demon has a radar scanner that gives him some assurance that no officers are about, and so
proceeds along his hasty travels. The speed bump, on the other hand, doesn't end its shift. By
simply existing along the driver's path and credibly threatening to break the driver's suspension,
the driver will slow down. Of course, if our speed demon drives a robust SUV, he will likely roll
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with impunity over the concrete hump. Or if the driver doesn't see the bump, then it will only
articulate  its  meaning  after  the  fact.  Still,  the  officer  and  the  bump  operate  over  different
timeframes.
The objects with which we are enrolled transform not only our driver's plans for speedy
travel: objects can also transform political practice. Noortje Marres, for instance, demonstrates
how devices of carbon accounting, like an orb-shaped light placed next to a tea kettle, can enroll
tea-drinkers into global climate politics. The light is connected to the internet,  and polls  the
national power grid to determine whether it's under heavy use. If demand on the power grid is
high,  the  orb  glows  red;  if  demand  is  low,  the  orb  glows  green.  In  so  doing,  this  device
“foregrounds an everyday material action (tea making), and frames it as a form of action upon
the environment” (Marres 2012, 65). That is, this tea light brings its user into contact with the
power  grid  and carbon  emissions  through the  act  of  making  tea,  and in  so  doing recasts  a
mundane act as a form of political participation. To acknowledge this much is not to say that tea
making is a robust or especially meaningful mode of political participation, but rather to argue
that  objects  can  link  us  to  other  actors  (the  grid,  the  environment)  in  durable  ways  (the
microcomputer  inside the orb hums along while the user,  bored of watching the power grid
statistics, has long ago taken a nap). Objects are a fundamental part of our politics,  and our
politics are regularly remade through our associations with nonhumans.
What  objects  accomplish  for  a  sociology  of  associations  is  to  both  enroll  actants  in
different  networks  – and thus  assemble them differently – and to  do so over  different  time
periods – also assembling them differently. Our driver is a different driver in each instance: the
one, wary of a speeding ticket and higher insurance rates; the other, protective of his automobile.
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Each of those drivers consequently moves differently – a rebel without a cause will flout the
police, but perhaps not his undercarriage. How the driver moves, where he drives, what kind of
car he purchases, his relationship to an observational state – when nonhumans like the speed
bump are admitted to have actancy, these questions about what we tend to think of as  social
relations are unsettled. The driver is reconstituted through his engagement with the bump. 
To put all this in terms of spatial justice, geographies will be assembled depending on the
nonhumans involved. Detroit might be a postindustrial ruin-scape filled with vacant Art Deco
skyscraping masterpieces and burning houses; Detroit might be a vibrant, thriving, hard-scrabble
union town that never quits; Detroit might be a model for urban agriculture. All of these different
Detroits rely on certain nonhumans: skyscrapers, union halls, farms. Once these nonhumans are
understood  as  mediators that  “transform,  translate,  distort,  and  modify  the  meaning  or  the
elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2007, 39), then it becomes possible for geography
to influence social relations.  A more just Detroit  might  involve the preservation of beautiful
buildings and a world-class art collection; it might involve a government bailout of a struggling
auto manufacturer; it might involve the development of a land trust to protect the hard work of
some industrious urban farmers.  In all  cases,  a specific geography – composed of particular
nonhuman elements – is assembled and then enrolled in those controversies. The point I want to
make here is that those justice claims require certain nonhumans to prop them up. Spatial justice
recognizes that geographies like Detroit are assembled, and that assembly is consequential for
justice relations.
Although I want to focus on how objects like the tea light,  the speed bump, and the
geography of Detroit help to hold together a certain kinds of justice claims, I don't want to argue
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that such a process is straightforward and deterministically written into the object. Rather, this
approach  demands  that  we  look  seriously  at  exactly  how social  relations  are  formed  and
maintained, and how localities are central actors in political controversies about justice. “Detroit”
is  not  automatically  composed  based  on  the  existence  of  certain  entities;  nor  is  “justice”
automatically composed owing to the existence of a certain kind of Detroit. Yet if it is not the
mere existence of things that produces geographies, then what does? 
The answer involves a process of what Michel Callon calls  translation: “the identity of
actors,  the  possibility  of  interaction  and  the  margins  of  manoueuvre  are  negotiated  and
delimited”  (Callon  1986,  203).  There  are  four  components  to  this  process.  First,
problematization:  identities  of  various  actors  in  controversies  must  be  assigned.  In  Detroit,
“gentrification” is a phenomenon that has been identified, such that it is an “obligatory passage
point,” a necessary component of Detroit's politics. One cannot talk about renewal in Detroit
without at least recognizing that the gentrifiers might be arriving. We know that it has happened
in other cities, but is it happening here, in Detroit? Second, these roles – the identities that have
been assigned - are tested through “trials of strength,” a process that Callon calls “interessement”
(1986, 206). Although there is a growing sense that gentrifiers are a threat to the city's housing
market and Whole Foods is enlisted as evidence that the process is already underway, others
contend that buildings remain vacant, property values low. Is gentrification even possible in such
a sprawling city with so much vacancy? Will the gentrifiers anchor here in Detroit? Third, if
successful,  interessement  will  lead  to  enrollment.  This  stage  of  translation  makes  solid  the
identities  ascribed at  the  outset.  If  the  gentrifiers  anchor  themselves  to  a  neighborhood and
longtime residents move out, then the question has been settled: gentrification can occur. The
45
gentrifiers, however, are not so easily enrolled: buildings in much of the city remain empty. But
in specific neighborhoods,  rents are rising,  new construction is occurring,  high end boutique
retailers are moving in.  Some residents and bloggers agree that gentrification is occurring in
some neighborhoods.  Finally,  once allies  are enrolled,  they must  be mobilized.  Mobilization
refers to the process of making certain neighborhoods speak for the city. To make them thus
speak, representatives are required who translate them into photographs of grocery stores and
narrative pieces about development in Midtown. The gentrifiers are mobilized in these accounts.
Detroit has been tenuously assembled as a site of gentrification6.
Yet this solidification of Detroit is only temporary. Ongoing tests of strength – among
them,  a  sheer  disbelief  that  a  city  of  this  size  with  such high  vacancy rates  could  ever  be
gentrified – lead to ongoing contests  over  what  Detroit  is.  Furthermore,  the very identity of
gentrifiers is challenged: do they displace residents, or do they move in alongside residents?
Callon's analysis offers a way to understand the process by which locations are held together, and
the controversies that inevitably emerge around such a settling. The sociology of assocations
does not require us to think that the identity of Detroit – gentrified or not? - is settled upon the
arrival of boutique watch-maker Shinola, Whole Foods, or more white residents into Midtown;
instead, much depends on which components of Detroit are assembled. Whole Foods, Shinola,
rising rents, and young white people? Or size, vacancy, magnitude? There will be maps drawn,
newspaper  articles  and  blogs  written,  pictures  taken to  mobilize  some elements,  not  others.
Detroit's identity is unstable, and certain nonhumans, not others, will be enrolled in an attempt to
settle its identity.
6 Margaret Kohn provides the only sustained analysis of gentrification in political theory. In her account, as in the 
spatial justice literature, the question is how gentrification qualifies as an injustice (Kohn 2016). 
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Yet Whole Foods – or at least the building that currently houses it – is durable in a way
that its present surrounding controversy may or may not be. A certain kind of cynic might argue
that the Whole Foods Corporation's presence is fickle and fleeting, just as the presence of so
many of Detroit's past white residents, who moved to the suburbs since the 1960s. In Detroit,
perhaps more than in other cities, the durability of houses, streets, warehouses, skyscrapers is
haunting and promising all at once; they are considerable allies enrolled in the Detroit assembled
by ruin pornographers and rightsizers both. But while some of these buildings and infrastructure
remain  (others  have  been  torn  down by  bulldozers  commissioned  by  the  Mayor),  they  are
different than the ones built and inhabited when Detroit was the “Arsenal of Democracy,” the
epicenter of a booming middle class. Other actants have transformed these buildings – years of
rain,  snow,  wind;  sledgehammers  applied  and  copper  removed  by  industrious  scrappers;
encroaching trees and ivy; broken windows. Buildings may be durable, but their identities, too,
are also constantly undergoing tests  of strength as other actants modify them. The power of
nonhumans is that they both remain relatively durable over time and modify each other. And the
identity of geographic entities like Detroit are remade as houses are transformed. There could be
no ruin pornography without ruins: imagine glossy pictures of perfectly unchanged, early-20th
century rowhouses on streets. It's hard to view such a photo spread as a warning against white
flight and American consumption. The identity of Detroit is contingent on the mobilization of
relatively durable actants whose identities are themselves unstable.
The main question for a geography of associations concerns how and whether the actor
“Detroit” emerges in the world, and further how it is held together. To answer these questions
involves  examining the actants  that  compose Detroit.  But  one understands these actants  not
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simply by counting them (although that is one way to hold Detroit's geography together); the
point of a geography of associations is to understand which allies are enrolled into controversies
over Detroit's identity. And, as should not be surprising at this point, some especially durable
features of Detroit's infrastructure are often enrolled: the wide lanes of Grand River Ave and
Woodward Dr, the vast political boundaries of the city, the crowded Ambassador Bridge that
crosses into Canada, the abandoned factories, the half-occupied Belle Isle Aquarium, the iconic
Michigan Central Station,  a bright new stadium for Detroit's NFL team, a brand new Whole
Foods, a Diego Rivera Mural that anchors an art museum, a razed lot, a working art exhibit
composed  of  abandoned  houses  and  found  objects.  As  Detroit  is  being  reassembled  at  this
moment, all these things persist, being enrolled into certain Detroits, not in others. They, like the
tea light, draw in other actors. Geography is unstable, but it is rendered durable through tests of
strength  that  involve  actants  that  don't  sleep:  the  things  that  make  up  Detroit  don't  simply
disappear.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined a theory of spatial justice. I argue that existing accounts of
spatial justice often treat the concept as a normative outcome, which leads its proponents into
some treacherous waters. Notably, such an assessment requires theorists like Soja to adopt a
notion of space that he himself explicitly rejects: space as a background condition, or extension
of,  social  processes.  I  argued  that,  instead  of  understanding  spatial  justice  as  a  normative
outcome, spatial justice is better understood as an analytic framework that investigates the role
of  particular  geographies  in  producing  justice  and  injustice.  To  understand  how  such  an
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influence is  possible,  I  interpreted literature  in  science and technology studies  to  argue that
locations are political actors that must be assembled and held together at the same time that they
undergo tests of strength. Crucially, such an assembly may change as the actors – the humans
and nonhumans – that compose them change. That is,  nonhumans play an important  role in
constituting justice relations.
The upshot is that we're now well on the way toward spatial justice: I've shown how it's
possible  for  geographies to  influence  political  relations.  The  task  now  is  to  wrestle  more
systematically with justice. In other words, although I have so far argued that geographies can
act; I now need to show how they act on justice. In the next chapter, I take up this task.
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CHAPTER III
How to Produce Justice
Introduction
In  the  previous  chapter,  I  argued  that  spatial  justice  should  be  understood  not  as  a
normative evaluation – as an ethical state in which “space” is just or unjust – but instead as an
analytic framework that investigates how spatial relations produce justice. To begin filling out
that framework, I offered an account of how space produces anything, much less justice. I argued
that the most fruitful way to understand spatial  production is to conceive of both space and
society as collectives that require assembling. Space refers to particular locations that are held
together through human and nonhuman actors – territories, places, scales, networks, maps, as
well as bureaucrats, police officers, store owners, and urban planners. Yet not only space is made
and held together, but those locations help to hold together all those other actors. The gentrifiers
we encountered in the previous chapter are assembled through their relationship to rising rents, a
history of white flight, their movement from suburbs to the city center, how and whether other
city residents are displaced, whether they work in the Cass Corridor or Downtown, and what bars
and restaurants they frequent. Spatiality – where the gentry are - is one important factor in what
it means to be “the gentry.” 
In  the  remainder  of  this  dissertation,  I  use  the  spatial  framework  developed  in  the
previous chapter to analyze justice claims. The guiding question for the rest of this dissertation is
“how does  space  produce  justice?”  In  this  chapter,  I  provide  the  conceptual  answer  to  this
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question, which has two parts. First, space is the foundation for justice claims. Although space
might explicitly serve as the foundation for justice claims – as when we say “segregation is
unjust” – my claim here is that spatial relations are the foundation of justice claims whatever
their explicit endorsement. Second, spatial relations help to produce social collectives who make
justice claims. Recall from the previous chapter that, for space to be an actant, it must “redraw
social maps.” That is, space must be understood to bring new social collectives into existence.
Those new collectives can,  in  turn,  make justice claims.  Thus,  spatial  relations can produce
justice relations in 1) modifying the terms of justice claims; and 2) creating social collectives
who make justice claims.
To make my case, I proceed in two sections, following the two principles outlined above.
First, I show how spatial relations are the foundation of justice claims among theorists of justice.
I analyze theorists of justice because they offer systematic accounts of justice, and thus might
make  visible  how space  does  or  doesn't  ground  justice  claims.  My goal  is  not  to  offer  an
exhaustive survey of theories of justice, but rather to carefully analyze some prominent theories
of  the  interrelationship  of  space  and  justice.  To  that  end,  I  analyze  two  pivotal  figures  in
contemporary justice theory: John Rawls and Michael Walzer. I argue that, even when they seek
to eviscerate space from their theories, justice theorists like John Rawls implicitly enroll space to
prop up their theories of justice. Moreover, much of the disagreement between Rawls and Walzer
can and should be understood in spatial terms. Despite the implicit importance of space in their
accounts of justice, space remains a silent partner for both Rawls and Walzer; space is merely a
background condition for justice (albeit a conceptually important one). Thus, space is always a
foundation for justice claims.
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In the second and third parts of this chapter, I outline what it means for spatial relations to
produce social collectives who make justice claims. I do so in the second section, “Justice as
Encounter,” by analyzing one prominent way in which political theorists have brought spatial
relations to the forefront of justice theory: the encounter. When people encounter each other, the
argument  goes,  they  learn  to  tolerate  cultural,  racial,  class  and  ethnic  differences,  and thus
increased encounters among citizens can promote justice. Although theorists of the encounter
explicitly endorse the productive power of spatial relations, I argue that they do so by treating
social relations as static.
In the third section, I begin to elaborate an alternative model for analyzing the spatial
production of collectives who make justice claims. I extend some recent work in the production
of race literature, which argues that shifting metropolitan forms make race durable in America. I
argue that  this  literature provides a foundation for thinking about  how social  collectives are
spatially produced, a foundation that I will continue to elaborate in Chapter 4.
What follows, then,  is  both an argument about spatial  justice and an argument about
political theory as a discipline. The argument about spatial justice is that we need to understand it
as an analytic framework that investigates how spatial relations can produce political and social
collectives who are marked with and take up certain kinds of justice claims. The argument about
political theory is that space is a fundamental, if usually only silent, participant in making justice
claims.
I. Space as a silent partner
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Political theorists frequently deploy spatial metaphors to make their arguments: public
space, the private realm, the landscape of modernity, Arendt's table and chair, the place where
theory meets action, and on and on. Most plausibly, the authors using these spatial metaphors
intend  them as  metaphors  alone.  Whatever  their  intentions,  alongside  spatial  justice  scholar
Mustafa  Dikeç,  I  argue in  this  section  that,  for  political  theorists,  “‘space’ is  not  employed
merely for the sake of simplicity or convenience. It  does a good deal of theoretical work...”
(Dikeç 2012, 669).  In particular, I argue that space implicitly does some heavy lifting for both
John Rawls and Michael Walzer in that it provides the very foundation of their arguments about
justice. Yet even as space is enrolled into their theories of justice – indeed is woven into the very
fabric  of  the disagreement between them – space remains a  silent  partner.  Thus,  Rawls  and
Walzer are instructive for thinking about spatial justice because they show two different ways for
rendering space merely a backdrop for considerations of justice, even while they both implicitly
rely on space to construct their theories. The argument here is that space is always enrolled in
theories of justice, and thus an important participant in nearly any claim about justice.
Rawls and the View from Nowhere
There is something striking about how John Rawls talks about justice: there are so few
spatial metaphors. Given the frequency of spatial metaphors in political writings, John Rawls
seems almost systematic in his evisceration of them from  Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
(2001), his late-career restatement of many of the ideas he originally presented in  Theory of
Justice. Even his discussion of the public, perhaps the most frequently spatialized concept in
political theory, remains an ideal and not a realm: Rawls speaks of “public reason,” defined by a
53
specific mode of justification among equals, wherever it may occur (89). So, too with the private
realm, about which Rawls is even more explicitly aspatial: “A domain is not a kind of space, or
place, but rather is simply the result,  or upshot, of how the principles of political justice are
applied...The principles defining the equal basic liberties and fair opportunities of citizens always
hold in and through all so-called domains” (166). Although Rawls is here describing a view of
public and private that I think is commonplace (one can have certain rights to privacy even while
outside of the home, a point consistent with Rawls here), Rawls is noticeable in his removal of,
even antipathy to, spatial language in his account. He dissolves the physical boundaries around
the home. Such an absence has led Mustafa Dikec, whom I mention in the introduction to this
section, to comment explicitly on Rawls' inattention to space (Dikeç 2001; Harvey 1973). 
That Rawls is so systematic in avoiding spatial metaphors makes his few appeals to them
are all the more striking. One such metaphor stands prominent among all others: the original
position. Rawls' original position is the means by which Rawls arrives at his principles of justice.
Famously, the original position is a point of view by which we can arrive at fair principles of
social cooperation:
“In the original position, the parties are not allowed to know the social positions
or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent. They also
do not know persons' race and ethnic group, sex, or various native endowments
such as strength and intelligence, all within the normal range. We express these
limits  on  information  figuratively  by  saying  the  parties  are  behind  a  veil  of
ignorance” (2001, 15).
The original position and the veil of ignorance are means for discovering what people would
agree to without knowing how they might end up in life. Such a position, according to Rawls,
should give a strong indication of a just ordering of society.
54
On the one hand, the original position simply reinforces what I've already said about
Rawls' space above: even Rawls' original position attempts to avoid any particular geography.
The original position is simply a heuristic for figuring out legitimate public justification, a mode
of public reasoning and not actually a place, a point Rawls consistently maintains: if people were
free and equal and without attachment to any particular social position, what model of justice
would they select (Rawls 2001, 83)? This is not a question for empirical debate (there never was
nor is there such a condition of total equality, freedom, and radical social contingency), but a
thought experiment, a device of representation (Rawls 2001, 17–18, 81). There is no where in the
original position; it is a means for discovering what we hold, here and now, to be the legitimate
conditions for and restrictions on public agreement  (2001, 80, 86), and consequently what we
ought to hold to be the legitimate principles of justice. 
Although Rawls does not mean to call forth an actual location, he cannot help but enroll a
space for the original position, and it is everywhere and nowhere all at once. Rawls is attempting
to construct universal principles of justice, applicable across all locations, independent of one's
particular  distance  (both physical  and emotional)  from others,  and independent  of  territorial
boundaries. To do so, he detaches us from our workaday social attachments and asks us to enter a
mode of public reasoning, a disembodied self in the ether, present at no actual location. And what
I want to stress is that Rawls requires just this unplaced everywhere and nowhere to make the
original position work.
As a counter-factual, imagine that Rawls were required to actually assign a particular
geographic location for the meeting place of the Original Position. For the sake of making our
hypothetical  manageable,  we'll  limit  the  Convention  to  one  nation,  a  significant  territorial
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limitation on the  principles  of  justice that  Rawls  seems ready to cede  (Rawls  2001,  80,86).
Because  I  know  it  better  than  other  countries,  let's  assume  that  we're  limiting  the  Justice
Convention to the US. To make this easier on ourselves, we'll also assume that all 50 states, plus
all the US territories and protectorates, will be involved in the Convention. We'll also assume
(the  assumptions  are  stacking  up  now)  that  all  protectorates,  territories,  and  States  are  not
coerced into participation. Further, the participants actually want to engage each other as free and
equal and behind a veil of ignorance. 
The selection of a site for an event of such importance raises a variety of questions. First
and perhaps most obviously, it raises logistical questions: how will the delegates arrive? Will
some – but not others – be jet-lagged on their arrival? Will some – but not others – wither in the
heat or suffer in the arctic chill? Some Alaskan delegates will, no doubt, be selected from deep in
the Alaskan bush, which will require a jarring flight on a single propeller plane to arrive at either
Fairbanks or Anchorage, still another several hours from a lower 48 US location. Guamanian
delegates, too, will likely have a long travel day ahead of them to any location in the mainland
US.  Perhaps  we  should  select  somewhere  on  the  West  Coast  –  Los  Angeles  has  a  major
international airport – or perhaps San Francisco? Such a location would imply the least severe
jet-lag  for  the  most  far-flung  delegates  (already  we  are  following  Rawls'  maximin  rule  –
inequalities  in  travel  time  must  come  at  the  benefit  of  the  least  advantaged).  Beyond  the
logistical question, there is also a question of regional hostility: certain of our delegates – drawn
from elsewhere in the country – may well find the relaxed and groovy Los Angeles vibrations
jarring. They may feel judged for their provincialism, or hostile to encountering a certain kind of
person on the West  Coast.  And there's  also the problem of  the symbolic  importance (not  to
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mention future economic benefits in the form of tourism) attached to hosting such an event –
Washington DC is the most obvious actual beneficiary of just this sort of pride. The question of
where we should hold the Convention to the Original Position is a difficult one to answer, with
all  sorts  of  implications  for  its  attendees.  Even  if  those  attendees  mean  to  approach  the
Convention as free and equal and without their particular social attachments, their material and
spatial attachments will no doubt become exceedingly apparent as they travel great distances
across time zones into different climates. And those spatial attachments may well influence the
delegates'  abilities  to judge without  considering their  own positions,  as  they travel  from the
Alaskan bush to LA, from a coastal Maine summer to sweltering Los Angeles August.
Rawls, of course, actually cares not at all that these sorts of material difficulties beset the
actual project of the Original Position: 
“Is that position a general assembly which includes at one moment everyone who
lives at the same time? No. Is it a gathering of all actual or possible persons?
Plainly not. Can we enter it, so to speak, and if so when? We can enter it at any
time.  How? Simply by reasoning in  accordance with the  modeled  constraints,
citing only reasons those constraints allow” (2001, 86)
Rawls could not be clearer: the original position is not an actual gathering; it is simply a
mode of justification that we enter by deploying a certain kind of reasoning (with whom
one deploys that reasoning is also irrelevant; the original position models what counts as
legitimate grounds for establishing the principles of justice). 
If my hypothetical Original Position were a critique of Rawls, then I would be hard-
pressed to offer a rejoinder here. Thankfully, I've given myself no such task. What I want to point
out is that Rawls requires that we are able to imagine just such an abstract spatial existence,
detached not only from our particular friends, families, and material goods, but also from where
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we live, the borders we must cross, the degree to which we feel attached to particular places. If
Rawls  had  to  assign  an  actual  meeting  place  for  the  original  position,  if  we  were  actually
embodied  with  particular  spatial  attachments,  Rawls'  claim  about  justice  would  require  a
different  sort  of political  justification.  We would be dealing not  only with a  largely (though
hardly exclusively) deductive exercise which starts from the premise of free and equal people
without knowledge of their particular social position, because finding an actual location for the
Original Position already points to our embeddedness in particular locations. In order for Rawls'
original position – one of the most characteristic and interesting justifications for a theory of
justice – to successfully operate,  we  cannot expect to inhabit  an actual location, or else that
attachment is simply irrelevant to justice.
In the context of spatial justice, what interests me is the degree to which Rawls – who is
criticized  for  being  “weak”  on  the  sociospatial  front  (Dikeç  2001) –  is  actually  devilishly
consistent and strategic, however unintentionally, when it comes to thinking about space. The
original  position  becomes  preposterous  exactly  when  we  try  to  imagine  it  as  an  actual
convention: it must remain an exercise possible only in the space of the mind, in reason, tucked
away  in  the  philosopher's  brain7.  In  other  words,  Rawls  is  not  aspatial  nor  “weak”  on  the
sociospatial front; rather, Rawls reveals the extent to which theories of justice always rely on and
enroll space: without a view from everywhere and nowhere, applicable across all places, Rawls'
justification for his theory of justice would have to look different.
To note this much is only to state the obvious: our existence necessarily has a spatial
component, and even normative theorizing about the good life must implicitly acknowledge as
much.  Although Rawls  clearly does  enroll  geography into his  theory of  justice,  his  analysis
7  This is what Henri Lefebvre called mental space (1992, 5).  
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leaves little ability for particular places to produce or influence justice relations among citizens.
As the original position makes plain, Rawls ultimately considers justice apart from geography.
Justice is a set of principles arrived at from nowhere.
It is possible, at least, that Rawls' theory of justice might accommodate the productive
spatial claim that spatial justice requires, that justice relations are reconfigured through shifting
spatial relations. Could, for instance, distributions of certain social goods be refigured – and thus
distributive  justice  upset  or  reconfigured  -  through  changing  geographic  relations  among
citizens? For example, might income-based residential segregation result in an unfair distribution
of educational opportunities to many low income Americans? If so, might this count as a version
of geography refashioning distributive shares, and thus justice relations?
My answer  is  a  tentative  “yes,”  and  I  will  have  more  to  say  on  this  subject  in  the
concluding  chapter.  Although  Rawls'  theory  of  justice  is  capacious  enough  to  allow  for  a
productive  account  of  geography,  Rawls  ultimately  leaves  much  geography  unattended.  My
interest in this chapter, however, is to more fully flesh out what it means for space to produce
justice, and Rawls will not be a useful guide for this task.
Walzer and the Territorially Encumbered Self
Rawls was, of course, critiqued by communitarians for his inattention to the fact of social
embeddedness.  Much ink  has  been spilled  commenting  on,  defending,  and moving  political
theorists past the individualist-communitarian debate in political philosophy and political theory.
I do not wish to intervene in this dormant debate. I do, however, wish to point out the degree to
which the communitarian critiques of Rawls implicitly critiqued Rawls' geography. In that sense,
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communitarian critics of Rawls again demonstrate the degree to which claims about justice and
geography are implicitly bound together in political theory.
Communitarians were a diverse set of critics of not only Rawls, but also an entire strain 
of individualist, Anglo-American liberal philosophy. Communitarians often critiqued Rawls and 
others along methodological lines (Avineri and De-Shalit 1992, 2). In its bare-bones form, the 
methodological critique argued that Rawls and other so-called individualists detached us in an 
ontologically impossible way from our constitutive attachments. In short, Rawls' original 
position asked us to imagine ourselves as kinds of persons that we patently cannot be: 
individuals without communities (Sandel 1984). We are socially embedded beings, and Rawls 
makes a mistake in asking us to abstract from that fact.
To say that we are social beings is not, by itself, a very strong claim about space. To
construct that claim, we need a more robust account of how we are not only socially, but also
materially and geographically, embedded. In other words, the fact of constitutive attachment to a
particular social world may imply a certain spatial embeddedness, but does not, by itself, offer
any more robust a claim about spatial production.  For that, we need a more strongly spatial
critique of Rawls in the communitarian spirit.
Michael Walzer's  Spheres of Justice offers just such a critique. In the remainder of this
section, I argue that although Walzer more strongly grounds justice in space, space remains a
background  condition  for  justice in  the  sense  that  space  is  a  fixed  entity,  itself  relatively
determinate. Space, in other words, though an implicit ground for disagreement between Walzer
and  Rawls,  never  becomes  an  actant  in  producing  justice  –  it  is,  instead,  an  indicator  of
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legitimate political community. Two spatial metaphors guide my discussion, both of which are
concerned with the boundaries of justice claims - spheres and territories.
Before I interpret these metaphors, I want to take a moment to demonstrate how Walzer's
disagreement with Rawls, though explicit, is only ever implicitly spatial in character. In the first
place, the spatiality of their disagreement is evident in Walzer's method.  Walzer describes the
motivation for Spheres through an extended metaphor that evokes the different position inhabited
by himself and Rawls:
“One way to begin the philosophical enterprise – perhaps the original way – is to
walk out of the cave, leave the city, climb the mountain, fashion for oneself (what
can never be fashioned for ordinary men and women) an objective and universal
standpoint. Then one describes the terrain of everyday life from far away so that it
loses its particular contours and takes on a general shape. But I mean to stand in
the  cave,  in  the  city,  on  the  ground.  Another  way  of  doing  philosophy  is  to
interpret to one's fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share. Justice and
equality can conceivably be worked out as philosophical artifacts, but a just or an
egalitarian society cannot be. If such a society isn't already here – hidden, as it
were, in our concepts and categories – we will never know it concretely or realize
it in fact” (1983, 14)
The universal, Rawlsian project begins by leaving the place that one inhabits, taking a distant
view of the landscape, assessing humanity from the top of a mountain. Walzer, on the other hand,
means to stand here among us. And he expects to find the principles of justice here in this place.
Walzer's account is, at the outset, embedded in particular places.
To say this much is only to point out that Walzer offers a pluralist critique of Rawls. Such
a pluralist critique might take any number of forms. What interests me here is the extent to which
Walzer draws on space to make his pluralist argument. Much as Rawls attempted to detach us
entirely from any particular place in his universalist account of justice and thereby implicitly
enlisted  space  in  his  account  of  justice,  Walzer  seeks  to  situate  us  in  particular  places,  and
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thereby implicitly enlists the antidote to Rawls' everywhere and nowhere. Although it would be
too strong to claim that Walzer's disagreement with Rawls is fundamentally or primarily spatial,
it is clear that Walzer draws on a different geography than Rawls. Space is implicitly embedded
in their disagreement over justice. 
Not only in his method, but also in the substance of his disagreement with Rawls, Walzer
implicitly  enlists  space  in  his  theory  of  justice.  Because  Walzer  seeks  emplaced theories  of
justice, boundaries become a prominent problem and feature of Walzer's theory of justice. Two
spatial features – spheres and territories - with corresponding features of political life - social
goods and political communities, respectively – demonstrate the implicit importance of space for
Walzer.
In the context of social goods, the importance of boundedness can be summed up briefly:
“No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y
merely because they possess y and without regard to the meaning of x” (1983, 20). That is, each
social good – dignity, political participation, wealth, respect, love - has its own set of distributive
rules that govern it, and those rules don't necessarily work within the boundaries of other social
goods.  In  the  US,  for  instance,  wealth  and  political  power  are  usually  understood  to  be
distributed  according  to  very  different  principles:  wealth  is  either  earned  or  inherited,  and
political participation should be distributed equally by virtue of citizenship. The meritocratic or
inheritance principle should operate in the sphere of wealth, not political participation. Injustice
occurs  when distributions  of  social  goods  aren't  made  according  to  the  relevant  distributive
principle. Most frequently, such injustice is a product of “domination” (10), a condition where
having some given good “x” entitles its possessor to “y.” Domination occurs when, in the United
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States,  the  rich  exert  disproportionate  influence  on  politics  simply  because  they  are  rich
(Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2013). We call this “domination” because one set of legitimate
inequalities (wealth) bleeds into another sphere of social life (political participation). So in the
first place, the maintenance of bounded spheres of social goods is the very meaning of justice.
Second, not only are social goods bound, but so, too, are political communities bound
within territories. For Walzer, justice is plural in its character: there are many different meanings
of justice situated in particular political communities with shared social meanings. Yet how are
socially shared meanings determined? 
The answer is, in no small measure, that political communities are bound by territory:
“politics  is  always territorially  based”  (1983,  225).  To make his case about  the necessity  of
territory,  Walzer  rejects  both  the  desirability  and  possibility  of  political  community  without
territorial  boundaries.  The  dissolution  of  territory  is  undesirable  both  because  territorial
boundaries promote good governance by demarcating the community to which state actors are
obliged  (1983,  38) and  because  individual  claims  to  territory  form  the  basis  of  legitimate
government: “the state's claim to territorial jurisdiction derives ultimately from this individual
right to place”  (1983, 43). A political community's legitimacy and state obligations to political
communities are derived from the protection of its members' right to place.  
Territory and legitimate political community are so strongly co-dependent that “if  the
community is so radically divided that a single citizenship is impossible, then its territory must
be divided, too, before the rights of admission and exclusion can be exercised” (1983, 62). As an
example,  Walzer  considers  the  historical  doctrine  of  “White  Australia,”  by  which  British
colonialists claimed the entire continent of Australia for Britain. The British wanted to create a
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homogeneous (in other words, white) continent; yet that desire and the territory it occupied did
not rest on the right to place. Aboriginals were excluded from the political community of White
Australia, so territory and political community did not align. Walzer demands a revision: “Its
members could yield land for the sake of homogeneity, or they could give up homogeneity (agree
to the creation of a multiracial society) for the sake of the land. And those would be their only
choices”  (1983,  47).  In  other  words,  the  claim  to  territory  is  coextensive  with  political
legitimacy; a community's membership must be coextensive with its borders. Territory is the first
fact of political community, and it determines who must be included in political life8.
It should be no surprise that, for Walzer, territory is both necessary and desirable. Rawls
gave us  the space of everywhere and nowhere:  a  universalist  theory of justice.  In  response,
communitarians critiqued the social impossibility of that universalist project, that detachment
from particular places.  To avoid falling into an empty relativism where justice is  simply the
expression of individual  want,  justice has to  be a  set of shared norms.  In Walzer's  account,
territory is the experiential basis for that shared conception of justice. 
Walzer's emphasis on bounded social goods and political communities demonstrates how
space plays a more active role in Walzer's theory of justice than in does in Rawls. And in a
limited sense, Walzer accomplishes what I seek in a theory of spatial justice: to incorporate the
productive power of space for justice relations. Most noticeably, Walzer foregrounds the role of
8 Not only is the dissolution of territorial boundaries dangerous to governance, it is also 
unlikely. If political boundaries were to be dissolved, the free movement of people into and out 
of political communities “is almost certain to be resisted at the local level...Their members will 
organize to defend the local politics and culture against strangers” (1983, 38).  Without 
enforceable territorial boundaries that define a sense of “us,” parochially defined communities 
are likely to erect boundaries of their own. A world without teritorially defined communities is 
thus a pipe dream: “The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, 
without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life.  If this distinctiveness is a 
value, as most people...seem to believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere” (1983, 39).
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territory in legitimating and demarcating political community, a political community that sets the
norms of justice that guide it. The maintenance of borders – of distributing membership to others
– is both an issue of justice (how borders are erected can be more and less tyrannical) and a
constitutive component  of making justice relations:  borders  help us define who we are as  a
political  community  and  what  “our”  shared  values  are.  Territorial  boundaries  profoundly
influence justice relations by setting the very terms and boundaries of justice claims. 
Yet  the  particular  way in  which  Walzer  understands  the  spatial  production  of  justice
makes his a poor model for spatial justice: space is a static recipient of social action. In the
previous chapter, I argued that space – understood as particular locations – is itself produced,
albeit  not  exclusively  socially  produced.  Space,  like  society,  is  unstable  and  must  be  held
together by various actants, sometimes pulling in different directions. In Walzer's case, territory
is taken to be a relatively unproblematic and settled actant, and hence the space that Walzer
enrolls  is  ultimately  a  static  one.  For  Walzer,  territory  is  simply  a  background  condition,
something that is set by people at one point or another, most often by military conquest, that does
its work rather unproblematically until the next conquest comes along. There are then rules of
justice that must be followed once those territorial  borders have been set.  The only relevant
action for territory, in this account, is that the size of the political community must match the size
of territorial borders. 
But the point of a spatial justice analysis as I have framed it is precisely to take seriously
that  both  space  and  society  are  constantly  recomposed,  and  that  each  is  complicit  in  the
reproduction of the other. Walzer, on the other hand, makes both space and justice relatively
static  entities  whose  composition  requires  little  explanation.  Although  there  is  a  relevant
65
interrelationship between territory and the size of the political community, that interrelationship
is  direct  and  unproblematic:  the  expansion  of  territory  demands  the  inclusion  of  formerly
excluded others. Aside from a simple addition of some number of new citizens, the composition
of the political community itself changes little. That is, the “shared values” of a given political
community need not change in order for a political community to accommodate newly acquired
members. The expansion of territory is simply the expansion – but not the remaking – of the
political  community.  To  use  Latour's  language,  territory  simply  intermediates  and  reflects
changes in political community. 
In  the  preceding  two  sections,  I  argued  that  Rawls'  and  Walzer's  disagreement  is
implicitly spatial in character. Even when we might not expect it, space is enrolled into how
political theorists assemble abstract principles of justice. I argued that even Rawls, who is often
criticized as spatially unaware, is enrolling a particular space – characterized by a relationship
between a cosmopolitan scale and an everywhere present subject – to construct his theory of
justice. 
Yet  even though both  Rawls  and Walzer  rely  on space  to  construct  their  theories  of
justice,  they  treat  space  as  precisely  that  kind  of  background  container  that  spatial  justice
theorists wish to revise.  Neither Rawls nor Walzer enables space to be an active participant in
their  theories of justice. Although they implicitly rely on space to do much to prop up their
theories, they both treat it as a background condition. For Rawls, space is simply transcended; for
Walzer,  space  appears  as  a  bounded  territorial  political  community.  Theorizing  the  spatial
production of justice will require more explicit attention to the productive power of space, and I
now evaluate a common way of theorizing just that.
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II. Encounter and the Spatial Production of Difference
“...literally  bringing  people  together  in  a  variety  of  ways  through  their  daily
experience makes a difference in how they think politically – not in terms of the
content of opinions, but in terms of the awareness of different perspectives that
must  be  taken  into  account  in  forming  opinions...we  ought  to  explore  the
possibility that just as the construction of social space makes certain interactions
rare, so can it create and foster better interactions - ones better for a democratic
polity” (Bickford 2000, 370–71)
Without  using  the  word,  Susan  Bickford  theorizes  one  prominent  way  that  political
theorists  figure  the  relationship  between  space  and  justice:  the  encounter.  Encounters  –
momentary meetings among strangers who would never otherwise cross paths – help diverse
citizens to broaden their perspectives and promote understanding across difference. Importantly,
spatial reconfiguration will help to cultivate this understanding – Bickford focuses in this essay
on the detrimental effect of mass suburbanization on public life, and how a revised spatiality can
reinvigorate it. Not just Bickford, but a whole spate of political theorists and spatial theorists
argue that rearranging the city can cultivate encounters – the coming together, often by chance,
of citizens – that might enhance democracy and justice. Encounters are sometimes appealed to
explicitly – as they are in the case of Iris Young, whom I discuss at length below9 – and at other
times implicitly – as it is in the work of Peggy Kohn, who argues that public space is necessary
because it facilitates explicitly political contact among the polis' many citizens (Kohn 2004). 
This way of thinking about encounters among diverse citizens thus reflects one common
way of thinking about the relationship between space and justice.  Space might foster justice
relations in two related ways in these accounts: reconfiguring spatial relations will lead to more
9 See also (Merrifield 2011)., who argues that the encounter is a fundamental part of “the urban” and possible 
foundation for anticapitalist politics.
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encounters  (for  example,  desegregation  will  increase  encounters  across  different  types  of
citizens), and; the encounter itself is a kind of spatial relationship that transforms justice relations
(as citizens come together in one place, it influences how they understand others).  
In  what  ways  might  these  theorizations  of  the  encounter,  often  touted  by  political
theorists,  imply the productive power of spatial  relations? In other words, the above authors
argue that the city's built form can promote or limit the kinds of encounters necessary for just
relations; to what extent does that argument deploy a spatial justice analysis? I argue below that,
when understood in the first way (reconfiguring space can lead to more encounters), space is
understood,  in a  limited sense,  to “act  back” on justice relations  when citizens meet.  When
figured in the second way (encounters will help people negotiate their differences), people are
implicitly understood to carry pre-established differences to their encounters with others, and
space  is  consequently  not  understood  to  “redraw  the  social  maps.”  In  other  words,  in  the
encounter itself, social differences are implicitly figured as static, and space is figured as the
realm in which those differences meet each other without being transformed. Thus, this line of
argument about the cultivation of encounters has spatial justice intuitions, but the encounter is
ultimately a static event.
To put  this  in  the  ANT language from the  previous  chapter,  in  these  theories  where
encounters will cultivate justice, space and social difference are both figured as  intermediaries
for social structure. Recall from the previous chapter the distinction between intermediaries –
objects that transport “meaning or force without transformation: defining its inputs is enough to
define its outputs” (Latour 2007, 39) – and mediators, which “transform, translate, distort, and
modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (Latour 2007, 39). As I argue
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below, spatial relations should be understood not as a passive receptacle for group differences
(and therefore an intermediary),  but  instead  as  mediating group difference.  More directly,  if
American  cities  were  marked  by  more  encounters  among  diverse  others,  the  very  “diverse
others” in question may change substantially. Theorists of encounters frequently focus only on
the way in which remaking space can increase toleration for pre-existing differences, not the way
in which those differences can be reconfigured spatially.
To make this argument, I analyze one especially prominent example of this figuring of
the encounter: Iris Young's justice as city life and her critique of segregation. I interpret Young
both because she frequently deployed the encounter in theorizing justice relations and because,
throughout  her  career,  she  attended  to  the  relationship  between  space  and  oppression  more
generally. For example, in one of her earliest published works, “Throwing Like a Girl,” Young
analyzed the  space  of  femininity,  arguing that  a  distinct  feminine  kind of  bodily  movement
characterizes being a woman under patriarchal oppression  (Young 1980, 153). Young directly
engaged influential spatial thinkers like David Harvey and Doreen Massey, and was in turn taken
up directly by geographers  (See Callard 2011). Thus, Young offers one of the most thorough
engagements with the relationship between space, justice, and the encounter10. Any account of
spatial justice ought to account for Young's treatment of those concepts.
This  section  proceeds  in  two  parts.  First,  I  analyze  Iris  Young's  discussion  of  the
encounter and city life. My aim in this first subsection is to trace the role of spatial relations in
Young's account of justice, and in particular how Young argues for the imperative for creating
encounters that promote justice. In so doing, Young and similar theorists of the encounter, more
10 “Encounter” is a term that Young sometimes expressly uses, but at other times is implied. Yet the spirit of the 
encounter – the coming together and meeting of people – is quite clearly central to Young's justice. 
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than Rawls or Walzer,  make an argument that  implicitly  accords  an active role for space in
producing justice relations. Second, I argue that although Young insists that the right kind of
spatial  relations  are  imperative  for  managing  justice  relations  among  diverse  citizens,  the
encounter she has in mind ultimately renders space inert. Consequently, when Young discusses
space  and justice,  space  simply  becomes  the  realm for  managing social  differences  that  are
already established before emplaced.  
Encounters and the Just City
By focusing on the encounter in Young's work, I limit myself to one of many possible
treatments of space in relation to Young's political theory. Even within Justice and the Politics of
Difference, arguably Young's most influential work, the relationship between space and justice
takes a variety of forms. Each of Young's “five faces of oppression” - the different ways in which
injustice occurs – has a corollary spatial expression. So, for example, one face of oppression is a
familiar sort of Marxist exploitation: “the energies of the have-nots are continuously expended to
maintain and augment the power, status, and wealth of the haves” (Young 2011, 50). One form of
such exploitation occurs in the relationship between central city residents and suburbanites, as
suburban dwellers “work in the city, use the city's services, and enjoy its life but, except in those
rare cases where there is a city income or sales tax, pay no taxes to the city” (Young 2011, 247). 
I won't recount each of those faces of oppression here, nor list the myriad ways in which
space is enrolled into Young's account of justice. I refrain from doing so both for the sake of
brevity and, more importantly, because many of Young's spatial analyses ultimately treat space as
a realm in which social injustice happens, and thus cannot ground spatial justice as I define it.
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The suburban exploitation described above undoubtedly counts as an injustice, but Young simply
states that exploitation – the extraction of resources without reciprocal contribution – happens
across  municipal  boundaries.  Exploitation,  in  other  words,  happens  in  space.  Because  I  am
developing a theory of justice wherein space is an actant, I will not rehash the ways in which the
figuration of space in these terms – as a container in which social relations play out - brings me
no  closer.  Furthermore,  I  am  interested  here  in  how  Young  understands  and  develops  the
encounter because of its resonances with other political theorists.
In  the  encounter,  Young does  suggest  the  productive  power  of  spatial  relations.  The
encounter  is  most  prominent  when  Young discusses  an  idealized  form of  city  life  that  will
promote chance meetings among citizens, what she calls “justice as city life”11.  In an extended
metaphor, Young compares justice to an imagined, Utopian form of city life, “a form of social
relations which I define as the being together of strangers. In the city persons and groups interact
within spaces and institutions they all experience themselves as belonging to, but without those
interactions dissolving into unity or commonness” (2011, 237). Different citizens can feel a sense
of belonging in a city without needing to exclude others. The city is, for Young, a place where
differences can flourish, citizens can meet and interact across those differences, and where we
can  climb  “up  towers  to  see  the  glitter  of  lights  and  sampl[e]  the  fare  at  the  best  ethnic
restaurants”  (Young 2011, 237). In short,  the city is  the site where different types of people
encounter each other. 
11 Given Young's critiques of rural, agrarian communitarianism, it is unsurprising that Young turns to the city as 
the model built environment for justice relations. It is noteworthy that, in doing so, Young explicitly takes issue 
with the spatial form often advocated by communitarian scholars. Young took issue with the spatial basis of 
communitarianism, much as Walzer critiqued Rawls' spatiality. This further suggests the necessary 
embeddedness of spatial claims in political theory.
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The city promotes encounters, in the first place, because it supports diverse activities that
draw  people  into  the  world:  “When  stores,  restaurants,  bars,  clubs,  parks  and  offices  are
sprinkled among residences, people have a neighborly feeling about their neighborhood, they go
out and encounter one another on the streets and chat” (2011, 239). Because city neighborhoods
offer a variety of experiences, people are more likely to meet each other on their way to the
neighborhood grocery store, cafe, and dry cleaner. The city also promotes encounters through its
erotic  qualities:  “City  life  also instantiates  difference  as  the  erotic,  in  the  wide  sense of  an
attraction to the other, the pleasure and excitement of being drawn out of one's secure routine to
encounter the novel, strange, and surprising” (2011, 239). Promises of food from all corners of
the world and park performances draw us into contact with others from diverse backgrounds.
Eroticism is  a  product not  only of variety in the city,  but also the “aesthetics of [the city's]
material being: the bright and colored lights, the grandeur of its buildings, the juxtaposition of
architecture of different times, styles, and purposes. City space offers delights and surprises”
(2011, 240). Finally, cities create opportunities for encounters in public space: “city life provides
public places and forums where anyone can speak and anyone can listen”  (Young 2011, 240).
Public spaces are meeting spots for strangers, locations where diverse citizens can witness each
other. Although it would be a stretch to say that the encounter is the most important or only
element of justice in the city, it is clearly an important part of what makes the city just.
Encounters  not  only  cultivate  justice  in  an  idealized  city,  but  they  also  produce
contemporary injustice in the city. Young acknowledges that cities often fail to live up to the
ideal of tolerant cosmopolitanism, and the city's practical failures include some sinister kinds of
encounters: “homeless people lying in doorways, rape in parks, and cold-blooded racist murder”
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(ibid.). Sinister encounters might be unjust, but the absence of encounters – represented most
visibly in the segregation so prevalent in American cities - also creates injustice. In her critique
of segregation, the absence of encounters plays a central role in producing the “structures of
privilege  and  disadvantage”  (Young  2002,  205) that  mark  injustice12.  For  example,  because
members of privileged families do not see true disadvantage, they can think of their lives as
average. The things they take for granted – city services and readily accessible groceries – are
rendered normal: “by conveniently keeping the situation of the relatively disadvantaged out of
sight, it thereby renders the situation of the privileged average” (Young 2002, 208). Segregation
thereby  hides  privilege  from  view.  And  encounters  with  diverse  others  might  substantially
undermine that sense of averageness: “Many of these people who think of themselves as average,
good, and decent could be made uncomfortable by frequent everyday human encounters with
those excluded from these benefits, within their daily living environment. Their sense of justice
might  even be pricked...”  (Young 2002, 208).  Further,  regular  segregation means that,  when
encounters  do  occur,  they  can  easily  result  in  marginalization:  “Since  the  privileged  allow
themselves to construct their lives as average, when they learn of the difference between their
lives and those less privileged, this encounter may as likely feed stereotypes and deprecating
judgments as much as it may produce sympathetic understanding” (Young 2002, 210).  
As encounters are necessary for the just city,  it  is  clear that one major problem with
segregation is that it undermines the kinds of regular encounters necessary for the cultivation of
justice. The harm is that the privileged do not share environments, do not share a life, with the
12 My position here is not that Young critiques segregation solely because of its relationship to the encounter. 
Young clearly argues that one substantial harm of segregation is that it limits the housing choices of 
marginalized groups like African Americans (Young 2002, 205). However, Young also states that “most 
importantly, processes of segregation produce and reinforce serious structures of privilege and disadvantage” 
(2002, 205). The question, then, is how those structures of privilege and disadvantage are produced, and the 
encounter provides much of the answer.
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oppressed.  Without  such  encounters,  privileged  groups  are  more  likely  to  understand  their
privilege as natural,  and unlikely to  hear,  understand,  or  advance the political  claims of the
disadvantaged.  
In  this  account  of  justice  and  city  life,  we  quite  clearly  see  that  rearranging  spatial
relations is imperative for cultivating different kinds of justice relations. The spatiality of the city
can promote encounters among citizens and allow people to meet in public. In that sense, Young
implicitly offers an account, much more than either Walzer or Rawls, where spatial relations can
configure social relations. Cities enable the kinds of encounters that will lead diverse citizens to
forge  solidarity  with  similarly  positioned  people,  expose  all  citizens  to  diverse  others,  and
provide opportunities to negotiate those differences in public places. And in that limited sense,
Young enrolls space as an actant in her theory of justice: density, mixed use zoning, bright lights,
and plazas will foster encounters that reduce oppression and domination.
The Differences Encounters Don't Make
Although Young implicitly argues that spatial relations can produce justice relations by
arranging citizens so that they encounter each other, the encounter she has in mind – at least
when she turns to examples of justice and injustice – is an event that simply occurs in space
among already constituted groups. Consequently, in thinking about the role of the encounter in
promoting justice,  Young ultimately treats  both space and social  collectives  as  inert.  Such a
treatment  of  the  encounter  is  sympathetic  with  broad trends  in  thinking  about  encounter  in
political theory (as, for instance, in the case of Susan Bickford). I argue in this section that such
an understanding of the encounter cannot serve as a model for spatial justice. 
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Young's discussion of two solutions to segregation – integration and her own theory of
differentiated  solidarity  –  most  visibly  suggests  the  static  character  so  often  ascribed  to
encounters. First, although Young is deeply critical of segregation, she also rejects integration as
the proper solution to it, arguing that integration tends to “focus on patterns of group clustering
while ignoring more central issues of privilege and disadvantage”  (Young 2002, 216). That is,
Young argues that integration's boosters needlessly focus on spatial distribution of people, when
in fact the main issue of segregation concerns the disadvantage it produces. Segregation causes
its harms because of its thoroughness – in spheres of work, play, life, and political institutions –
such that encounters necessary to cultivate respect across difference are precluded. Integration is
a misguided solution to the problem of segregation, though, because it seeks to level differences
through residential redistribution rather than the cultivation of mutual understanding and respect.
Encounters  may  be  necessary  to  foster  the  encounters  that  will  help  citizens  cultivate  that
respect, but certainly are not sufficient. 
Young's implicit  point is  that groups  may be residentially clustered and differentiated
because  they  precede  their  spatialization.  For  Young,  although  encounters  can  interrupt  or
facilitate the just management of group difference, and in that sense have a hand in the normative
quality of those differences, space is pretty clearly not involved in producing those differences –
and hence the relevant basis of injustice. That is why group differences may remain residentially
differentiated  in  Young's  just  city:  spatial  differentiation  will  simply  follow  existing  ethnic,
cultural, and class affinities that have already been established and will be stable across spatial
configuration. Encounters – represented most visibly in the public spaces of Young's just city –
will  then  help  people  negotiate  these  differences  by  allowing  diverse  citizens  to  foster
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understanding across residential affinities. In the encounter, social differences are stable before
spatialized, and then meet each other in public. 
The same stability of group difference is apparent in Young's own proposed solution to
segregation, which she calls “differentiated solidarity.” Under differentiated solidarity, the city
has “some neighborhoods and communities generally recognized as group-differentiated – as
characteristically  Jewish,  or African American,  or gay,  or  Maori,  or  straight  white  European
neighborhoods”  (Young 2002, 226). Yet these neighborhoods are not homogeneous, and other
neighborhoods in the city will be more mixed. Further, there are no clear borders, and people can
travel  freely  around  the  region  without  fear  of  hostility  or  being  out  of  place.  And  the
differentiated city also has much cross-region contact: people are traveling to other districts and
neighborhoods for work,  shopping, leisure,  and residence.  Finally,  the differentiated city  has
many public spaces, where citizens can encounter each other. 
Perhaps paradoxically, differentiated solidarity is manifest in a city where space is made
irrelevant to group difference, where group differences can move freely. Residential clustering
may  occur,  but  that  clustering  is  simply  the  effect  of  established  social  identities  and  the
preference to be around similar others. Clustering in the newly differentiated city has little effect
on what it means to be African American, gay, Maori, or straight white European. Borders are
almost non-existent.  People in the differentiated city are highly mobile,  and they are free to
encounter  others  in  public  spaces.  Nearly  everyone  and  everything  are  moving  through  a
basically  frictionless  space,  where  friendly  faces  welcome  diverse  others  into  diverse
neighborhoods. Strangely enough, space is almost as ineffectual in this account as it is in Rawls':
citizens move across neighborhoods and encounter  each other as equals.  The fact  that some
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people live together here, and others together there, is simply a reflection of a desire to live with
like others. In differentiated solidarity, space has been rendered just because it is powerless: we
bring ourselves to encounters with others, already carrying along the identities and differences
that we assert to them. 
As an example of how Young de-spatializes  difference,  consider  again one particular
aspect of Young's critique of segregation: segregation normalizes privilege and hides it from the
view of the privileged.  It  might  seem as though Young is  suggesting that  the privileged are
reconfigured  through  spatial  relations:  after  all,  they  come to  understand themselves  as  not
privileged because  of  the  few  encounters  that  transpire  between  themselves  and  the
disadvantaged. But on the other hand, Young assumes that “privileged” is given in structural
relations that are then reflected in their spatiality. The privileged are relatively solid, a product of
their structural position relative to “the oppressed.” 
The problem with this view of privilege is that it understands groups as prior to their
emplacement; it omits that part of the very meaning of “privileged” is precisely spatial, that one
inhabits and moves in particular kinds of locations, and has certain kinds of spatial relations to
others.  “Privileged,”  is  not  just  a  fact  to  be  managed  by  encounters  across  stable  group
differences;  rather,  shifting  spatial  relations  will  inevitably  reconfigure  who  is  and  is  not
privileged, what the social collective “privileged” comes to mean in the first place.  
We see just this sort of reconfiguration of privilege in discussions of gentrification, a
process that requires a different way of thinking about who is privileged than does white flight.
One way of thinking about gentrification is that privilege remains durable across spatiality – that
there is a privileged group who once moved to the suburbs and now is moving back to the city.
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Yet  the  existence  of  privilege  is  precisely  what  has  to  be  rethought  when  one  talks  about
gentrification rather than white flight: the whole point of talking about gentrification is that white
flight made privilege a primarily suburban phenomenon. “Gentrification” means to reconfigure
the group “privileged” to include those wealthy residents who return to the city. It is no longer
only that one had the resources and racial privilege to leave the city that makes for privilege, but
that one can return to the city and remake it as one pleases. And the spatiality of the gentrifiers is
central to determining both whether gentrification is occurring and who might be part of it. 
The oppressed, too, are figured around shifting mobility patterns. Much of the academic 
debate on gentrification has revolved around displacement, the process whereby residents of a 
neighborhood move to a different neighborhood even though they would have preferred to stay 
(see Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2007). The concern centers around who moved, why they moved, 
where they moved, all in an attempt to cleanly link gentrification to displacement. Scholars of 
displacement understand it to signal proof that gentrification is both unjust and occurring. In the 
process of charting displacement, they also tacitly refigure the oppressed, arguing that they have 
certain mobility patterns in relation to the newly revised privileged.
“Gentrification” not only remakes the privileged and oppressed; it makes “gentrifiers” an
actant that matters, and the geography of that actant makes all the difference. That someone
comes from outside the neighborhood and brings privilege in is  what makes gentrification a
meaningful analysis and critique. A Whole Foods in the suburbs hardly signals the arrival of
gentrifiers;  a Whole Foods on Woodward Avenue in Detroit  starts  a firestorm of speculation
about whether the gentrifiers are arriving and what that means for social justice in the Motor
City. And those changing spatial relations have constituted an entirely new group – the gentry –
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whose identity must be debated and solidified. Who are the gentry? Where do they come from?
What does that mean for Detroit's  neighborhoods? All  of these questions are simultaneously
questions of space and social position, and a justice claim emerged from that co-production. It is
not simply that gentrification is a critique of who controls space (although it clearly does involve
that), and thus a critique of powerlessness and marginalization in Young's terms. Inherent to the
critique of gentrification is  a claim about  where people are from and  how that  makes  them
privileged. What it means to be privileged in this debate is, in part, to move from an out-of-town
suburban retreat and to colonize a poor neighborhood. 
My argument here is that Young's differentiated solidarity, and the kinds of encounters it
advocates as necessary for justice, implicitly adopts an understanding of social groups as already
formed  before  being  emplaced,  and  thus  space  as  simply  the  realm in  which  social  action
happens. Crucially for thinking about spatial justice, understanding the encounter in this manner
– as the site where pre-established differences meet – underestimates the degree to which spatial
relations can reforge the very differences that come to matter in political life.  
In making this argument about a static encounter, I parallel Chantal Mouffe's criticism of
Young.  Mouffe  argued  that,  for  Young,  “there  are  groups  with  their  interests  and  identities
already given, and politics is not about the construction of new identities but about finding ways
to satisfy the demands of the various parts in a manner acceptable to all” (Mouffe 2005, 86). The
problem with such a view of political identity as stable is that a truly democratic politics may
require  the  “transformation  of  existing  social  differences”  (Mouffe  2005,  86).  Rather  than
expanding politics to accommodate and accept differences that are themselves taken to be stable,
Mouffe argues that social differences must be refigured through politics (Mouffe 2005, 70, 86).
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For example,  one prominent response to  masculinized models of citizenship is  to argue that
women and men – as the stable categories “women” and “men” – must be incorporated equally
into politics, as Carole Pateman's work has done. Such a model, argues Mouffe, unnecessarily
takes  for  granted  the  stability  of  the  binary  woman/man  (Mouffe  2005,  81).  Instead  of
incorporating  stable  differences  into  democratic  politics,  Mouffe  seeks  to  “construct  a  new
conception of citizenship where sexual difference would become effectively irrelevant” (Mouffe
2005,  82).  Politics  might  substantially  reconfigure  what  counts  as  “difference,”  not  simply
provide a forum for managing those differences.
Young's politics tended to treat social difference as static and politics as the mechanism
for managing it; Young's critique of segregation does the same to space. In Young's city, group
difference – itself already given - is managed spatially via encounters, much as group interests
might be managed in the realm of politics. What is not at stake in Young's account of segregation
is that space is crucial to the formation and maintenance of group difference. Imagined this way,
the encounter is thus an insufficient model for spatial justice, because it renders social relations –
and in particular group formation – relatively impervious to space. 
To be fair,  Young did,  at  moments,  figure the encounter – and spatial  relations  more
broadly – as actants in forging social difference. I am not arguing that Young never did, nor
could, account for the spatial production of group difference. To the contrary, at moments, Young
explicitly argued that  encounters can be the foundation of group difference: “As long as they
associated  solely  among  themselves,  for  example,  an  American  Indian  group  thought  of
themselves only as 'the people.' The encounter with other American Indians created an awareness
of difference”  (2011, 43)13. Young also suggested the productive power of spatial relations in
13 See also (Young 2002, 88–91).
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“Gender as Seriality,” in which  she argues that social collectives are the product of material-
structural facts (what Young calls a “series”). Those collectives can, under certain circumstances,
develop  a  group  consciousness  organized  around  a  political  demand  (at  which  point  they
become, according to Young, “a group”). So, for example, people who wait together for a bus are
a series  “united only by their  desire  to  ride on that  bus”  (Young 1994,  725).  Thus,  we are
assembled in some limited sense by virtue of material  and social structures – riding the bus
together, waiting on the bus corner – before we develop the consciousness of a group capable of
political change – the bus rider's union.  In these examples, Young did explicitly theorize some
version  of  the  spatial  production  of  group  difference,  one  where  spatial  relations  produced
differences that became politically meaningful.
When Young turned to segregation, she figured space as a realm in which diverse citizens
would manage their difference. In so doing, Young was in good company with many political
theorists  and  spatial  thinkers,  who  tacitly  treat  the  city  as  a  site  where  differences  will  be
managed, and justice will be the condition in which those differences meet. Such a figuring of
space as static is all the more surprising given Young's acknowledgment that encounters play a
role in producing those very differences. Although Young understood that spatial relations were
an important feature of what  it  meant  to  be related and might  have a role in redrawing the
relevant  social  maps,  she  nonetheless  did  not  incorporate  that  insight  into  her  analysis  of
segregation. What might explain such an inconsistency by Young when she turns to segregation?
In part,  this inconsistency suggests the real difficulty in thinking of space and justice
together – how can we hold both spatial relations and social relations in motion, such that neither
is rendered static, and both are enrolled into the production of the other? Further, how can that
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co-production  shed  light  on  justice  claims?  In  a  similar  context,  Jane  Bennett  noted  that
accounting for the actancy of things required a radical rewriting of “the default  grammar of
agency, a grammar that assigns activity to people and passivity to things” (Bennett 2010, 119).
Accounting for the actancy of space is a departure from some well-established ways of thinking
about justice; such an accounting was hardly Young's aim, so it should not be surprising that she
did not consistently think those elements in dynamic co-production. 
Whatever the reasons for Young's static treatment of space and group difference in the
context of segregation, that understanding of space as the site where differences are managed is
not a sufficient model for spatial justice. What is required is a more active analysis in which
space might figure group differences. In the next section, I provide a model for exactly that. By
thinking  of  spatial  relations  in  terms  of  the  social  collectives  they  reconfigure,  the  spatial
production of justice becomes visible.
III. The Spatial Production of Difference
How, then, does space produce social collectives and their justice claims? In this final
section, I draw on some work in the production of race to show how to think of both space and
social difference as emerging together. In doing so, the spatial production of justice comes into
view. In short, shifting spatial relations can produce the very differences that matter for politics,
and furthermore can become the very grounds for justice claims. What follows is a first attempt
at how to think of space, social difference, and justice together; I will continue to deploy and
develop this framework in Chapter 4.
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Space can produce difference by helping to make it legible. In  How Americans Make
Race, Clarissa Rile Hayward offers an account of this sort in the context of race. Hayward's
starting point is the following puzzle: how can it be the case that race as a social category persists
even though “race” was long ago – and continues to be – debunked as a meaningful biological
category? In other words, where does the durability of race come from? Hayward's answer is that
racial identity categories persist for two reasons: “it was institutionalized in rules and in laws and
eventually  objectified  in  spatial  forms,  which  enabled  it  to  live  on  as  a  kind  of  collective
'common sense'” (Hayward 2013, 58). Race is institutionalized, effective in bureaucracies like
Federal Housing Administration and Home Owner's Loan Corporation, and objectified, built into
the very form of the city14. In other words, segregation is an important component of making race
knowable in America.
One of Hayward's interview respondents provides an example of how race is reproduced
in the built form: 
“'[Race] was installed in my mind as a child...You know, there are certain places
you  don't  go,  certain  people  you  don't  socialize  with.'  He  characterizes  the
Birmingham neighborhood in which he grew up as ' an all-black neighborhood.'
He tells me the school he attended was 'an all-black school.' He identifies by name
what he refers to as 'white' neighborhoods in and around the city of Birmingham:
neighborhoods he says he was taught at an early age to avoid.” (46).
Hayward draws the following conclusion: “If [the respondent's] racial identity is 'embedded in
his mind,' his responses to my questions suggest, this is the case in significant part because he
learned his race through place.” (46).  In other words, this respondent learned race in part through
the places he inhabited and where they were in relation to white residents. Segregation, in this
14 Hayward argues for the prioritization neither institutionalization nor objectification, and the relationship 
between them is clearly important to her. I focus solely on objectification's role in producing racial categories 
because of her explicit spatialization of the concept.
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account,  does  far  more  than  reflect  and  reproduce  structural  inequalities;  segregation  is  an
important means by which race is made knowable at all as a collective identity. 
Contrast Hayward's account of the spatial production of race with Young's. For Young,
racial,  cultural,  and  ethnic  differences  exist  relatively  independently  of  their  spatial  forms.
Changing the form of the city so that more encounters are possible across difference leaves those
differences intact: the point of a just city is to manage the normative quality of those differences
which persist because of their structural origins, whatever their spatialization. On the other hand,
Hayward argues that the very persistence of racial categories is in part spatial: changing the form
of the city, adjusting who encounters whom, could change much about narratives of race and
social difference. Racial narratives persist because they have spatial and institutional forms that
reproduces them. “Race” is not something prior to structural relations, but rather something that
is materially reproduced15. 
This  is  not  to  say,  of  course,  that  the  city's  built  form is  the only relevant  mediator
enrolled in the maintenance of racial categories – movies that retell the Civil Rights movement,
histories of slavery, and institutional inequities come readily to mind. And forced integration –
requiring spatial relations to change by forcing the movement of oppressed communities – would
not necessarily eliminate (and would likely exacerbate) racial injustices in the United States. But
it  does  suggest,  in  a  way  that  Young  does  not,  that  those  very  racial  categories  might  be
transformed if their spatialization changed. Not only do changing spatial relations make race
relations more or less just, but they change how social actors understand themselves as members
15 The closest that Hayward gets to an explicit endorsement of the role that spatial relations might play in 
remaking race comes at the conclusion of the book: “Changing the institutions and the spaces that frame the 
ordinary stories of the racially privileged is a crucial step toward changing how Americans make and remake 
racial identity” (Hayward 2013, 202).
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of political communities. And it  is  thinkable,  at  least,  that spatial  relations would change so
profoundly as to make new racial relations.
One  striking  example  of  just  this  sort  of  reconfiguration  occurred  in  the  1920s,  as
changing  migratory  patterns  fundamentally  reshaped  racial  politics  in  the  United  States.
According to historian Matthew Frye Jacobson (1999), whiteness has been a category of national
political relevance at least since the Revolutionary period, when “free white person” was made a
prerequisite of citizenship. Yet the particular character of that whiteness – who is included and
who is not – has been contentious for just as long. Saliently for my purposes here, Jacobson
traces how, from the 1840s until the Immigration Act of 1924, as immigration from Eastern and
Southern  Europe accelerated,  whiteness  was  fragmented  into  a  distinct  biological  hierarchy:
Anglo-Saxons,  Celts,  Hebrews,  and  Slavs,  to  name  a  few,  were  ordered  according  to
phenotypical traits taken to be biological markers of race. And while these white races were
understood as provisionally white, they were nevertheless understood as sufficiently different
that the arrival of more immigrants marked a threat to racial purity and social harmony in the
United States.
Yet  in  the  period  of  the  1920s-1960s,  these  plural  white  races  were  made  into  a
monolithic Caucasian race, in part through a shifting spatiality. Two migratory changes were,
according to Jacobson, largely responsible for this shift in racial relations. First, new European
migration significantly slowed following the passage of the Johnson Act in 1924. Consequently,
some of the threat supposedly presented by these white races began to dissipate. Second, massive
migrations of African Americans from the South to the North and West “nationalized Jim Crow
as  the racial  issue  of  American  political  discourse”  (Jacobson  1999,  95).  During  the  1920s
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-1940s, the relevant distinction among races was drawn increasingly along Black/White lines.
Divisions among Europeans were less and less salient. Racial narratives in the United States
began  to  de-emphasize  the  differences  among  Caucasians,  instead  emphasizing  the  racial
differences between that newly formed Caucasian race and blacks.
Although it would be a mistake to say that these shifting migration patterns alone allowed
Caucasian to be a salient political actor, the emergence of Caucasian does suggest the importance
of shifting spatial relations for creating collectives who matter. Jacobson's own analysis is that
“Immigration restriction, along with internal black migrations, altered the nation's racial alchemy
and redrew the dominant racial configuration along the strict, binary line of white and black,
creating Caucasians where before had been so many Celts, Hebrews, Teutons, Mediterraneans,
and  Slavs”  (1999,  14).  Before  the  1920s,  European-Americans  were  understood  as
fundamentally different at  the level of biology, yet in short order were transformed into one
monolithic race of Caucasians. 
In Jacobson's telling, this Caucasian emerges in the postwar period in part produced by
shifting migration patterns. It is not simply the case that previously known racial groups were
coming into contact  with one another  and needed to  be managed,  but  the  encounter  among
diverse racial groups in fact remade how those races were knowable. And it was at this moment
that black/white segregation began to take hold in northern cities: prior to the 1930s, African
Americans and whites were far more likely to live together  (Hayward 2013, 50). This newly-
minted Caucasian came to inhabit increasingly segregated neighborhoods. Hebrews, Celts, and
Mediterraneans  –  heretofore  meaningful  biological  categories  –  were  condensed  into  one
Caucasian race whose members sought to protect the value of their  property against African
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Americans (Freund 2010). This newly emergent white race was transported to far-flung suburban
neighborhoods, where its distance from African Americans was made quite literal.
Not only do spatial relations help to make group differences like race knowable, but they
can also serve as the very foundation of justice claims associated with those shifting differences.
As an example, consider that Hayward argues that “disinvestment in America's black ghettos
exacerbated nontrivial collective problems and it effectively localized those problems in 'black
places.'”  (Hayward 2013, 71). The collective problems of living in American cities in the mid
20th century – unemployment and crumbling housing stock, for example – were, in the postwar
period, disproportionately made the problems of African Americans. These issues thus became
issues of a specifically racialized injustice through a segregated spatiality. As institutions like the
FHA and HOLC incentivized the creation of new and affordable housing stock in the suburbs
available almost exclusively to white Americans, the problems of the city – old infrastructure,
poor housing stock – became the problems of those residents who could not or did not leave city
borders. In the postwar period, it was African Americans, many of whom traveled north during
the 1910s-1960s, who inherited these problems. 
Segregation – a form of spatial relations - is the very foundation of the possibility for a
whole host of racial justice claims in the contemporary United States: segregation creates the
terms of debate about social  justice issues like access to affordable housing stock. Hayward
suggests that “black problems” became black problems through their spatiality – what had been
collective problems were abandoned by a newly emergent pan-ethnic white middle class, and
African American residents inherited those problems, which were subsequently identified with
African American communities. Well-known debates about poverty-alleviation measures ensued
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that racialized poverty. Subsequent critique of the injustice of distributional inequities is thus
premised on that  inheritance.  Segregation is  more than an indicator of deeply held systemic
injustices in the United States; it is a precondition of those inequities becoming racial inequities. 
 Here, then, we have a first crack at a spatial justice analysis: I have charted both how
particular geographies reproduce social collectives like Caucasian and African American, making
them durable without being determined; and I have shown how specific social injustices become
social injustices because of their spatiality, as “collective problems” become “black problems” in
the wake of white flight.
Consequently,  making justice claims against  racism requires  grappling with the city's
shifting spatiality. For example, critiques of gentrification enroll a different spatiality than does
segregation: displacement instead of exclusion. And the enrollment of that spatial ally has so far
proved elusive: are the gentrifiers arriving? And what does it mean for gentrification to occur in
Detroit, where vacancy is such a prominent piece of how the city is assembled? Changing spatial
relations help to redefine what it means to be white, to be racist, to be African American, to be a
homeowner, to be a true Detroiter. Both spatial and social collectives remake each other. Spatial
justice is the framework that foregrounds the connection between those two elements.
Conclusion
This chapter has brought me closer to developing a framework for spatial justice. In my
previous chapter, I defined spatial justice as an analytic framework that investigates the role of
particular geographies in producing justice and injustice. In this chapter, I offered a framework
for thinking about how space can produce justice and injustice. First, space is enrolled directly
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into claims about justice and injustice. In the first half of this chapter, I demonstrated that point
in the case of Rawls and Walzer, who enroll geographies into their theories of justice. So, too, is
space directly enrolled into justice claims when we discuss the controversies of gentrification
and segregation:  particular  geographies  are  central  to  understanding contemporary  class  and
racial injustice. 
The second way in which space produces justice is by producing the actants who make
justice claims. That is,  space is one of the actants that produces group difference. As spatial
relations change, so, too, might the relevant social groups, and with them, their justice claims
will shift. And vice versa: as social groups change, so, too, might their relevant spatiality. This is,
perhaps, the most forceful reading of Henri Lefebvre's well-worn dictum: 
“Change life! Change Society! These ideas lose completely their meaning without
producing an appropriate space. A lesson to be learned from soviet constructivists
from the 1920s and 30s, and of their failure, is that new social relations demand a
new space, and vice-versa” (Lefebvre 1992, 59)
Spatial  relations  and social  relations  are  enrolled into  each others'  production,  and as  social
relations shift, so too will spatial relations.  Given my analysis in this chapter, we can now say
that space produces justice in the following sense: spatial justice is an analytic framework that
investigates  the  role  of  particular  geographies  in  producing  the  actants  enrolled  into  justice
relations.  
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CHAPTER IV
Detroit Future City
Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I theorized spatial justice as an analytic framework that
investigates  how  spatial  relations  enable,  constrain,  and  otherwise  constitute  claims  about
in/justice  and the  groups  who articulate  them.  In  this  chapter,  I  put  that  theory  to  work  by
analyzing one particular policy document:  Detroit Future City Strategic Framework (DFC). I
argue that spatial justice can illuminate what its current critics tend to ignore: that DFC is a
document that represents where things are in Detroit, and in so doing makes an argument about
justice that is not easily understood as a distributive or procedural matter.  
DFC is an ambitious planning document that was initially published in January 2013.
The sprawling document is a vision for the city's zoning and infrastructure over the next 50
years.  DFC began as  a  mayoral  planning initiative in  2009,  when acting  and soon-to-be-re-
elected Mayor Dave Bing made “shrinking” and “right-sizing” the city a central talking point of
his 2009 re-election campaign. Planning began in earnest in early 2010, after the announcement
by the Kresge Foundation – a suburban philanthropic organization – that it would fund such a
plan to shrink the city.  After several months of surveying the city and assessing the market value
of neighborhoods, Bing's office rolled out the initial public engagement stages of the “Detroit
Works Project” (DWP) in September 2010, with much public fanfare. 
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From the outset, DWP was conceived as an immediate stopgap to the city's impending
financial woes, and in July 2011, the first short-term policy action of the plan was put into place.
In Dec 2011, amid mounting criticism that DWP was ineffective in meeting its ambitious goals
and hopelessly out of touch with the needs of Detroiters, Detroit Works was split into a “short
term” and “long-term” planning office. The long-term planning office was tasked with turning
the short-term intervention strategies into a long-term vision for the city, which it released as
Detroit Future City in January 2013.
In the context of urban planning more broadly, DFC proposes an unorthodox strategy for
Detroit's well-known and myriad problems. Following the “shrinking cities” approach, it seeks to
make  depopulation a permanent feature of Detroit.  Most urban planning outside of shrinking
cities thinks that cities like Detroit need to attract population and development to rescue the city.
In that standard scheme, increased population will  transform vacant land into occupied land.
DFC is unorthodox precisely because it does not treat  population as the solution to Detroit's
woes. Instead, DFC thinks that Detroit can be a better place by planning for the population that
currently exists in the city. Detroit needs to rethink what kinds of services it provides, how to
deliver services to the existing population,  and what kinds of alternative land uses might be
possible, all while increasing the quality of life for all of Detroit’s residents. In so doing, DFC
implicitly argues for the transformation of neighborhoods with a high concentration of vacant
land  into  lower  density neighborhoods.  As  I  will  argue  throughout  this  chapter,  such  a
transformation  requires  institutional,  material,  and  discursive  modifications  to  Detroit’s
landscape.
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The document has, perhaps not surprisingly in a city marked by outrageous poverty rates,
poor service delivery,  and a struggling school  system alongside a  history of racially  uneven
access  to  services,  attracted  a  fair  amount  of  scrutiny,  criticism,  and  boosterism by  Detroit
residents, academics, planners, and national media outlets. I argue in this chapter, first of all, that
the two most prominent modes of criticism fail to treat DFC in a manner consistent with the
spatial  justice  framework  I’ve  developed.  In  these  critiques,  DFC  is  read  as  procedurally
illegitimate or as an unjust  distribution of resources.  In the first  place,  critics argue that  the
process by which DFC was created was insufficiently participatory; in the second place, critics
argue that  DFC is a  policy instrument that will  likely lead to either displacement or further
isolation of Detroit’s already marginalized residents. These are both powerful critiques that have
forced DFC to adjust its public outreach strategies and its overt relationship to some of urban
planning’s most egregious injustices. 
Although both these critiques have appropriately placed leverage on the process guiding
DFC and its slow political adoption, they also have tended to overshadow a third possibility
illuminated by spatial justice: that DFC is a representative strategy that sets an agenda for justice
debates in Detroit. That is, DFC wants to argue that Detroit has a problem, vacancy, that can be
resolved not by attracting population but instead by transforming land use. Echoing the argument
I made in chapters 2 and 3, I argue that both the procedural and distributive critiques of DFC
overlook this productive capacity of DFC. DFC cannot simply be read as failing to engage the
public, nor can it simply be read as a map of distributions that are just or unjust; DFC poses
questions of justice around which a public might coalesce.
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My second task in this chapter is to analyze the Detroit that DFC envisions. As I suggest
above, that version of Detroit is one where present vacancy patterns guide development of green
infrastructure, open space, larger lots, housing construction, transit routes, industrial siting, and
commercial  districts.  Implicit  in  DFC is  that  although widespread vacancy – with its  set  of
durable injustices – ought not to remain a feature of Detroit, neither should the city pursue mass
population increase and widespread development. DFC systematically imagines and represents a
less dense future for the city, and in so doing presents an alternative argument about what a just
Detroit might be.
Whether DFC is ultimately right in its utopian vision is, I will argue in the final section of
this chapter, a matter that, quite reasonable criticisms notwithstanding, we cannot possibly know
ahead of time. While my aim in this chapter is neither to defend DFC’s vision nor to criticize it, I
will argue that it is a document with many potential trajectories, a potential that will be realized
as it becomes associated with other actors in political, development, and sustainability circles.
DFC presents a claim about justice and vacancy; whether it will achieve that vision or something
else entirely will be up to the political actors who take it up.
DFC without Spatial Justice
In this section, I analyze the two main critiques of DFC: 1) that DFC was insufficiently
democratic in its planning process; 2) that DFC is a covert instrument of mass displacement.
Although I am sympathetic to both critiques as political strategies to publicize and influence the
planning process, I argue here that they both tend to overlook a set of questions about DFC as a
representative strategy. That is, I will later argue that one of DFC’s primary interventions is to
93
represent  a  transformation  of  Detroit,  and  both  the  democratic  critique  and  the  distributive
critique would benefit from attention to that representation. In the first place, spatial justice can
amend the procedural critique by drawing attention to the public organized around DFC that
refused to be engaged in the agenda that DFC set. In the second place, spatial justice can inform
distributive critiques by focusing their attention on the potential trajectories of DFC.
In analyzing these critiques, I return to the discussion of spatial justice in the preceding
two chapters: deploying spatial justice will provide insight captured neither by the procedural nor
distributive critiques so often raised by critical geographers. To some extent, I am asking the
above two critiques of DFC to stand in for the ways that justice is often conceived in relation to
the planning process: in the one instance, justice is composed of adequate participation; in the
other  instance,  justice  is  concerned with  how goods and services  are  doled  out.  Both  these
versions of critique look for an external criteria by which to judge plans – whether in the guise of
democratic procedures that will legitimate (or, more frequently, make illegitimate) a policy or to
frame it as engaged in austerity or neoliberalism to demonstrate its failures. Both critiques, I
argue, would be more robust and accurate if they treated DFC as a spatial representation that
calls a public to participate in its vision of justice.
In the previous chapter, I used the example of segregation to make a first pass at spatial
justice. I argued that spatial justice iluminates how collectives are made and the justice claims
that they are subesequently marked with. In that example, it was the movement of people that
quite literally redistributed problems of the city. It would seem, on first glance, that the approach
I am taking here is quite different: rather than an actual redistribuition, I am proposing to analyze
a vision for the city, a vision that may never come to pass. Are we not looking at an entirely
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different example, an entirely different set of concerns, an entirely different understanding of
space: actual residential movement in one case, representation of Detroit’s future in the other?
What I will be able to show about DFC because of my theory of spatial justice derived 
from ANT is that these two spatial relationships – segregation on the one hand, vacancy on the 
other – require the same kind of analysis. Vacancy, like segregation, is a spatial relationship that 
must be produced and then is enrolled into competing political claims about justice. ANT will 
help me to show how vacancy (and DFC’s representations of it), like segregation, might be 
enrolled into any number of possible futures. What I want to stress is that both “actual 
movement” and “vacancy” are spatial relationships that must become political actors through a 
process of translation. Perhaps the analysis of white flight seems so different from DFC because 
segregation is already an established spatial pattern, a spatial relationship that has already 
become an actor. It is important to keep in mind, though, that segregation had to become an issue
of injustice: both through the establishment of segregation in its contemporary form as described 
in chapter 3, but also in court cases and national legislation that set limits on segregation and 
then likewise in contemporary accounts that map the staggering inequalities among black and 
white neighborhoods (Sharkey 2013; Farley et al. 1994; Wilson 2012). What we want, in both 
the case of segregation and in DFC, is an analytic framework for seeing how spatial relations 
emerge and are then translated into political actors. We can do this whether we are examining 
urban residential segregation or, as we will see in this chapter, a hotly contested map of vacancy 
and service provision.    
Procedures
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What  I  am calling  the “democracy” critique  targets  the  legitimacy of  the  process  by
which  DFC was  created.  The  charge  is,  simply,  that  the  planning  process  was  illegitimate
because it  was insufficiently participatory.  A similar critique,  I argue in Chapter 2,  has been
incorporated into much of the discussion of justice in urban planning and spatial justice: spatial
justice means granting access to meaningful participation in planning. In the context of DFC,
Shea Howell,  an activist and consistent critic of DFC, expresses one version of this critique.
Discussing  Mayor  Bing's  efforts  to  engage  Detroiters  in  the  planning  process,  Howell  asks
wryly:
“This is the heart of the problem. In a city that is noted for its local and national
organizing efforts, that has more block clubs than most cities in Michigan have
people, countless community organizations, churches on virtually every corner,
schools  engaged  in  community  rebuilding  and  political  organizations  of  all
persuasions,  why do we need a community engagement process  that  bypasses
these existing structures?” (Howell 2010b)
A robust network of community organizations already existed in the city, and the Mayor should
facilitate discussion among those organizations and their leaders to foster democratic discussion
about Detroit’s future. But instead of doing so, the Mayor has hired consultants with out-of-town
credentials: a Harvard urban planner named Toni Griffin was the project's lead (Howell 2011b),
and  an  Arlington,  VA consulting  firm  was  hired  to  lead  community  outreach.  Additionally,
suburban philanthropic organizations were heavily financially invested in the DWP process. All
of these invested parties were viewed as outsiders in control of determining Detroit’s destiny via
DWP. Howell instead argues that a truly democratic process would involve more direct input by
Detroit residents. 
Not just outside interests, but also Mayor Dave Bing was frequently a target of criticism.
For instance, longtime Detroit activist Ron Scott, commenting on Mayor Bing's visit to Northern
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Italy to observe urban planning initiatives there, “said the mayor seems to value the opinion of
European academics more than nearly 5,000 residents who attended public hearings about the
plans this fall. 'An attempt to coerce people by suggesting that services that are rendered are
going to be diminished is not good public policy nor humane,' Scott said. 'It's clear we have to
rebuild the city, but it has to happen by the ground up'” (Nichols 2010). Bing was notorious for
holing up downtown at City Hall. He failed to appear in “the neighborhoods,” the large area of
Detroit  outside  downtown and the  small  area  known as  Midtown.   For  example,  Bing  was
criticized for his failure to attend a community meeting about DWP held on the city’s periphery,
at which more than 200 pastors were present.
Second, DFC was criticized not only for its failures to facilitate participation, but also for
the kind of participation it  did facilitate.  The public engagement during the first  and second
rounds of DWP (Sept 2010 and Jan 2011) produced some intense critiques of its anti-democratic
character.  The  first  meeting  was,  by  most  accounts,  poorly  organized  for  the  nearly  1000
residents that attended. Residents had to shout to be heard, and Mayor Bing didn't speak until
nearly the end of the event  (MacDonald 2010b; Neavling 2010; Nichols 2010). After the first
round of disastrous public engagement meetings, DFC infamously introduced another misguided
public engagement measure into its planning: electronic clickers. These clickers gauge citizen
opinion by allowing real-time response to questions listed on a PowerPoint slide. A slide would
pose a question, like “what is most important to you?,” and then list a set of multiple choice
questions that participants could respond to by pressing the appropriate button on the clicker.
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If  handled  carefully,  one  could  imagine  such a  survey response  measure  to  facilitate
meaningful,  if  limited,  citizen input into the planning process. Unfortunately,  DFC presented
respondents with a ludicrous set of options, detailed in an ethnography of DWP:
“Some attendees protested the clicker questions. When asked, ‘which .. . is most
critical to your quality of life ... education ... healthcare ... grocery stores ... ’,
people called out: ‘We need them all!’ ‘I want schools and food!’ They muttered
that other questions had obvious answers (‘How important is it for Detroiters to
have access to jobs in Detroit?’). One person called out that whoever thought of
the clickers should be fired” (Montgomery 2015, 15)
Clearly,  asking residents  to  rank order  the  importance  of  education,  healthcare,  and grocery
stores is a ludicrous endeavor – all of them are necessary, and it was insulting to ask Detroiters to
order them. 
These sorts of procedural critiques were instrumental in shaping DFC’s outreach strategy,
and should be understood as effective bulwarks against the worst sorts of procedural abuses.
Notably, DWP extended its outreach efforts into the neighborhoods with a “roving table” that set
up and sought feedback on what Detroiters wanted for the future of their city. Without question,
it is inspiring that some Detroiters demanded a more active role for participation in DFC. There
is good reason for planning to be attentive to procedural issues, as the profession has often been
criticized as woefully paternalistic for much of its existence.  
Whatever the effect of these procedural critiques on DFC’s planning process, I want to
argue  that  adequately  understanding  the  procedural  critique  of  DFC  will  require  implicitly
deploying a spatial justice analysis. Spatial justice, I argue in the previous two chapters, asks
both how spatial relationships are made and how those relations are then translated into justice
claims. Some of the most forceful procedural critiques implicitly take issue with precisely this
question of spatial  representation and its  power to organize justice claims. The point of this
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critique is that democratic practice does not start  with “the people” as actors with solidified
interests that its representatives – in this case, planners – must dutifully map. Instead, democracy
is a representative process wherein spokespeople cultivate interest groups  (Disch 2011). DFC
(and planning more generally) is more than simply a process that responds to interests held by
citizens or establishes the right format in which residents can discuss their interests: it helps to
make those interests. Given this constitutive role of the policy process, spatial justice illuminates
one powerful way in which those interests are made: in literally mapping the agenda to which
residents are asked to respond. In that sense, even if we begin by assuming that DFC has failed to
meet some democratic standard, then spatial justice can help us to understand how that failure
occurred. 
The  criticism  of  how  DFC  constituted  the  public  in  question  concerned  both  the
mechanism of participation and the agenda around which that public was formed. Consider the
clickers from another perspective I have already raised: the concern over the particular set of
tradeoffs that planners asked citizens to make. One could interpret this critique as being remedied
by asking Detroiters to choose between a more realistic set of tradeoffs: would you rather spend
the city budget on improving downtown or economic development in the neighborhoods? In this
model,  DFC would simply need to find the right interests  to be negotiated,  preferences that
residents already had when they arrived at the community meeting. Yet there is another, deeper
objection  to  the  clickers,  raised  by  local  activist  Shea  Howell,  about  the  very  character  of
agenda-setting in this context:
“[C]itizens are forced to endure a presentation designed to push the rationale for
the foundation-driven plan to shrink the city. Then the citizen engagement comes
in  the  form  of  little  electronic  clickers  intended  to  gather  information  from
individuals on a series of nearly meaningless multiple choice questions loaded
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with assumptions that require discussion. But instead of engaging in conversation
about the assumptions and the ideas behind the questions, people are told to click
their "answers" in isolation from one another. This is not a process of community
engagement. It is an insult to democratic discussion.” (Howell 2011)
With Maarten Hajer, we can say that Howell is making two related criticisms of the clickers: “not
merely...the content of policymaking but the practices of policymaking as well” (Hajer 2003, 95).
Publics do not necessarily arrive to community meetings with well-formed preferences about
schools  and grocery  stores;  they  form opinions  on  issues  in  response  to  policies  like  DFC.
Howell's  criticism is  not  simply that  citizens  were asked to  rank order  an impossible set  of
tradeoffs, but also that citizens are isolated from each other and not allowed to discuss the very
basis  of  the  questions  being  asked.  Democracy,  she  claims,  would  require  a  meaningful
engagement with the policy's assumptions. This public being formed around DFC was not given
the opportunity to “reflect on what they actually valued, who they were, where they came from
and where (if anywhere) they wanted to go collectively”  (Hajer 2003, 95). Howell argues that
the community called forward here was made instrumental to a pre-determined plan, not allowed
to cultivate its own set of preferences and interests. As such, Howell objects to the way that the
public was formed.
Part  of  her  objection  concerns  the  inherent  limitations  of  the  “clicker”  for  citizen
participation. That is, the clicker is a “participatory object”  (Marres and Lezaun 2011) imbued
with  specific  political  capacities  to  organize  the  meeting's  attendees.  In  this  case,  it  enrolls
citizens at the meeting as individual interest-bearers responding to a set of questions, that DWP
assumes  a  trajectory  for  Detroit’s  future,  rather  than  as  a  community  or  public  that  would
participate in defining and debating Detroit’s possible futures.  Howell is well aware that this
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technology is being deployed in the service of keeping citizens from talking to each other and to
keep them well-behaved. 
But the other part of Howell’s critique is what happened before this town meeting was
called: the assumptions embedded in the clicker session. There is a particular representation of
Detroit imbued in these questions, one that makes vacancy and blight its primary features and
therefore  orients  questions  of  justice  and  politics  and  tradeoffs  around  those  terms.  This
representation assumes away much of what Detroiters would want to discuss: what Detroit's
problems are and therefore how they might be solved (Callon 1980). Other problematizations are
effectively made silent by DFC's framing (Callon 1980, 213) and clickers make that that silence
quite literal. Howell resists not just the particular questions being asked in this session, but the
entire way of understanding DFC's research program (Callon 1980, 214). Howell is offering a
critique of how DFC imagines the Detroit that might serve as a subject of discussion among a
public, the way in which Detroit is figured as vacant and that citizens would not emerge with
their own understanding of what Detroit might become. 
The  most  glaring  omission  from  DWP’s  clicker  sessions  concerns  the  question  of
regionalism. DWP's – and later DFC’s – focus on the city of Detroit allows its boosters to ignore
the regional, national, and global context that made Detroit a site of vacancy, and furthermore the
ways  in  which  the  metropolitan  region  and  State  of  Michigan  have  relieved  themselves  of
responsibility for the social issues that DFC raises. As historian Thomas Sugrue argued in his
landmark Origins of the Urban Crisis, many of Detroit’s social and economic problems can be
traced to white flight and uneven access to union-protected jobs. As white flight proceeded in the
region and sprawling suburbs emerged on Detroit's periphery, Detroit steadily lost its population.
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That loss of population then led to the widespread vacancy patterns and a decrease in revenue
that became the fodder for DWP’s clicker sessions. Yet DWP’s focus on the city’s problems as
concerning  tradeoffs  between  schools  and  healthy  environments,  for  instance,  completely
disregards that regional context. In an op-ed unrelated to the clicker sessions, Howell put the
problem this way: 
“By  any  ecological  or  rational  standard,  suburban  living  is  by  far  the  most
damaging to the earth and to the psyches of those who live there. Moreover, if any
of those foundations had encouraged building within the boundaries of the city,
including their own offices, we might be facing a very different question today”
(Howell 2010a)
Howell here points out the hypocrisy of the supposed philanthropic do-gooders supporting DFC:
if  suburban  interests  were  sincere  about  sustainability,  they  would  demand  change  in  their
suburban communities. Of course, they do not; instead, they look to the city, the site of persistent
meddling by suburban outsiders.
Howell’s critique implicitly raises questions about spatial justice: how it is that Detroit is
represented spatially, and how might that representation enable certain tradeoffs and questions of
justice  and  remove  others  from consideration?  In  the  absence  of  an  implicit  spatial  justice
framework, we would be led to focus on the inadequacy of the clickers as a mechanism of
participation. But – and this is the critical part – her critique concerns not simply the clicker as a
mechanism that thwarts discussion but also the political claims that are made possible by certain
representations of Detroit’s future. This is a question about how Detroit is represented, by what
means, and what alternatives are possible. Democracy is not necessarily the process whereby the
already-formed  interest  group of  residents  living  in  Detroit  neighborhoods  duke it  out  with
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planners; justice is not the outcome of “the people's” interests winning in that battle. Rather,
interests are made and transformed, residents are brought into or out of interest groups by the
political process surrounding DFC; justice claims are the means by which democratic actors
engage in and contest the representative process of urban planning. Spatial justice allows us to
see Howell’s critique as concerning agenda, concerning how DFC enables certain kinds of justice
claims  by  representing  Detroit  in  particular  ways.   Understanding  procedural  justice  in  the
context of DFC will require understanding how actors are made representatives of various justice
issues, and furthermore whether they consent to be so represented.
Displacement
DFC is read not only as a failure of procedural justice, but also as a failure of distributive
justice. The claim is that DFC covertly recommends distributions of resources that will lead to
the displacement of thousands of citizens. DFC explicitly states – repeatedly – that no residents
will be required to move out of any neighborhoods. Despite its official position, DFC cannot
shake  displacement.  Much  of  this  difficulty  no  doubt  owes  to  some  early  and  unsavory
comments by Mayor Bing that Detroit's future would involve “winners and losers” and insisting
that  Detroit  needed  to  consider  the  use  of  eminent  domain  to  correct  its  service  delivery
problems(MacDonald 2010a). Bing's comments, combined with a general distrust among citizens
accustomed  to  well-meaning  but  disastrous  urban  planning,  meant  that  displacement  would
continue to be a problem for DFC years after eminent domain was officially dropped from the
planning stages of DFC. 
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DFC  kept  the  concern  over  relocation  alive  with  its  most  prominent  representation
strategy: mapping. DFC contains scores of maps of the city, ranging in scale from several blocks
to the entire three counties that comprise the metropolitan Detroit region and even to the scale of
the  Great  Lakes  region.  These  maps  chart  present  industrial  uses,  suggested  employment
districts, transit routes, potential park sites, and vacancy rates. The most controversial of these is
DFC’s map of future service provision (Figure 1). In that image, DFC states that some of the
highest vacancy areas of the city – which are also overwhelmingly the poorest areas of the city –
will have its services “replaced, repurposed, or decommissioned” over the next 20 years. DFC
tells us that such a transition will still ensure basic service delivery, at the same time it tells us
that it will eventually retire existing city systems. 
Lucas Kirkpatrick  (2015) interprets this map as the smoking gun that reveals that DFC
will require forcible, state-sponsored displacement. In his recent article in The Journal of Urban
History,  Kirkpatrick plots a narrative of displacement by the suspension of infrastructure and
services. If this proves insufficient incentive for people to leave, so that residents in service-poor
neighborhoods choose to stay put, he imagines that state violence may then be required to meet
DFC's goals. Kirkpatrick speculates on a mechanism by which this state violence might occur: he
imagines that the governor could exercise his power to appoint an Emergency Manager, a power
recently deployed to file bankruptcy on the City’s behalf, to carry out forcible displacement.
Even if this worst-case state force scenario did not come into play, it would be bad enough of the
residents of these neighborhoods were to stay put and find themselves with even worse services
than  they  currently  have.  DFC might  “shut  off  the  tap,”  and  in  so  doing  effectively  force
residents to move or tolerate deteriorating quality of life.
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In the scholarly imagination as in the popular mind, DFC is so tethered to problems of
relocation and displacement at this point that it even gets tied to the mass foreclosure crisis still
wracking Detroit. Consider an article appearing online at the Atlantic, which narrates a tragically
common occurrence in Detroit: Esters, a longtime resident and poor pensioner has a water leak in
her basement that, in a city with unusually high water bills, eventually costs her $4000. As her
fixed pension income cannot cover the cost, she falls behind on her water bill; the balance is
transferred to her property tax bill. This process escalates until Esters' house – which she owns
outright – enters foreclosure, which forces her to bid at auction for a house she already owns.
Then, a strange connection to DFC: 
“Regardless of whether  she manages  to keep her  house,  the future of Esters’s
neighborhood may not  be in her  hands...Detroit  Future City's  maps show that
Esters’s  and  Brown’s  neighborhoods  are  set  to  be  emptied  out,  with  the
recommendation that they be “steadily depopulated.” (Hackman 2014)
This article presents the “steady depopulation” sought by DFC alongside foreclosures carried out
by the County and City for back taxes. The article, in other words, articulates DFC alongside
foreclosure, water bills, the Land Bank, and struggling pensioners in Detroit's East Side, all of
which  seem to add up to  a  grand displacement  problem for  Detroit.  DFC is  pretty  durably
connected to those problems, which will likely always leave it with doubts about whether it can
produce its more just city. 
Analyses  like  Kirkpatrick’s  and  that  which  appear  in  the  Atlantic  participate  in  a
particular  genre of  critique:  they frame DFC and plans  like it  as  an instrument of  systemic
violence that casts it as a new incarnation of a familiar injustice. Among urban scholars, this
mode of violence is framed in three ways: urban triage, urban renewal, and austerity urbanism.
“Urban  triage”  is  an  urban  planning  strategy  popular  in  the  1970s  modeled  on  battlefield
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medicine.  Urban  triage  figures  the  city  in  terms  of  a  body  system and  distressed  cities  as
requiring  strategic  intervention.  The  idea  is  that  the  most  troubled  neighborhoods  will  be
effectively amputated – resources will be withdrawn and channeled into other neighborhoods
that still have the opportunity for recovery. Alternatively, plans like DFC are branded as models
of “urban renewal,” an epithet for the 1950s planning that cleared slums and erected high-rise
buildings and modern highways in city centers. Finally, this systemic violence is characterized as
participating in a particularly neoliberal form of governance, austerity urbanism: “At the most
basic level, austerity urbanism is a reduction in government resources linked to tax revenues that
evaporated in the wake of the 2007–08 global economic crash...taxes and social expenditures
were out;  belt  tightening and ‘realistic’ spending were  in”  (Hackworth  2015,  769).  In  other
words, DFC should be understood as a belt-tightening measure consistent with restricted access
to credit and tax revenue for most major American cities.
Each of these critiques focuses on DFC as a distributive mechanism, as a way of doling
out  goods and services. They all treat DFC, in other words, as a policy document with discrete
plans, or at the very least likely distributive tendencies that are uncovered by reference to some
historical pattern. In the case of triage, the objection is that DFC targets some neighborhoods for
“amputation” and thereby leaves behind the city’s most vulnerable residents. In the case of urban
renewal, the critique is that resources and development incentives will be targeted downtown and
in the pockets of entertainment moguls. In the case of austerity, much like triage, in the absence
of credit to rebuild the city, DFC will knock down buildings in Detroit’s poorest neighborhoods
and produce a landscape much like that of urban triage.
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In treating DFC as a distributive document, these critiques read injustice out of a map,
and thereby proclaim “this space is unjust.” I argued in Chapter 2 that, in the context of a theory
of  spatial  justice,  such  a  proclamation  provided  little  insight  into  theories  of  justice.  Here,
though, we are faced with a different application of these critiques: these distributive critiques
instead argue that certain injustices can be read out of the maps that DFC produces. Maps of
service provision can provide insight into the likely injustices of DFC, so long as we can place
DFC in the right theoretical framework for diagnosing its ills. Isn’t there good reason to take
these distributive critiques seriously, even if they don’t add up to a theory of spatial justice? 
Although it is certainly worthwhile to think of the possible ways that DFC might be used
to intervene in Detroit’s development politics, what I object to in these analyses is that they treat
such distributive outcomes as a foregone conclusion owing to some external criteria. Doing so, I
argue below, does some amount of interpretive disservice to DFC, as one of DFC’s most central
aims is to represent Detroit as it is now and suggest a future for it in which population growth is
not a central figure, rather than dictate the specific distributions of resources along discrete and
well-known lines. In so analyzing DFC, I treat DFC as a representative strategy that seeks to
shift conceptions about the preconditions for just relations in Detroit. I will argue that whether
this Detroit is an instrument of distributive injustice is ultimately a matter that will be settled by
actors well outside DFC. Whatever the outcome of that political process, rather than starting with
an external framing of DFC as an instrument of some other kind of spatial logic and patterning
that will dictate its injustice, I now analyze how DFC urges the transformation of Detroit. 
 Detroit the Vacant City
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Whatever  else  DFC  might  be  –  policy  intervention,  object  of  scorn,  instrument  of
displacement, saving grace of the city – it is also quite clearly a representation of Detroit. It is, in
other words, a spatial bid for the city: an argument about where things are located relative to
each other. DFC is concerned at the outset and throughout its document with the problem not
only of how to plan for the future, but also of how to help us see Detroit anew. DFC tells us at
the very beginning of the document:
“To transform Detroit into a new, healthier, safer, more prosperous, and socially
just city requires a new understanding of the city as it is right now, an imperative
to share information and decision-making power, and a willingness to abandon
fixed  ideas  and  old  approaches,  in  favor  of  fresh,  clear-eyed  understanding.”
(Detroit Works Project 2012, 15)
DFC wants to transform Detroit, and doing so will both require some new ways of thinking and
the circulation of those ideas among political and philanthropic institutions. Again:
“...everyone who cares about Detroit [must] set aside what they think they know
about the city, and cultivate a deep, mutual understanding of what the city really is
right now.” (10, emphasis original).
DFC must represent the city as it is right now, must show us where things are relative to each
other. 
Although DFC positions itself  as quite  clearly intervening in how we know the city,
DFC’s critics have overwhelmingly treated it not as a representative document, but instead as a
plan  with  distributive  outcomes.  To  the  contrary,  here  I  argue  that  understanding  DFC’s
relationship to justice and injustice also requires understanding it as engaged in transforming
how we understand and envision Detroit. DFC – and the “shrinking cities” literature with which
it shares important similarities –  aims to shift our thinking about quality of life in contemporary
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cities like Detroit. Specifically, DFC represents a transition in Detroit from high vacancy to low
density not via moving population, but by transforming land use. 
Framework Zones: From High Vacancy to Low Density
So what is the Detroit that must be grasped with clear eyes? Although there are various
facts that DFC would like us to know, the most central one concerns vacancy, and we know this
because of a representative strategy that DFC calls “framework zones.” These framework zones
categorize  the city's  present  conditions  according to  physical  and market  characteristics  (see
Figure 2). They accomplish two things: they both map the city as it is now and, in so doing, self-
consciously seek to guide “public, private nonprofit, and philanthropic decision makers” as they
plan the city. The framework zones map is the “fundamental tool” for these decision makers
(Detroit Works Project 2012, 107). These framework zones will, DFC hopes, direct development
funds, guide infrastructure like water line maintenance and street lights, and assign new land uses
for the city over the next 50 years.  Although DFC quite clearly seeks to be part of a policy
conversation, it does so by categorizing areas of the city. 
DFC’s ambition is to envision the city as a whole by using these framework zones to
direct future development and planning: 
“The boundaries of the Framework Zones were determined not only by vacancy
conditions, but also by neighborhood identity and physical separation created by
major pieces of infrastructure or variations in land use. The goal was to analyze
districts and neighborhoods in their entirety, not on the basis of parcel-level or
block-level conditions.” (Detroit Works Project 2012, 107)
Thus, the framework zones are more than simply maps of vacancy at the block level; instead,
they represent entire areas of the city as they relate to infrastructure, land use, and market value,
109
with continuity among blocks in mind. They are the largest scale from which DFC sorts the area
of the city.  
However holistic in its criteria for determining the framework zones, it is  vacancy that
dominates DFC’s vision of Detroit as it is now16. The vast majority of Detroit's land is bounded
in framework zones sorted according to vacancy characteristics, and only a small amount of the
city's land is categorized “cemetery,” “major park,” or “industrial.” The one major exception is
“greater downtown,” which has its own framework zone because of its unique combination of
high vacancy but high market value potential. And DFC tells us that there is an important reason
to represent the city this way: “Land is Detroit's greatest liability and its greatest asset” (DFC
93). Specifically, vacant land marks both this challenge and opportunity: “Today, approximately
20 square miles of Detroit's occupiable land are vacant. Within this context, the City of Detroit
finds itself insolvent and struggling to provide the core services Detroiters need” (99). Likewise,
in  describing  the  challenging  market  conditions  of  Detroit  real  estate,  DFC  explains  that
“...vacancy  quickly  becomes  abandonment,  blight,  and  a  public  safety  risk.  These  realities
represent real, physical hurdles to Detroit's redevelopment, and demonstrate a diminished quality
of life” (99). Although there are other challenges to just land use in Detroit – toxic sites, sewer
overflow  –  vacancy  is  among  the  biggest  problems  and  holds  the  biggest  opportunity  for
Detroit's  salvation.  So  whatever  else  the  framework  zones  mean  to  convey,  they  quite
importantly mean to represent vacancy in the city. Detroit is a city with a vacancy problem.
16 DFC addresses and represents other problems, as well: joblessness, lack of access to transportation, failing 
schools. Yet the framework zones, the self-proclaimed fundamental tool of DFC, organize themselves according 
to vacancy. Thus my analysis will focus on this measure.
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Vacancy may be prevalent, but why is it a problem for Detroit? And in what ways is
vacancy an issue of justice? In answering this question, it  is important to keep in mind that
vacancy is  not necessarily nor always conceived as a problem.  (Bowman and Pagano 2004)
argue that vacancy can be understood either a problem or an opportunity for cities, and perhaps
even both at once. That is, they argue that vacant land is a necessary condition for development
and land reuse. Vacant land might be transformed into a City park, or developed into housing, or
made into a recreation center.  They argue that in a healthy real estate market, there will be few
parcels that remain vacant for long periods of time, but there will likely always be some baseline
level of vacancy in the city. It is not every form of vacancy that is harmful, but widespread and
persistent vacancy, that is a problem for cities. My discussion below will concern the effects of
widespread vacancy.
So: what's the problem with widespread vacancy? There are some general problems of
vacancy that produce some injustices noted by DFC. First, widespread vacancy leads to the loss
of city tax revenue. In cities in the US, revenue is raised in large measure through the collection
of property taxes.  Tax revenue decline is  a function of not  only fewer households  who pay
property taxes as they leave for different cities, but also falling property values within shrinking
cities.  As residents move to the suburbs or far-flung locations, or as residents fall behind on city
taxes or mortgage payments and lose their homes to foreclosure, the city loses sources of tax
revenue.
Second, increased vacancy creates some unique service delivery problems in the city,
related  to  but  distinct  from  revenue  problems.  The  story  goes  like  this:  when  cities  are
depopulated, there are fewer people to pay for services, but the area over which those services
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must be distributed does not necessarily change.  This is because, in Detroit, vacancy is unevenly
dispersed throughout the city, and in many cases unevenly within neighborhoods. The city does
not decommission services to any given neighborhood or block, because only some houses are
vacant (and thus do not require services).  In other words, Detroit still has 140 square miles of
land  area,  and  there  are,  generally  speaking,  residents  who  require  trash  pickup  and  water
delivery in even the most abandoned blocks.  Thus, the city must still deliver services to all of its
land area, despite fewer households and residents requiring those services. This is a problem of
efficiency rather than simply revenue loss – the city must provide roughly the same service per
acre, even though there are half as many people using and paying for those services (Dewar and
Weber 2012).
A third problem frequently associated with vacancy is blight, itself a heavily freighted
concept.   Unoccupied  buildings,  if  left  unoccupied,  are  often  transformed.   Scrappers  strip
buildings for copper, light fixtures, and anything else of value.  Arsonists set fire to the building
in order to collect insurance money, or else for entertainment.  Rain and snow cave in roofs.  In
all these cases, vacant buildings can become blight.  With that blight is said to come danger, most
often for children who play next door.  That danger comes in the form of structural damage –
holes in floors, crumbling ceiling joists, crime, or fire.  Fires can spread from a vacant house to
an occupied one all too easily, especially in a city finding it difficult to provide functioning fire
hydrants or adequate firefighter response time to many neighborhoods.
Fourth, but less often noted, vacancy and population loss might also lead to social and
economic  isolation.   The  vastness  of  Detroit  makes  it  difficult  to  get  around  except  by
automobile.  Yet 25.2% of Detroit's households do not own vehicles, and it is likely that they live
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in  the  neighborhoods  with  the  highest  vacancy  rates.   Thus,  residents  of  these  areas  are
effectively cut off from much of the rest of the city.  Likewise, because not only residents but
also jobs have largely left  for the suburbs, people may find it  difficult  to get to work.   For
example, ABC's “Person of the Week” James Robertson, walked 21 miles per day in order to
travel from his Detroit home to his $10.55 per hour job in the suburbs (Laitner 2015).17
DFC enrolls these features of widespread vacancy into justice claims about Detroit. In
brief, DFC recognizes that the city contains many inequitable distributions, concerning not only
vacancy,  but  also  environmental  hazards  like  regular  sewer  overflow and  air  pollution.  The
distribution of these harms is, according to DFC, an issue of justice: “Not everyone in Detroit
bears  the  burden  equally.  Past  decisions,  policies,  and  practices  placed  disproportionate
environmental and health burdens on poorer neighborhoods” (Detroit Works Project 2012, 99).
Given these  inequities,  DFC hopes  to  prove to  you,  throughout  its  300 pages,  that  “a  new
approach to land use must now correct these inequities” (Detroit Works Project 2012, 99). In
other words, DFC argues that the right form of planning can contribute to a more just city. 
I  interviewed  the  project  leader  for  DFC,  who  was  responsible  for  much  of  the
document's design. Without prompting, he noted the fundamental injustice marking so much of
the city of Detroit. I asked him to say more, at which point he noted that some of Detroit's most
entrenched  quality  of  life  problems  were  most  pronounced  in  the  most  vacant  areas,  and
furthermore  that  the  residents  of  those  areas  were  disproportionately  elderly,  black,  women,
17 The story of James Robertson is both telling and tragic.  Robertson, after a decade of walking 21 miles to and 
from work, was catapulted to momentary national fame when a local newspaper caught wind of his long daily 
march.  A Detroit college student, touched by Robertson's story, raised over $300,000 to help Robertson with 
commuting expenses.  Not long after Robertson received both the money and a brand new car donated by a local
auto dealer, he moved to an apartment in the well-to-do suburb of Troy, saying "I may have been born [in 
Detroit], but God knows I don't belong there anymore" (Laitner 2015).  Robertson reported being aggressively 
pursued for a share of his windfall profits by other residents and the landlady of the apartment where he lived.  
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and/or not participating in the official labor market. In short, Detroit's past had already produced
the conditions of injustice in the city by depriving structurally disadvantaged groups of necessary
services, and vacancy was the marker of this injustice. He put it more bluntly: “People with the
least are traveling the farthest to get groceries.” DFC, he told me, tried to imagine a future for the
city in which residents of these areas would receive the services they needed. This, he said,
would require realigning services in some pretty radical ways, because the city could not afford
to provide services in their present form. That DFC engages in some form of belt-tightening
should  not  be  surprising  given  that  its  development  was  prompted  by  Detroit's  impending
bankruptcy. It would be easy to interpret DFC's professed inability to afford more traditional
service delivery models as an indictment of its austerity or triage tendencies: DFC is simply
trying to  rid Detroit  of its  least efficient  services and neighborhoods.  Although it  is  without
question the case that DFC is engaged in some degree of belt-tightening, it is also the case that
DFC  advocates  more  than  simply  enhanced  service  delivery  efficiency.  For  example,  DFC
focuses on numerous quality of life issues like pollution remediation and transportation delivery
to all areas of the city18.  
Such an emphasis on quality of life was evident during my interview with Dan Kinkead.
He put the problem to me this way: “how do you direct development strategically without letting
the market rip the city apart?” There is a sincere aim in DFC to enhance the quality of life for
Detroit's poorest residents by ridding the city of vacancy's greatest harms: long travel times, poor
service  delivery,  lack  of  greenspace.  Furthermore,  he stressed  repeatedly  that  Detroit's  older
model of development and service provision was itself  never sustainable, that the sprawling,
single-family  detached  housing  that  marked  Detroit's  postwar  boom  created  infrastructure
18 For an extended discussion of the ways in which DFC is not simply an austerity measure, see (Schindler 2014). 
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burdens that the city could not meet, and furthermore effectively made all Detroiters dependent
on automobiles that not all  could afford.  As the city  depopulated and subsequently had less
money for service provision, these most vulnerable populations were left behind. 
That Detroit's past and present – in particular issues of racialized access to housing and
employment – are littered with injustices that are now literally built into Detroit's landscape is
hardly  a  controversial  claim.  The  spatial  distribution  of  vacancy  is,  in  important  ways,  the
product of racially uneven access to housing that was overwhelmingly built in Detroit's suburbs
and jobs that fled for the suburbs. DFC takes a structural distributive approach to these injustices,
arguing for the provision of modified services (more on that soon) and goods to residents who
are most effected by this legacy. Doing so will, according to DFC, require a new type of urban
landscape,  where green-space is  integrated into the city,  and density is  incentivized in some
distinct areas of the city. 
Kinkead’s hope is that a re-imagined city, informed but not determined by DFC, could
bring those services to the people living in the most vacant neighborhoods. In effect, DFC wants
quality of life relative to race, gender, age, and class disparities to be the measure of justice and
injustice in Dertroit. This claim concerns the injustice of the present, widespread and unevenly
felt vacancy in Detroit, and the ability for a differently imagined city to re-position services,
shops, and parkland relative to its most marginalized citizens. This is a model of justice and
injustice animated by widespread vacancy: quality of life for those who are most persistently
disadvantaged.  
In short, for DFC, some of the most pressing problems of vacancy pertain to neglect:
neglect by the city, state, and region to adequately provide for people made vulnerable through
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white flight. DFC positions itself as attending to that neglect through strategic intervention into
Detroit's housing, business, transit, and infrastructure development. For DFC, Detroit is a city
with a vacancy problem that must be solved.
How to Make and Unmake Vacancy
DFC does more than simply argue that vacancy is a problem, however. DFC was at the
center of one of the most extensive efforts to map vacant residential land in Detroit.  This is
important to note because vacancy is a condition that becomes a potential site of intervention for
policy makers; yet vacancy had to be made an issue of injustice in Detroit. And DFC was at the
center of an effort to represent that condition in Detroit, to make its patterns and distributions
known. DFC not only argued about injustice of vacancy, but needed to establish it as a problem
that could be solved.
Although this may seem like a pedestrian point – that DFC had to represent the vacancy
that could become an issue of injustice – the importance of this representative strategy becomes
especially clear when reflecting on vacancy’s precarious conceptual status. Despite neat figures
declaring that Detroit has 20 square miles of vacant property, vacancy is hardly a straightforward
category of analysis. There are different kinds of vacancy: the vacancy of the derelict building,
the momentary vacancy of the temporarily unoccupied apartment. Further, there is emptiness that
never  counts  as  vacancy.  The rural  lot,  or  the  large  front  yard of  a  suburban mansion,  will
perhaps never count as vacant. 
One might think that a more strictly legal definition could solve this problem: vacancy is
the absence of legal occupation.  Yet “occupation” is by itself a sufficient,  but not necessary,
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condition for eliminating vacancy. Take, for example, Detroit's side-lot program. Let's imagine a
house in Detroit which, for any number of reasons, the owner ceases to occupy. After the owner
leaves, that house becomes unoccupied. After some years, many storms and burst pipes, that
unoccupied house becomes “blight,” a status that very well might doom it to demolition. Once
knocked down, the lot remains unoccupied, even though the house is gone. That lot may languish
under city ownership for some period of years, at which point nearly everyone would agree that
it is vacant. Recently, it became possible for neighbors on adjacent lots to purchase these vacant
lots from the city for a small fee. The deed is then transferred to the new owner, at which point
the lot  is  no longer  vacant.  Nothing about  the status of  the lot's  occupation changes in  this
scenario  – before,  the  city  owned a  vacant  lot;  now, a  next-door  neighbor  owns  it.  Neither
occupies it; yet it has changed from vacant to not. Occupancy is not what makes this lot vacant –
the next door neighbor who comes to own this lot doesn't occupy it in any more real way than
she did before. Instead, there is a relationship between use, ownership, and proximity that has
been transformed.
Recognizing the breadth of types of vacancy, one group of authors define vacancy as
“unused or  abandoned  land,”  a  definition  that  has  expansiveness  on  its  side  but  opens  two
conceptual problems just as it settles the problem of occupation (Bowman and Pagano 2004, 7).
First:  what  counts  as  use?  After  all,  a  building  may  be  considered  “vacant”  even  though
sheltering unsanctioned residents or trees that take up a more permanent residence.  Alternately,
vacancy will pertain even when “used” for the purpose of speculation: in Detroit, for example,
some major portion of “vacant” land is owned by speculators, whose sole use is to extract future
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value from the land.19 Vacancy, too, might refer to land that was never previously developed: in
the rapidly developing city of Phoenix, for example, vacancy comprises the undeveloped, city-
owned desert north. Such undeveloped land might constitute a park or greenbelt in other cities,
not “vacant” land. Second, what is the relevant scale at which “land” will be considered unused
or abandoned? Given that there must be emptiness – and thus potentially non-use - between all
bodies, at what point does that relationship constitute unused land? Here, legal boundaries will
be absolutely central: land has to become a lot before you can even conceive of emptiness. The
reason why a suburban lawn, although consisting of perfectly “usable” land, is not considered
“vacant” is because of the legal boundary for that lot. That is, vacancy is a characteristic of use
assigned at various scales – the lot, the building, the apartment, the bedroom, the bed.  
My intention in this brief discussion is not simply to frustrate the reader in the conceptual
vagueness of vacancy; yet neither is my aim to provide a strict definition for the term. Instead,
my  point  is  that  vacancy  is  a  condition  that  must  be  made,  argued  for,  negotiated,  and
represented for it to become an injustice that DFC is charged with resolving. The question is,
then, how did vacancy become a problem for Detroit?
In the first place, widespread vacancy is a historical problem made by suburban flight:
since the 1950s, over half the city's population left, and nobody took their place. There are many
reasons why such a process occurred: racially uneven access to housing and employment were
19 One might be tempted to draw a hard line here between “use value” and “exchange value,” and thereby to define
speculated land as vacant in a straightforward way, because speculated land is simply the container of exchange 
value and not use value. Although such a distinction is no doubt important  in policy battles over speculation, I 
see no good reason to refuse to consider speculation a “use” in determining if land is vacant. If, for example, we 
consider “storing totaled automobiles” to be a use and thus a local junkyard is not “vacant” property, or if we 
consider a city dump to not be vacant but instead a location where garbage is stored, then it seems that 
“speculation” (wherein abstract exchange value is stored)  should also, on its face, count as a use. This is not an 
argument about legitimate use – it seems to me that widespread speculation is an especially harmful use that 
ought to be heavily regulated. The point of the argument here is that “use” is itself an insufficient criteria for 
determining when land is vacant.
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among the most significant forces  (Sugrue 2005). For purposes of thinking about vacancy, we
could  say  that  the  federal  government  subsidized  white  flight  in  Detroit  by  providing  low
interest,  and  therefore  inexpensive,  loans  to  new  homeowners,  the  terms  of  which  were
overwhelmingly favorable to  white  homeowners  in  Detroit's  suburbs  and excluded would-be
Black homeowners. If we have found the origins of white flight, then we have also found one of
the origins of widespread vacancy (at least insofar as we here describe Detroit's particular variety
of vacancy, which is the widespread vacancy owing to depopulation in the city's borders): many
of Detroit’s white homeowners left for the suburbs and there were not commensurate incentives
for new home occupation in the city. More recently, attention to widespread vacancy has shifted
to another  supply-side mechanism: mass  eviction  precipitated  by the 2009 foreclosure crisis
(Hackworth and Nowakowski 2015). The reasons for suburban flight are also likely demand-
side: Reynolds Farley has spent considerable time arguing that white flight was driven in no
small measure by whites' aversion to living in mixed-race neighborhoods  (Farley, Krysan, and
Fielding 1997; Farley et al. 1994).
In the  second place,  vacancy is  a  representative  problem.  While  white  flight  and its
motivators  were  a  crucial  part  of  making  widespread  vacancy,  vacancy  also  required
spokespeople before it could become an issue of injustice. In other words, widespread vacancy is
a problem insofar as its particular distribution became politically present and salient. Who or
what made vacancy present? Where did such spokespeople emerge? As a starting point, we can
say that DFC positions itself as a spokesperson for vacancy, insofar as it establishes facts like
Detroit's 20 miles of vacant property and establishes framework zones with variable levels of
vacancy. On what grounds do they speak for vacancy? The answer to this question involves the
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Detroit  Residential  Parcel  Survey  (DRPS),  an  organized  survey  of  volunteers  who,  in  the
summer of 2009, drove nearly every street in Detroit to chart the vacancy characteristics and
physical condition of every residential lot in the city. 
Vacancy's representatives were also on the very lots themselves. We get a sense for this
when  we  examine  the  definitions  that  surveyors  used  in  conducting  the  survey  (Figure  3).
Surveyors are asked to evaluate the properties by reference to some specific criteria and cues: a
tarp placed over the roof to keep out the rain signals that someone lives in this place, that it is
cared  for.  A punched-in  window makes  a  house  not  simply  vacant,  but  “vacant,  open  and
dangerous,” a new category demanding its own remedies. 
The importance of these materials in representing vacancy becomes especially clear when
we  consider  the  alternative  survey  that  mapped  vacancy,  the  Motor  City  Mapping  survey
conducted in winter 2014. According to one organizer of DRPS, because MCM conducted its
survey in the winter, surveyors relied on different measures to assess vacancy (Lewinski 2016).
The same tarp that in the summer protected the inside of the house from rain kept out the winter's
snow. Although summer rain sheds off the roof, snow simply covers the tarp, renders it invisible
to the surveyor. Yet other indicators for vacancy become more visible in the winter: a shoveled
driveway or  sidewalk  indicates  non-vacancy.  Tamped  down boot-prints  might  signal  regular
walking over  the walkway to  the home.  In all  cases,  surveyors  are  asked to  enlist  different
materials to determine the vacancy of a property. 
To  say  that  DFC,  in  collaboration  with  DRPS,  produced  vacancy  is  not  to  say  that
vacancy is somehow “not real” or “constructed” or some-such. It is instead to say that “vacancy”
as it is known in Detroit is in part a product of DFC. In that sense, DFC helped to set the agenda
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of injustice in Detroit: we now know the particular contours of vacancy geographically, and with
sufficient Census data, we can layer those contours on top of each other until we emerge with a
particular picture of injustice in Detroit.
This  is  the  basis  of  DFC’s  claim  that  Detroit  has  a  vacancy  problem:  mapping  the
contours of that vacancy, translating features of the housing stock into questions of injustice.
DFC is hardly alone in arguing that the distribution of widespread vacancy is unjust:  nearly
everyone agrees that vacant land is a problem for Detroit that needs to be addressed. To be sure,
a fringe set of proposals wish to see vacancy remain in Detroit. One author infamously proposed
that Detroit's vacant downtown skyscrapers should be allowed to slowly crumble and a theme
park should be erected around them (Vergara 1999, 1995). An out-of-town artist took a similar
idea on the road, shipping a foreclosed home to Europe to display in an art gallery  (Stryker
2016). Fortunately, much more common than these memorial proposals is to turn vacancy into
something else. For DFC, vacancy can be transformed from an agent of injustice into a solution
to  Detroit’s  inequities.  Doing  so  will  require  rethinking  vacancy’s  trajectory  and  possible
solutions.
Transforming Vacancy 
What, then, should be done? DFC’s own answer to this question involves transforming
high vacancy neighborhoods into low density neighborhoods. The framework zones represent
Detroit as it is now, and are coded primarily according to vacancy rate. It is that “clear-eyed
understanding,” given to us by the framework zones, that DFC hopes will guide future land use
decisions in Detroit. And within those framework zones, that future land use is established by
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“land use typologies” (some of which are listed on the left hand column of Figure 4) which
designate the specific land use that can be pursued within any given framework zone. Each block
and neighborhood within each framework zone will be identified along one of the following land
use typologies: neighborhood, industrial, or landscape. Each broad land use is then broken into
more specific land uses, shown in the right hand columns. Using a development matrix (Figure
5), decision makers will plan each neighborhood in the city. The framework zones are thus the
descriptive, and macro-level context that guides the potential land uses for individual, block and
neighborhood-level planning. 
To visualize how this process of framework zones and land use works, consider two very
different,  but  adjacent,  neighborhoods  in  northwest  Detroit:  Grandmont-Rosedale  and
Brightmoor.  Grandmont-Rosedale,  according  to  DFC,  is  entirely  encompassed  by  a  “Low-
Vacancy 1” framework zone. According to DFC, roughly 26% of the city's land area is similarly
“low-vacancy” (108). Following the matrix of land use typologies in Figure 5, there are now
several  choices  to  make  about  block-by-block  planning  within  this  2.5  square  mile
neighborhood: development may proceed along traditional low density residential,  traditional
medium density residential, green mixed rise (a form of development incorporating vacant lots
alongside residential properties), neighborhood center, or district center. In point of fact, DFC
suggests land uses for the framework zone, coding the part of Grandmont-Rosedale that straddles
Grand River Ave (a major traffic and commercial thoroughfare) as “neighborhood center,” a
form of mixed-use commercial and high density housing development. The rest of Grandmont-
Rosedale is slated as traditional low density or traditional medium density. The framework zones
propose  few  development  changes  in  neighborhoods  like  Grandmont-Rosedale,  Detroit's
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historically low-vacancy neighborhoods with persistent property values. There is little vacancy to
transform, and Grandmont-Rosedale's density patterns will remain more or less the same.
It  is  Detroit's  high-vacancy  framework  zones  where  the  most  radical  changes  are
proposed. Just west of Grandmont-Rosedale, across Evergreen Road, lies one of Detroit's most
photographed  and  discussed  neighborhoods,  Brightmoor.  Although  a  small  portion  of  the
neighborhood is accorded a “low vacancy 2” framework zone, most of it is coded either high
vacancy or moderate vacancy 2. In the moderate vacancy 2 areas, the matrix tells us that “green
residential,” “innovation productive” and “innovation ecological” are the available options. DFC
recommends that  much of  Brightmoor  be  transformed into  “innovation  ecological,”  wherein
ecological features are integrated into neighborhoods within the city (see Figure 6). Innovation
ecological land use will incorporate forest and farm land, stormwater runoff settling ponds, and
large park areas. Green residential is a similar, if less radical, version of land use, with room for
scattered houses alongside these innovative ecological features.  Those areas of the city, like
Brightmoor, will not be developed with more houses, but transformed into new and reputedly
sustainable uses. DFC's recommended land use strategies for the entire city are shown in Figure
7.
This map is the basis of Kirkpatrick’s assertion that DFC will ultimately involve either
displacement or cessation of city services, a point to which I will return shortly. Here, though, I
want to stress that DFC also urges another kind of transformation in how we think about Detroit:
if DFC is successful in its representational strategy, then low-vacancy areas will remain low-
vacancy;  high-vacancy  framework  zones  will  become  “innovation  ecological”  or  “green
residential” or “productive ecological.”  Gone from this land use map is any mention of vacancy,
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and with it the old-fashioned zoning categories of residential, commercial, industrial,  and the
like. Instead, this map specifies new categories and uses for areas of the city, like Brightmoor,
which are presently encompassed by “high-vacancy” and “moderate-vacancy” framework zones.
Vacancy, in the new map, is transformed into innovation ecological, green residential, blue-green
infrastructure, and a smattering of low and moderate density traditional residential zones. All of
these land uses effectively transform the vacancy of the framework zone into residential areas
according to a different condition to which vacancy is closely and often confusingly related:
density.  Grandmont-Rosedale  will  retain  its  moderate  density  residential  and  commercial
character; Brightmoor, on the other hand, will be transformed from vacant to low density.
Density and vacancy might be, but are not necessarily, related conditions. Consider a few
different hypothetical (and admittedly unrealistic) scenarios:
-  Decreased  density;  unchanged  vacancy:  A city  of  1.6  million  residents  contain  800,000
households, each of which contains exactly two residents. One day, a single person from each
household in the city leaves. The city's population would decrease by 50%, yet its vacancy rate
would remain unchanged,  as the remaining residents would continue to occupy all  available
housing.
-  Increased  vacancy;  unchanged  density:  A city  of  1.6  million  residents  contains  800,000
households, each of which contains exactly two residents. One day, every household in the city
decides  to consolidate,  such that 1.6 million people now live in  400,000 housing units.  The
remaining households  are  at  least  temporarily  vacant.  The  city's  population  density  remains
unchanged, yet its vacancy rates rise to an astonishing 50%.
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-  Increased  vacancy  and  decreased  density:  A city  of  1.6  million  residents  loses  half  its
households. The housing vacancy rate is now 50% of all available units; density is now 50% of
its former figure.
The third scenario describes Detroit's most vacant neighborhoods like Brightmoor. So,
whatever the potential conceptual distinction between vacancy and density rates, in practice they
have  proceeded  in  tandem,  as  Detroit’s  vacancy  rate  increased  while  its  overall  population
decreased during the period of the 1950s-present. 
Perhaps because of their historical co-development, density and vacancy are often used
interchangeably.  DFC, for example,  often elides vacancy, blight,  abandonment,  depopulation,
and low density, often without noticing that it is doing so: 
“Density directly impacts the financial condition of the city. Areas of the city with
high land vacancy only generate a fraction of the tax revenue that higher density
areas produce. The problem is compounded when city systems, originally sized
for a higher density,  must be maintained and renewed for a population that is
significantly smaller” (94). 
 In  this  passage,  DFC  moves  between  density,  vacancy,  back  to  density,  and  finally  to
depopulation (which, again, need not be related to vacancy).  So these related problems travel
together and are presently difficult to parse, both within DFC and outside it.  
Although density and vacancy have proceeded together historically, and although DFC
often uses those terms interchangeably, DFC’s most radical intervention is to invite its readers to
imagine that those conditions are separable when thinking about Detroit’s future. The healthier
Detroit that DFC imagines is one where vacant property, whose contours are well known because
of DRPS, is transformed not into occupied property but into property that is put to use. It does so
by shifting from neighborhoods with high vacancy to neighborhoods with low density. It is this
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difference between density and vacancy that DFC employs in its representations of the city, even
while it does not parse them conceptually in its descriptions of Detroit’s land use.
This is DFC's great spatial bid: DFC aims to re-envision Detroit such that the problems
and materials of vacancy are remade into new networks and associations with density and use at
their center. Density and vacancy are in this sense different assemblages, with different materials
and discourses.  Vacancy,  as  we have seen,  enlists  lost  residents,  lack  of  occupation,  blight,
dumping, and inadequate service provision; density, on the other hand, is a point on a continuum,
from less to more dense, which still has land use and maintenance as one of its central elements.
DFC  transforms  neighborhoods  with  a  high  concentration  of  vacancy  into  less  dense
neighborhoods. Blight is torn down, lots are mowed to make dumping less possible, vacant lots
are made into infrastructure delivery assets, transportation networks are reformed to put Detroit's
residents in new connection with downtown, the suburbs, and cross-town traffic. 
Adapting  to  depopulation  –  and  allowing  low  density  to  be  the  marker  of  this
transformation -  requires not simply a discursive shift or simple re-branding, but also knocking
down buildings,  planning for green-space,  changing legal codes to allow for alternative land
uses, establishing a land trust. In other words, adapting to vacancy is a material and discursive
bid to place actors in new social and spatial relationships to each other. But DFC is not a bid to
move  population;  rather,  certain  neighborhoods  will  be  transformed  from  “vacant”  to  “low
density” as a permanent feature of the city. For example, houses that are “blighted” must be torn
down or given over to different uses, whether demolished and shipped to a landfill or turned into
a  house  decorated  with  flowers  (“Flower  House  Detroit”  n.d.).  Vacant  land  might  host  any
number of temporary cultural, recreational, or economic activities.  Often, it is hoped that these
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uses will be entrepreneurial in character, emerging from residents' desires for particular goods or
services. A vacant lot might become an erstwhile skate park; an empty house might become an
art installation. All these uses can be planned for and managed, rather than simply tolerated until
some development project is found to take their place.
DFC’s  demonstrates  its  commitment  to  transforming  vacancy  via  land  use  and  low
density in its  Field Guide to Working With Lots, a supplementary, 72-page document produced
by the DFC implementation office in 2015  (Detroit Future City 2015). The  Field Guide is a
workbook,  filled with worksheets,  pages  for  notes,  and instructions  on how to connect  with
neighbors  and  identify  potential  sites  for  neighborhood  transformation.  At  the  end  of  the
document,  there are 36 ideas for how to transform vacant lots into stormwater management,
urban agriculture, shade cover, or park space. It is a guide for transforming Detroit's vacant lots
into used lots.
Residents  of  those  neighborhoods  are  positioned  as  the  initiators  of  these  vacant  lot
transformations. As a workbook, it is quite clearly addressed to the “you” who might fill out
worksheets that takes responsibility for “what happens in your neighborhood.” The reader and
will, first of all, gather their neighbors and start a conversation about what vacant lots might do
in the  neighborhood,  assess  available lot  soil  composition  and stormwater  holding potential,
develop a budget, and ultimately transform a lot. It is an ambitious, if perhaps overly hopeful,
attempt  to  enlist  Detroit's  citizens  to  organize  and  implement  city  transformation.  To  be
successful, this field guide will rely on entrepreneurs who can organize, plan, budget for, and
implement  land  management  in  the  city.  And  it  is  these  residents  who  will  create  value  –
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understood more expansively than simply exchange value or economic value – in Detroit's least
dense neighborhoods20.
Likewise, the problem of inadequate infrastructure delivery needs to be shed from these
high-vacancy framework zones for them to become low density neighborhoods. Infrastructure
delivery  can  be  managed  and  planned  for  with  pockets  of  lower  density  in  mind,  both  by
transforming  infrastructure  and  cultivating  so-called  “green  infrastructure”  in  its  wake.
Kinkead’s “alternative service provision” might provide one means for shedding service delivery
problems; then again, Kirkpatrick’s “decomissioning” might provide another, a point I will return
to in the final section.
What  makes  DFC’s  approach  radical  is  that  it  seeks  to  accomplish  all  this  not  by
managing the location of population, which has been the typical target of vacancy transformation
strategies, but instead by transforming land use. To see why this is a break from past planning,
consider the 1998 Community Reinvestment Strategy (CRS), developed under Mayor Dennis
Archer  (1997). Like DFC, the CRS was a framework for redeveloping the city. The CRS, too,
made frequent mention of vacancy, blight, and abandonment as major obstacles for Detroit. But
unlike DFC, the CRS proposed a transformation of vacant spaces in only two limited ways:
either vacant property was to be knocked down and then redeveloped, or else it became green-
space and parkland. Yet the CRS proposed to redevelop and repopulate all areas of the city. In
other words, CRS hoped to solve the problem of vacancy with population, to transform vacancy
into occupation.
DFC, however, embodies an alternative planning ideal that often goes under the name
“shrinking  cities”  planning.  Shrinking  cities  can  usefully  be  thought  of  as  “adaptation  to
20 DFC’s reliance on a volunteer labor force to transform vacant lots is not without its critics. See (Kinder 2016).
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depopulation”21.  That  is,  shrinking  cities  takes  as  its  starting  point  the  understanding  that
populations  may  not  increase  in  heavily  depopulated  cities  like  Detroit.  Consequently,
widespread  vacancy  and  its  attendant  problems  will  not  be  resolved  by  attracting  more
population and thereby increasing market demand for housing; planners must, instead carefully
manage  land  and  service  delivery  (Rybczynski  and  Linneman  1999;  Blanco  et  al.  2009;
Hollander 2011; Popper and Popper 2002). These authors are not simply pessimistic or resigned
to  a  city’s  decline.  On  the  contrary,  they  begin  with  a  conceptual  shift  to  recognize  that
population decline is  at  the very least  benign on its  own terms, that  it  does not represent a
necessary threat to the health of cities, that it need not be countered.  Depopulation may be here
to stay in cities like Detroit, and the question for adherents of shrinking cities planning is “what
ought the city do with all its vacant land?”
This stance toward population puts DFC at direct odds with the history of urban planning
and documents like CRS. Advocates of shrinking cities frequently tell a story about the history of
planning and the  radicalness  of  the  new planning ideal.   The story goes  like  this:  since  its
inception, urban planning was a discipline tasked with the management and promotion of urban
growth.  Growth was a characteristic of both population – mass immigration to urban centers
from rural areas coupled with increasing birth rates for much of the 20th century – and the actual
land area of the city: as city populations grew, so too, did the borders of cities.  Cities as diverse
as Detroit, Boston, Miami, and Topeka all increased both their population and land area during
21 I am inspired in this definition by planner Margaret Dewar, who described shrinking cities planning as 
“adaptation to vacancy” (Krohe 2011, 12) . While pithy and helpful in pointing our attention to making do with 
existing infrastructure and urban conditions, this characterization implies that vacancy will become a durable 
feature of the landscape, when in fact nearly all versions of shrinking cities planning would like to see vacancy 
transformed into something else. In other words, this definition risks eliding the very terms of the debates active 
in DFC and plans like it: vacancy, population, and density.
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this  period.   With  that  urban  growth  came  a  whole  catalog  of  social  problems  related  to
sanitation, transportation, housing and more.
Urban planning as a professional discipline emerges in the United States at exactly this
moment of explosive urban growth, and the management of growth's attendant social problems
has been the profession's fundamental challenge. Given that growth was at  once its  enabling
condition and fundamental challenge, the story goes that shrinking cities present some problems
that urban planners are ill-equipped to manage.  For a long time, say some advocates of shrinking
cities,  urban  planners  have  tried  to  encourage  growth  in  cities  with  declining  population.
Instead,  the  time  has  come  to  adapt  to  depopulation.  Adapting  to  depopulation  means  that
planners and city officials will not attempt to reverse depopulation and treat it as a disease to be
cured, a sign of the faltering health of a city. Instead, depopulation is conceptually equivalent to
growth, and permanent depopulation is an imaginable feature of cities. Thus, the permanently
shrunk  city,  one  where  population  declined  over  some time  period  and  there  is  no  plan  to
increase population, becomes a conceivable urban planning strategy. 
To put this all more directly, shrinking cities, and DFC with it, understand differently the
relationships among population, vacancy, and urban systems. Where standard approaches like the
CRS attempt to  solve some of the problems attendant  to urban depopulation with increased
population,  DFC  will  dis-aggregate  depopulation  from  vacancy,  and  instead  of  managing
population will  attempt to manage land use.  The movement,  properties, and perturbations of
population  are  neither  the  primary  concern  of  DFC,  nor  the  point  of  intervention  for  its
strategies. Instead, DFC makes the transformation of vacancy its primary target. The particular
character of that transformation is from vacant neighborhoods into low density neighborhoods.
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This  depopulated  city  must  be  actively  planned  for  not  by  directly  managing  a
population,  but  instead by transforming land use  itself.  This  is  not  to  say that  DFC has  no
relationship to managing population, as it quite clearly seeks to stabilize population numbers in
the city and thereby not increase vacancy rates in the city. But the solution to Detroit’s present
vacancy problems will not be located in the management of population. DFC wants to convince
us that a less dense city might be a healthy one with a high quality of life for all residents.
This point about DFC and its desire to represent the problem of vacancy and the low
density solution to it is precisely what is left out of the distributive critiques of DFC. By focusing
on the distributive outcomes of DFC and the analytical context that will direct it, critics have
tended to overlook one of DFC’s primary interventions: that it makes an argument about what a
healthy and just city might be, and therefore to introduce a way of thinking about Detroit that
does not rely on markets or population movement to resolve its planning problems. My argument
in the preceding section showed this interpretive failure on the part of critics like Kirkpatrick:
they misread what DFC does.
Such an ambition on DFC’s part does not, of course, obviate the need to think about how
it will be deployed and what that means in real terms for Detroit’s citizens. How might this
problematically  vacant  city  become  a  simply  less  dense  one?  How  does  the  conceptual
distinction materialize into city space and services?  This is not simply a discursive problem:
vacancy isn't transformed simply by looking at it a different way. Rather, those lots must become
parts of new networks and associations. What might vacant properties become associated with to
transform them? I take up these questions in the next, final section of this chapter, in which I
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argue that the interpretive miscalculation I identify above leads to a set of analytic and political
problems.
Conclusion
So: will DFC ultimately end up in displacing Detroit’s most vulnerable residents? There
are basically two ways of answering this question. The first examines DFC as a policy document
that advocates or at the very least allows – either covertly or overtly – displacement or not. This
approach focuses  on the intentions  of  DFC, about  what  it  plans  to  distribute where:  does  it
advocate displacement? Or, in the absence of covert advocacy, do its recommendations create the
possibility for displacement? The second approach, and the one I want to endorse here, argues
not for uncovering DFC’s intentions, but instead concerns the question of how DFC is enrolled
into political networks.
The difficulty of the approach that seeks to uncover DFC’s intentions is that DFC itself
makes very few statements about  how, where,  or  whether  people living in  its  lower density
neighborhoods will move, and in fact explicitly disavows forcible displacement.  When DFC
does explicitly mention the possibility of population movement, it is equivocal:
“The Detroit Strategic Framework recommends a gradual depopulation of these
areas,  but recognizes  that  there will  be residents still  living in these areas for
years, if not decades, to come. These areas are comprised of both residents who
feel strongly attached to their neighborhoods and do not want to leave, and others
who would gladly relocate to a more traditional neighborhood if  they had the
means or opportunity. For those who would choose to relocate, programs should
be  developed  to  allow  them  to  do  so.  For  those  who  choose  to  stay,  it  is
imperative to ensure that their basic levels of service are met, including provisions
for safety and security. New alternative land uses provide jobs opportunities for
residents around agriculture, aquaculture, energy fields/ forests and research plots.
Pilot projects around alternative city services such as waste collection, recycling,
and  non-fixed  route  transit  (“transit  on  demand,”  available  to  residents  by
appointment or by diverting nearby routes on request)  should be developed in
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these  areas  while  vacant  commercial  corridors  should  be  repurposed  for  blue
infrastructure. While the long-term identity of these neighborhoods should not be
residential in character, they still must sustain and support the people who live
within them” (DFC 257)
So  here  we  have  DFC  gesturing  toward  some  “alternative  land  uses”  and  advocating  for
“programs to be developed.” Some residents of high vacancy neighborhoods will choose to stay
for decades;  others  will  choose to  relocate if  given the means (and DFC vaguely advocates
providing the means). For those that remain, services should be provided. If we are looking for
what DFC advocates, all we are given are some vague endorsements.
Given  the  ambiguity  of  the  above  statement  and  despite  DFC’s  own  claims  to  the
contrary, it is tempting to imagine that the document implicitly advocates population movement.
This is, for example, Kirkpatrick’s assessment: under DFC these neighborhoods will, in the long
term, become “not residential.” In Kirkpatrick's words, this is an “oddly delivered assurance,”
that services could be “replaced, repurposed, or decommissioned,” at the same time that DFC
promises  to  deliver  services  to  those  same neighborhoods.  Given  this  statement  about  “not
residential” and DFC's maps of neighborhoods like Brightmoor that leave out representations of
houses, one might well argue that DFC is either naive or intentionally deceitful in its only brief
figuration of movement and, with Kirkpatrick, make the assessment that DFC will require the
relocation of some 88,000 people. 
I asked DFC's project leader to comment specifically on whether DFC would require the
displacement of residents or, alternatively, their forced independence from standard city services.
He denied it, and then said the following to me: 
“One  of  the  things  that  I  would  have  done  differently  is  to  emphasize  that
traditional  infrastructure  might  be  decommissioned,  but  that  people  will  still
receive  services  in  a  different  model.  We spent  too  much  time  talking  about
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decommissioning  without  spending  a  commensurate  amount  of  time  on  their
replacement” (Kinkead 2016).
In other words, DFC didn’t make its intentions clear, and this has led critics like Kirkpatrick to
speculate on the document’s ability to produce mass displacement. Critics claims that DFC is an
instrument of injustice; DFC itself denies its participation in displacement. How do we resolve
this conflict? One way might be to compare DFC to other shrinking cities plans; another might
be to place DFC in the context of urban planning more generally. 
The trouble with any answer to this question is that it asks us to speculate on a matter
whose answer we cannot  possibly know in advance.  DFC is purposely vague,  less  a policy
prescription than a framework, a vision for what the city might become. Thinking about it as a
policy  document  that  implies  displacement  supposes  that  we  can  read  out  of  it  a  set  of
distributions, that DFC is a map that either resolves injustices (as a certain kind of booster might
be tempted to think) or reveals injustices (as its critics suppose). Although DFC may in the end
do either of these things, DFC asserts  quite plainly that it  is  a framework meant to guide a
decision-making  process  and  not  a  set  of  policy  prescriptions.  DFC  states  it,  as  does  the
document’s initial lead planner, Toni Griffin: 
“We did not want to leave the city with static illustrative pictures of what their
city could look like...There were already lots of those around. We wanted to leave
the city with a tool that would enable people to manage change, because as you
know  Detroit  is  still  very  much  in  flux  in  terms  of  its  governance,  fiscal
structures, city services, population loss, and ever-changing composition of land
vacancy.” (Gallagher 2015)
DFC is a tool  that first  and foremost  represents  Detroit,  a representation that invites certain
justice claims about vacancy and quality of life. This, I think, is how we need to interpret DFC:
not  as   document  of  distributive  certainty  whose  intentions  we can  uncover,  but  instead  an
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impetus  for  potential  political  formations  around  population,  land  use,  vacancy,  and  urban
sustainability. It is a document of potential rather than certainty. 
Given  these  radically  divergent  potential  uses  for  DFC,  the  most  sensible  political
strategy is to attempt to understand its likely trajectories and guard against them: what kinds of
arrangements could DFC be enrolled into, which of them are more or less likely, and what kinds
of material,  discursive,  and political  allies would need to  likewise be enrolled for  justice or
injustice to come into existence? Thinking about DFC this way entails understanding it as a
document whose future involves something of a controversy that can only be settled politically –
DFC might  be  an  instrument  of  displacement;  it  might  an  instrument  of  austerity;  it  might
transform the city’s relationship to population; it might become just another dusty and utopian
planning document on the shelves of city archives. It also might become more than one of these
– both an instrument of austerity and a radical refashioning of the relationship between vacancy
and density in American cities. The important point is that whether it will result in displacement
or any other form of injustice depends less on what DFC itself advocates and more on the way in
which its representations are enrolled politically. 
In  a  sense,  this  question  about  likely  outcomes  is  what  critics  like  Kirkpatrick  and
Hackworth speculate on: they attempt to uncover the logic of triage or austerity in which DFC
participates. These critics initially acknowledge the potential for DFC to become any number of
things,  but then immediately settle  the question of DFC’s likely outcomes by using external
frameworks like triage and austerity: because DFC is a triage document, it is likely to produce
displacement, as do all other triage documents. 
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What would be required for DFC to become an instrument of triage? Kirkpatrick defines
triage as “any plan or policy that spatially targets expenditures on the basis of viability, such that
the ways in which the flow of public resources to 'non-viable'  neighborhoods is constricted”
(263). It was a strategy explicitly pursued in the 1970s, but has since fallen out of favor as an
explicit strategy. The basic strategy of urban triage, modeled after wartime medical practice, was
to codify and save the areas of the city that were still viable, while directing resources away from
those areas that were at risk of death. Roger Starr, who became associated with slum clearance in
1970s New York, was its  most infamous practitioner.  If DFC is in fact an urban triage plan
masquerading as sustainable planning, then it will almost certainly require the displacement of
residents.
So how likely is this scenario? What other actors would DFC need to be associated with
for DFC to become an instrument of  triage? Prominently,  DFC’s  representations of vacancy
would  have  to  be  translated  into  viability:  “Like  all  triage-based  policy,  the  plan  sorts
neighborhoods  by  viability”  (266).  Such  a  transformation  is  possible  given  the  contingent
character of DFC, but not particularly supported by DFC’s own statements and maps. DFC itself
makes only a handful of references to viability, most often in the context of the viability (in other
words  effectiveness)  of  different  land  management  solutions.  When  it  does  reference
neighborhood  viability,  it  does  so  to  argue  for  the  importance  of  maintaining viability  of
neighborhoods (in what Kirkpatrick might call a “classic triage” approach). In any case, at no
point does DFC explicitly link “viability” to vacancy characteristics. DFC is more likely to use
viability as a defensive strategy against encroachments of planning strategies rather than as a tool
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to diagnose distribution patterns in the city.22 It is beyond doubt that DFC does in fact codify the
city according to vacancy rates, yet DFC does not associate that vacancy with viability, insofar as
“viability” stands in for ability or need to be saved. Whether or not it's a promotional stunt, DFC
explicitly states that there is a future for all neighborhoods in Detroit. It is an open question, of
course,  and  one  that  I  won’t  try  to  settle  here,  whether  DFC will,  in  the  end,  be  durably
associated with triage. Much like whether it will be an instrument of displacement, resolving this
question  requires  political  intervention  by DFC’s  critics,  commentors,  and boosters,  and the
actors that do or don’t consent to DFC’s own recommendations23.
Another possibility into which DFC might be enrolled is austerity. Where Kirkpatrick
assesses  DFC  by  translating  vacancy  into  viability,  Hackworth  translates  vacancy  into
opportunity for private investment, and thereby into austerity.  Erasure and demolition are the
means by which he associates DFC with austerity. Hackworth argues that DFC cannot possibly
reduce the infrastructure costs in Detroit while also providing services to citizens in the high-
22 See the following pages for a discussion of viability: 107,  longterm strength and viability, seemingly of the city;
167, overall viability of the city; 172, viability of management solutions; 201, viability of deployment solutions;
208, viability of strategies; 208, viability of neighborhoods undermined to the benefit of other neighborhoods; 
277, in reference to how demolition will affect neighborhood viability; 339, the viability of different solutions.
23 I do, however, want to draw one important distinction in thinking about triage: it’s important to keep in mind the
difference between and actor and an analyst when talking about enrollment. An actor will attempt to enroll DFC 
into a political project, and will require allies to translate DFC into either a document of displacement or not. An
analyst, on the other hand, shows what allies are associated with DFC. These two categories are, of course, fluid
to some extent – all analysts are in the business of translating allies into networks – but they do different things. 
As an actor, Kirkpatrick would be concerned with actually turning DFC into an instrument of triage, in his case 
by discursively transforming vacancy into viability. His article in the Journal of Urban History might, if 
circulated widely and made part of other networks critical of triage, play some part in that. So in that sense, 
whether DFC is an instrument of triage is something we cannot yet know – we will have to see whether other 
actors agree, and Kirkpatrick provides some clues about which actors will be necessary. 
As an analyst, on the other hand, I think Kirkpatrick’s assessment of DFC leaves out precisely that DFC 
transforms vacancy not into viability, but instead into sustainable density.  And the analytic point is that 
Kirkpatrick treats DFC as if the justice problems were already well known and captured in the historical pattern 
of triage. That analysis falls flat because he treats DFC as a document that distributes, not as a document 
concerned with creating spatial representations that will be picked up by other actors. The point is simply that 
we can read Kirkpatrick as engaged in a recognizable political position whose analytical position misses some 
of the most important elements of DFC, and in fact grafts terms onto DFC that do not fit. 
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vacancy  framework  zones.  Likewise,  he  argues  that  DFC  provides  no  plan  for  building
affordable  housing,  a  state  of  affairs  that  will  likely  mean  that  DFC  is  just  undertaking
demolition. Finally, once the existing infrastructure and buildings are knocked down, DFC does
not have a vision of what will  replace demolished properties,  and in the context  of funding
sources, private investment is the likely outcome. That is, he argues that there are an existing set
of networks into which DFC, whatever its intentions, might be enrolled. There are well-defined
networks for funding blight-busting, but fewer such networks for building affordable housing
and alternative infrastructure. Thus, he translates DFC into austerity by moving from demolition
through what is absent in DFC: a clear plan and funding for how to proceed. This allows him to
argue that rightsizing plans like DFC are only superficially committed to greenspace and instead
want to create investment and development by erasing what is present. 
As I  argued above with Kirkpatrick,  whether  DFC will  be enrolled in  such a way is
largely a political matter in which DFC will play some part. To date, DFC has done little, beyond
some explicit denials, to assure residents that they will not be required to move. That, I think, is
the  failure  to  which  Kinkead  pointed  in  my  interview:  DFC should  have  spent  more  time
discussing  how,  exactly,  services  in  high-vacancy  neighborhoods  would  be  “replaced  or
repurposed,” rather than creating the impression that they would simply be “decommissioned”
and thus neighborhoods erased as Hackworth speculates. In any case, it is clear that whether
DFC is an instrument of displacement,  austerity, or erasure is dependent on how actors well
outside of DFC implement it. 
There is  some indication that although DFC could be enlisted in mass blight busting
efforts, its status in Detroit planning politics is more benign. Although this would take another
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chapter  to  determine,  I  did  receive  some  insight  on  DFC’s  status  within  the  planning  and
development department from a former employee (2017). At the city level, it seems as though
DFC is being used mostly as a source of data. This informant said that when Mike Duggan was
elected Mayor in 2013, he quickly distanced himself from the widely unpopular DFC. There
have since been some efforts to determine how and whether DFC might figure in city planning:
this informant was involved in a process to determine if there were any parts of DFC that aligned
with the visions of some of Detroit’s strongest community organizations. She said there was
some overlap, mainly on questions of green infrastructure and industrial siting. Likewise, one
staff member of DFC has joined the planning department. But more than these planning and
policy implications, it seems that DFC has been a source of data: “For the most part, I now see it
as  a  wealth  of  information  in  terms  of  the  surveying  that  was  done  in  that  organization.”
Unfortunately, I have not yet received a response from this informant to find out exactly what
data is being used and in what ways. But her statement does suggest that DFC’s most durable
contribution to Detroit planning is its status as a database.
This informant’s evaluation of DFC’s data and assessment of DFC is a good place to
close this chapter: “Of course the city has all sorts of problems, but I don't consider DFC one of
them.” She may, in the long-run, be right or wrong. But in any case, this chapter showed that
DFC has to be read as a representation of Detroit and alternative version of a just city. Whether
DFC can ultimately cultivate that vision remains to be seen. I do think it’s important, however, to
understand DFC and the process around it not as simply arguing for distributions that can be
called just  or unjust,  but  as  instead engaged in a  representation of Detroit  that  argues for a
particular configuration of justice: a city where high quality of life is decoupled from a promise
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of population increase. Recognizing as much requires withholding judgment about DFC as a
distributive document and instead assuming that  it  is  a  tool  that  might  be enrolled into any
number of potential  political alliances.  Such an analysis  requires approaching DFC from the
spatial justice framework I have been advocating.
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Figure 1 Strategic Renewal Approach (DFC, 175)
Figure 2 Framework Zones (DFC, 106)
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Figure 3 Detroit Residential Parcel Survey Definitions (“Detroit Residential Parcel Survey: Survey Overview 
Presentation” 2010, 15)
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Figure 4 Strategic Framework Zones (DFC, 113)
144
Figure 5 Development Matrix (DFC, 122-123)
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Figure 6 Innovation Ecological Land Use (DFC, 117)
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Figure 7 Before and After, (DFC, 118-119)
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
Political theorists have recently become interested in the role of things in politics, most
visibly by the proliferation of “new materialism” as a conceptual frame. Perhaps most prominent
among these accounts has been Jane Bennett’s  Vibrant Matter, which Bennett calls an “onto-
story” about the actancy of things. Bennett hopes that attunement to the “actancy of things” – an
efficacy similar to “agency”  – might have far-ranging political consequences:
“What would happen to our thinking about nature if we experienced materialities
as actants, and how would the direction of public policy shift if it attended more
carefully to their trajectories and powers?”  (Bennett 2010, 62)
Bennett here asks about the politics of nature, but the literature on new materialism extends this
question more broadly: how might policy and politics be transformed by the insight that things
are active participants in politics?
In  this  conclusion,  I  demonstrate  the  value  of  spatial  justice  for  thinking about  new
materialism. Without quite offering a direct answer to Bennett’s question, I argue that my theory
of  spatial  justice  suggests  a  particular  way of  answering  it:  participation rather  than  innate
capacity to act should be the focus of new materialists who analyze the role of things in politics.
I  will  argue  that  new materialists  like  Bennett  have left  themselves  open  to  the  critique  of
mysticism  because  they  have  tended  to  analyze  things  as  acting  independently  of  the
assemblages  within  which  they  operate.  Yet  I  will  also  argue  that  there  is  another  analytic
possibility latent in these accounts, one that investigates the specific materials and alliances by
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which things become political actors. This latter analytic possibility better carries forward the
mission of new materialists to take seriously the actancy of things.
The core of this argument is my spatial justice analysis of vacancy. I will argue that there
are ways of understanding vacancy that treat it as imbued with innate capacities to enchant us,
namely, in the debate around ruin photography. Spatial justice can help us see the liabilities of
this approach – that this argument renders invisible the multiple meanings and possibilities for
ruins, possibilities that will only unfold as ruins are enrolled into particular political alliances. I
contrast that account of ruins with my own analysis of vacancy that I began in Chapter 4 and will
continue here. Spatial justice directs us to the ways in which vacancy is itself an actor enrolled
into various political alliances, and thus is a spatial relationship of potential. My theory of spatial
justice thus urges new materialists to de-emphasize that things are acting and instead to trace the
alliances that humans and nonhumans find themselves in. 
Innate Capacities
There is  a tendency among new materialists  to hope for the possibility  that  a deeper
appreciation of the power of things can give us a new and better politics:  “[enchantment with
things] will enhance receptivity to the impersonal life that surrounds and infuses us, will generate
a more subtle awareness of the complicated web of dissonant connections between bodies, and
will  enable wiser interventions into that ecology”  (Bennett  2010, 4,  emphasis mine).  Roman
Coles has suggested that  sympathy, a psychological and affective transformation,  will  be the
instrument  that  motivates  us  toward  different  policies  (Coles  2016).24 Kathy  Ferguson,  too,
locates a transformative – and arguably liberating – power in printing presses of 19th century
24 Bennett has also explored sympathy as a political concept, arguing that it is itself a “vital force” that connects us
with the material world (2016)
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anarchists, which she argues provided an object around which anarchists developed a durable
politics in the face of active state oppression (Ferguson 2014). Gay Hawkins argues that thinking
through the multiple effects of plastic bags might unsettle our too-quick ethics of bag banning
(Hawkins 2010). The point, in all cases, is that things have the power to rearrange our politics,
should we only have eyes to see them and a sympathetic disposition.
These accounts implicitly treat things as actors with innate qualities that move relatively
autonomously and exert  their  capacities  on the world.  Such an innateness is  evident in  Gay
Hawkins’ account of the “thing-power” of a plastic bag whose two layers are stuck together: 
“in this ordinary moment, the bag does not simply perform utility; it also presents
its materiality as something to be experienced and negotiated. The sticky plastic
makes a polite request to the human to be patient and persistent, to rub her thumb
and finger together and get a better grip. When the bag opens, panic is converted
into appreciation” (2010, 127). 
That the bag is not performing utility at that moment seems clear enough: it resists the attempt of
Hawkins to open it. What is striking is that Hawkins renders that performance independent of her
own participation in making “utility,” contingent as that concept is on Hawkins’ own designs and
performances. In so doing, she has imbued the bag itself with action, and seemingly removed it
from the assemblage that includes the author. Although Hawkins explicitly acknowledges the
importance  of  thinking  in  assemblages  at  various  other  moments  in  her  account,  the  bag
nonetheless appears to have some innate ability to act. This capacity is then thought to effect
Hawkins’  political  commitments:  the  bag  “disrupts  knowledges  of  it  as  dangerous  and
destructive. Its mundane practicality challenges the circuits of guilt and conscience that drive
command moralities:  say no to plastic bags!”  (2010, 127). Here we have an example of how
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things act in politics: they exert tedencies that are already formed, and in so doing challenge
ethical commitments.
There are two related problems with this understanding of things acting in politics. First,
it implicitly relies on a notion of agency that its authors seek to displace. As Abrahammson et al.
(2015) argue in  relation to  Bennett,  that  things  don’t act  on their  own.  Rather,  the point  of
actancy  as  it  developed  in  Science  and  Technology  Studies,  the  literature  to  which  new
materialism  so  frequently  traces  its  intellectual  lineage,  is  to  distribute  action  among  the
collectives within which they operate. Abrahammson et al.  argue that Bennett,  like Hawkins,
takes for granted the thing-power of omega 3 fatty acids, which Bennett argues can cause people
to behave in certain ways by altering their moods. Yet Bennett, in her search for the vitality of
matter, glosses over the very scientific findings on which she relies: fatty acids only influence the
moods  of  some very  specific  prisoners  who lack  fatty  acids  in  their  diets.  In  other  words,
whatever vitality fatty acids might have emerges in particular contexts, interacting with myriad
other  acids,  translated into  scientific  findings  and broadcast  in  medical  journals;  there  is  no
blanket statement available about what omega 3 acids are or do, as Bennett implies. Nothing
(humans included) acts in isolation, and it is a mistake to derive a political mandate from those
things isolated from their assemblages. 
The second problem, related to the first, is that because things may act in any number of
ways depending on the allies with which they are enrolled,  there is  no obvious politics that
emerges from enchantment with any given thing. Consider the example of vacancy. Although I
am not aware of any analyses of vacancy that explicitly endorse account of actancy outlined
above,  there  is  one  especially  prominent  treatment  of  vacancy  that  implicitly  relies  on  its
151
enchanting qualities: ruin photography and its surrounding literature. As a photographic genre,
“ruin pornography,” as it is often derisively called, captures the vacant buildings and lots of cities
in a state of decay. Ruins photographers and their defenders argue that these physical landscapes
of  vacancy  affect  us  with  an  appreciation  of  the  failures  of  capitalism.  Ruins  do  so  by
participating  in  multiple  time  scales,  quite  literally  making  the  past  present.  For  example,
Marchand and Meffre, in a description of their project The Ruins of Detroit, say 
“Detroit  presents  all  archetypal  buildings  of  an  American  city  in  a  state  of
mummification. Its splendid decaying monuments are, no less than the Pyramids
of Egypt,  the Coliseum of Rome, or the Acropolis in Athens,  remnants of the
passing of a great Empire”  (“Yves Marchand & Romain Meffre Photography”
n.d.) 
That is, these ruins tell the tale of explosive boom and subsequent bust of the Fordist fantasy of
Detroit.  In a recent review article on ruins, Desilvey and Edensor (2013) argued that ruins are
often portrayed in these photographs as “memory traces – in the form of ruined factories and
abandoned  infrastructure  –  contain[ing]  within  them  the  potential  to  counter  the  passive
acceptance of economic decline” (468). Ruins, if we have the eyes to see them, can instruct us on
the violence of global capitalism, which built and then abandoned countless cities like Detroit. I
think the connection between ruins and the above conception of matter is stronger than just a
mere parallel: at moments, Jane Bennett is invoked explicitly by those who tout the ability of
ruins to enchant us with the past and impose on our designs  (Göbel 2014, 52; DeSilvey and
Edensor 2013, 476). 
The problem with such an approach to vacancy, as numerous critics have noted, is that
ruin photography implicitly detaches vacancy from the networks and assemblages in which they
are enrolled. So, on the one hand, ruins photographers are critiqued for their decision to quite
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literally  leave citizens out of the picture,  thereby participating in  a genre of frontier-making
(Safransky 2014). Yet even at its best, say its critics, ruin photography removes those buildings
from their particular histories, and places them instead on museum walls or in coffee table books
where viewers can imagine whatever nostalgic history they prefer. One critic has called such
nostalgia a “war on memory, dislocating the political dynamics of ruin in favor of momentary
sensations  and  lurid  plots”  (Finoki  2009).  As  Jerry  Herron  argues,  the  former  Hudson’s
department store in Detroit was often understood as an emblem of the golden era of American
cities, where one could shop in a bustling downtown. But, he argue, such a vision of Hudson’s is
“...a kind of screen upon which we can replay an idealized past — a past without any of the
problems that made the utopian promise of suburbia seem worth abandoning the city to fulfill”
(Herron 2012). Hudson’s mission was in part to create a consuming class, a class that eventually
left downtown for suburban shopping malls (where they could find more Hudson’s stores, of
course).  Ruin  photography  removes  ruins  from the  assemblages  in  which  they  existed,  and
translates an empty building into an aesthetic spectacle that can bear any meaning whatsoever. In
other words, ruin photography has relied on the innate aesthetic quality of ruins to be transform
our ethics.
Ruin  photography  carries  in  it  both  possibilities:  to  enchant  us  with  a  critique  of
capitalism; to enchant us with revulsion at insensitive gawking. As the ruin travels from the
assemblages within which it is embedded, it goes through the translation of the photographer, the
publisher,  the museum wall;  or  perhaps  the ruin  tourist;  or  perhaps  the resident  looking for
shelter. In any case, we can’t know what a ruin will inspire, not in a photograph and not standing
in context.  
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What this suggests is that there is nothing automatic about the particular constituencies,
justice claims, or social networks that will emerge from an encounter with ruins; vacancy has no
actancy that is intrinsic to it. The capacity for ruins to act politically will be shaped by the allies
with which they travel. And I think that ruins-gazing, at its best, manages to distance itself from
some particularly unsavory allies – notable among them, openly racist white suburbanites who
lament the city’s decline as a function of its becoming increasing black  (Steinmetz 2008). The
point is that we just don’t get to a better politics by imagining that ruins or vacancy acts on us in
some mystical way. What matters is how those materials ally with certain actors and not others. 
Although there is a tendency among new materialists to understand actancy in the above
manner, it is also possible to read them as advocating for a different kind of perspective on the
actancy of things. I think the better way to read new materialists is that they are working toward,
but sometimes not articulating, a view of things participating in politics. Spatial justice, I argue,
can provide a vocabulary for this intuition. 
Vacancy the Participant
So, if the role of things in politics is not simply to transform the worldview of willing
human participants, how do things participate in politics? The answer is precisely that things
participate: any actor is one of many allies moving toward a political goal, all of whom are
working in alliances. The methodological implication is “...instead of seeking to resolve once and
for all whether non-humans qualify as participants in social and political life, we must ask how
these  entities  acquire  and  lose such  powers  in  specific  circumstances”  (Marres  2012,  106,
emphasis  mine).  It  is  a  question  of  the  particular  allies  with  which  different  materials  are
assembled, and the collective capacities of those constantly evolving assemblages. For example,
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when Noortje Marres analyzes carbon accounting technologies like the tealight mentioned in
Chapter 1, she does so by tracing the specific ways in which its user is enrolled into electricity
markets, climate politics, and an environmental ethic. The effect of that tea light is not simply to
network  an  environmentally  concerned  citizen  in  new  ways,  but  also  to  “encourage  the
bifurcation of the public sphere into two separate domains of professional and lay participation”
(Marres 2012, 76) by rendering engagement with these networks effortless and automatic. The
tea light might enable participation, but not necessarily by transforming users’ worldviews about
climate politics. Andrew Barry demonstrated something similar in his analysis of an international
oil pipeline. This pipeline called into existence “affected communities,” publics who “could be
informed  and  consulted,  and  the  impacts  on  them  assessed”  (2013,  102)  concerning  the
pipeline’s placement and operation. These affected communities were brought into a political
process through the circulation of information about the pipeline, central to which was a map of
a corridor of affected communities. The question of who was  a properly affected community
was, of course, contested in the first place. Yet the arrival of another set of materials and people –
construction crews and heavy equipment – raised new questions and disputes about who was
affected by the pipeline’s construction, operation, and maintenance. The pipeline acts in politics
as it is assembled with environmental activists, corporate social responsibility, and map-makers. 
As things are represented in the political process, they become allies in controversies.
Bruno Latour’s  The Pasteurization of France (1993) analyzed such a process in the context of
late 19th century medicine. Latour argued that Pasteur needed to do more than simply discover
microbes, as a matter of good science, in order to help prevent diseases. Additionally, Pasteur
and his followers had to ingratiate themselves with the existing medical establishment, and then
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to convince physicians to treat disease in a manner consistent with Pasteurian science (144).
Furthermore, the very act of “discovering” microbes was a laboratory practice, a practice that
required enlisting microbes themselves as allies. The laboratory created favorable conditions for
microbes, but conditions that were very tightly controlled in a way that allowed the scientists to
observe them (39). In this way, treating disease was, through and through, a process of enlisting
allies as diverse as microbes and army doctors. 
When we turn to the question of vacancy, we want to know: how is vacancy enrolled into
politics? And how does its enrollment organize, complicate, and otherwise transform the political
landscape into which it is enrolled? Vacancy is an assemblage composed of buildings, surveyors,
tarps,  and broken windows, all  compiled into maps that  travel  among policy makers  and in
DFC’s document. “Vacancy” does not simply appear in debates about Detroit and DFC; rather,
tarps, footprints, broken windows must be documented, transformed into maps of vacancy, made
into framework zones that encompass particular neighborhoods and future trajectories, and then
made to travel to public forums where they can become issues of injustice for DFC and its
publics.  It  is  only  when  vacancy  goes  through  these  sorts  of  transformations  that  it  can
participate in politics. Vacancy acts in politics insofar as it travels with allies who make it matter.
There  are  potential  allies  and  obstacles  all  along  the  way,  and  vacancy’s  political
capacities depend on the alliances made. In Chapter 4, vacancy became an ally with DFC, and in
so doing, both became a political actors. The interesting thing about DFC, I argued in Chapter 4,
is that it seeks to codify the city according to vacancy rates, and then to transform that vacancy
not by increasing population, but instead by translating widespread vacancy into low density. In
so doing, DFC effectively forges an alliance between itself and vacant land which, heretofore,
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was the enemy of urban planning in Detroit. Instead, says DFC, we ought to accept that vacant
land, while not exactly here to stay, nonetheless might occupy a different and more prominent
role in Detroit’s future. In that sense, DFC is a resigned advocate for vacancy in the political
process.  So,  by  representing  vacancy,  recruiting  blue-green  infrastructure,  urban  farming,
wildlife corrdidors, and recreational greenspace, DFC assists in making a home for low density,
which is really a new form for vacant land. Remember that DFC is not going to propose radical
new  changes  in  low-vacancy  areas;  rather,  it  wants  to  rethink  vacant  residential  land  and
transform it with low density uses in mind. Meanwhile, by not advocating for piecemeal housing
development in all parts of the city, DFC hopes that it will secure a brighter and more realistic
future for  Detroit.  So DFC and vacancy have become allies,  they both become stronger  by
allying with the other, but they both have to give something up in the process, too: vacancy has
to become low density; DFC has to take on the charge of urban triage and austerity. 
Whether DFC will ultimately succeed as vacancy’s spokesperson is going to depend on 
other alliances DFC makes. So, for instance, that DFC has made its maps of vacancy available to
city planners may suggest an alliance with the city, but that alliance that may ultimately 
undermine DFC’s proposed transformation of vacancy. That is, DFC ultimately cannot control 
how city officials are going to approach the problem of vacancy in the city – they may, in fact, 
take up their old war against vacancy via population increase (and, indeed, Mayor Duggan seems
to be happy with that possibility). On the other hand, DFC may ultimately end up like so many 
other urban planning documents: dusty tomes on bookshelves with little policy impact, its only 
allies the shelves on which it sits or the server that hosts its website.
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So we can say that vacancy participates in politics, but not because it has innate qualities 
that force an ethical or intellectual shift. What I want to signal with the term participation is that 
all capacities for action emerge as things – human and nonhuman alike – are enrolled into 
particular assemblages, a process that itself is contingent. Spatial justice illuminated this in the 
context of spatial relations. What I showed is that spatial relations like vacancy are contingently 
related to political problems like justice – they will not “produce” justice or injustice by 
enchanting us with responsibility; instead, vacancy might be enrolled into any number of 
alliances that render it just or not.
Spatial Justice and New Materialism
This discussion of vacancy suggests an answer to the question about how spatial justice
might  inform  new  materialism:  spatial  justice  gives  us  a  framework  for  understanding  the
different ways that one might understand the role of things like vacancy in politics. On the one
hand, we might follow ruin photographers and analyze the role of ruins in enchanting us with the
past. On the other hand, we can follow assemblages and place ruins in their assemblages and
thereby uncover how such ruins are quite literally made and continually reproduced, and how
such ruins then participate in political arguments (or are made absent from them). In the first
place, spatial justice can offer this debate, and political theory’s interest in new materialism, a
way of seeing these two discrete possibilities, and furthermore a warning against fetishizing the
innate qualities of things. 
What  I  have  done  with  spatial  justice  is  to  offer  a  way  of  thinking  about  things
participating in politics, but without taking sides in their capacities or their politics. When we do
158
that, we see that vacancy requires the participation of things – tarps, snow tracks, cars, survey
measures, etc. – to become vacancy. And that collective of things is then enrolled into the story
that DFC wants to tell, into critical academic articles about the frontier, into debates about the
future of American cities. Vacancy may or may not enchant us, and that enchantment may or may
not lead to a better politics. But spatial justice can help us trace the way that debates about justice
in Detroit unfold. 
Spatial justice offers new materialists a shift from thinking about things as having innate
capacities to thinking about how things participate in politics. At the heart of this account is an
insistence that the capacities of things cannot be known in advance of the specific materials and
politics in question; instead, the appearance of things in politics is itself a political act. In my
analysis of DFC, I argue that although vacancy and density can intervene in justice debates in
particular  ways,  their  existence  is  far  from guaranteed.  Because  these  representations  were
associated  with  DFC – an assemblage of  private  philanthropy organizations,  an  out-of-town
planning firm, and a Mayor’s clumsy statements about eminent domain, they were enrolled into a
critique of top-down planning, urban triage, and business-as-usual urban development; they were
not enrolled in the justice arrangements that DFC would have preferred (that DFC could rectify
Detroit’s longstanding injustices by planning a better future). There is no politics nor an ethics
innate  to  vacancy;  rather,  vacancy  becomes  an  issue  of  justice  only  as  it  is  enrolled  in
assemblages with other actors. Experiencing vacancy as an actant – as Bennett would have us do
– requires experiencing it in context as it is enlisted into DFC, with the Mayor, with eminent
domain and displacement, with citizens opposed to Bing’s planning intervention in the city.
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Much like Marres and Barry, spatial justice calls attention to how objects, processes, and
material relations are translated into issues of politics and justice. While normative claims and
political demands are always already being shaped by the literal rearrangement of the actors in
question, neither the rearrangement of those actors nor the ethics within which they are enrolled
are predetermined. Rather, spatial justice treats the material transformation of normative claims
as an analytic proposition, as a way of thinking about how justice relations are transformed, and
not as a way of prescribing those relations or uncovering the qualities of things which might
inspire a different politics. The question I ask is “how do things enable certain justice claims, and
not others?” Spatial justice is one site to begin to answer this question. 
My argument  in  this  dissertation  thus  provides  a  table  at  which  these  two  different
versions of new materialism might meet. That is, if justice is a political concept and not simply a
universal ethic to be discovered in advance (and even Rawls, one of the most universalizing
theorists of justice, argues that certain aspects of justice must be worked out politically), and
materials are acting on politics as an analytic matter, then it seems likely that these STS theorists
have something to say about how justice debates are configured. Spatial justice as I present it in
this  dissertation is  an attempt to  open the conversation between these two different  ways of
understanding the role of things in politics.
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